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* LOS OLV~DADOS,
THE FORGOZTEN,
is the title of a 1950 film by Spanish
filmmaker Luis ,Bbiiuel about impoverished children living on the streets of Mexico
HIGGINBOTHAM,
LUIS B ~ E 77-82
L
(1979) (describing film's
City. See V I R G ~ I A
plot). The beginning of the film features a panorama of famous cities as the
narrator states that "this film, based on real life, is not optimistic . . . but leaves
the solution to this problem in the hands of the progressive forces of our time."
GWYNNE
EDWARDS,
THE DISCREETART OF LUIS B U ~ E 92
L (1982). I feel the same
way about this Article's approach to the issues discussed.
** Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. A.B. 1980, University
of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1983, Harvard University. Arturo G h d a r a and
Virginia Salazar offered helpful comments on the prefatory story. Chris Cameron,
Richard Delgado, Sergio Ghcia-Rodriguez, Peter Margulies, Hiroshi Motomura,
Michael Olivas, Steve Roscow, Robert Rubin, and Jim Smith provided constructive
feedback on a draft of this Article and helped correct a multitude of errors and
sharpen the analysis immeasurably. My colleague John Oakley provided me with
useful materials on the question whether lawful permanent residents are
constitutionally entitled to the franchise and engaged in helpful discussions with
me on the subject. Ming-Yuen Fong and Saul Garcia conducted the labor-intensive
review of Supreme Court decisions and legislative histories of immigration
legislation. Despite the long hours and tedium of the task as well as my
unrealistic demands, they did an excellent job in good humor. Kerry Bader,
Kathryn Gimple, and Nipa Rahim also provided helpful research assistance. I
appreciate the help, support, and encouragement of all these people and am
confident that they cannot imagine how much they influenced this Article. Finally,
generous financial assistance from the UC Davis School of Law and the UC Davis
Academic Senate is deeply appreciated.
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"I had never heard of New Haven, Connecticut. But that
is where we ended up after leaving Peru. I also never had a
lawyer as a boss. But Lillian and I got work with two lawyers.
Let me tell you what happened . . . .
The 'Senate investigators' called me a t work. They said
that they wanted to talk to me about my old boss. They said
that they had nothing to do with 'La Migra.' I wondered.
My friend Pablo had been picked up by La Migra. He
had been here for ten years and didn't want to be sent back to
Mexico. He was jailed in bad conditions. They kept telling
him that he would be sent back because there were too many
'wetbacks' in this country.
Other fkiends told me stories like Pablo's. We knew that
La Migra would do whatever it took. It reminded me of the
police in Peru.
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I was worried that these 'investigators' would tell La
Migra about me. Didn't they all work together anyway? But I
was afraid not to talk to them.
I told them about the trip to the United States from
Peru. We were lucky and quickly got work in the home of the
rich lawyers. They paid us well. They gave us room and board
in a big house. Lillian watched their baby boy and I drove
them around town and did odd jobs.
Life had been hard in Peru. Work was hard to find.
Wages were low. We worked long hours. El Sendero Luminoso
[the Shining Path] made life dangerous. The government
wasn't any better. Even so, the decision to leave family and
friends was not an easy one.
Coming to the United States was hard. The trip was
dangerous and expensive. We paid all the money we had to
fly to the United States a s tourists. Friends had told us that
along the border there were many Migra officers with guns
and jeeps and helicopters and bright lights. 'If you try to go i t
alone, they will kill you,' we were told.
I told the 'Senate investigators' all that I knew. They
kept saying that the lawyers, our old bosses, broke the law. I
told them that the couple had been good to us. I explained
that I had moved out because I was arguing too much with
Lillian.
After my talk with the 'investigators,' newspaper
reporters came looking for me. They asked a lot of questions
about one of my old bosses, the woman.
Then La Migra found me. I received a letter addressed to
me (Victor Cordero) in an official-looking envelope. After
reading it a few times, a friend and I figured it out. They
wanted me to turn myself in!
I should have known better than to have believed the
'Senate investigators.' They all work together, just like in
Peru.
I didn't want to be jailed. I didn't want to go home. I
didn't want to leave Lillian. But there was no choice. These
words rang in my ears: 'they will kill you.' The guns, jeeps,
helicopters, and bright lights and the stories of Pablo and the
others kept coming back to me.
I wrote a note to Lillian. The next day, I got on a plane
for the long trip home to Peru."

The prefatory story might sound vaguely familiar.
President Clinton's first Attorney General nominee, Zoe Baird,
employed the two undocumented persons (Victor and Lillian
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Cordero) on which the story is loosely based.' The nomination
of Baird, who had employed the Corderos in violation of federal
law: sparked a national furor? The controversy refused to die
quickly. A second Attorney General candidate, a respected
federal district court judge, who employed a n undocumented
worker from Trinidad in her home when i t was lawful, was
pressured by the Clinton administration to withdraw from
consideration:
Heated debates (particularly in law school faculty lounges,
I assume) took place in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the
two Attorney General candidates. Among the frequently
discussed issues were the propriety of the developing litmus
test for a high level appointment in the Clinton administration
(i.e., a nominee could never have employed undocumented
workers, even if entirely legal a t the time, or failed to pay
social security taxes): the alleged double standard used in
applying the test to fill Cabinet position^,^ and the manner in
1. This story is not all factual. Indeed, I made parts of it up out of whole
cloth. Based on my experience representing and working with undocumented
persons, I filled in the gaps in the publicly available information about Victor and
Lillian Cordero with details about what might have been. Because i t in no way
purports to represent the "truth," use of the story might be subject to criticism.
See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN.L. REV. 807, 832-35 (1993).
Nothing in the story is meant to suggest that, assuming these facts to be true,
the Corderos might or might not have been eligible for asylum in this country, or
any other type of relief from deportation. See Huaman-Cornelio v. Board of
Immigration Appeals, 979 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1992) (denying asylum to Peruvian
national claiming fear of political persecution by the Shining Path). Political
persecution by guerrillas and security forces in Peru, however, has been welldocumented. See, e.g., AMNESTYINT'L, REPORT1993, at 236-39 (1992).
2. In employing the Corderos, Baird violated provisions of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603 § 101(a), 100 Stat.
3359, 3360-74 (codified as amended a t 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1988)), barring
employment of undocumented persons, a s well as other laws.
3. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus & Michael Isikoff, Clinton Withdraws Baird's
Justice Nomination, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1993, a t Al.
4. See Ruth Marcus, Babysitter Problems Sink Second Clinton Prospect; Wood
Withdraws from Consideration a s Attorney General, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1993, a t
A1 (reporting that Judge Kimba Wood employed an undocumented person before
IRCA's passage in 1986).
5. See Martin Fletcher, Washington Team Suffers Ordeal of Aliens Witch
Hunt', THE TIMES(London), Feb. 10, 1993. One Washington lawyer reportedly was
removed from the "short list" of Attorney General candidates for failing to pay
social security taxes for a domestic employee. See Karen Tumulty & John Broder,
Feb. 8, 1993, a t Al.
Ron Brown Failed to Pay Employer Tax, L.A. TIMES,
6. See, e-g., Michael Kranish, Woes Over Workers: Clinton Denies a Double
Standard, BOSTONGLOBE,Feb. 9, 1993, at 1; Catherine S. Manegold, Looking for
a n Attorney General: The Reaction; Women are Frustrated by Failed Nominations,
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which the debacle highlighted the national childcare problem
with its disparate impact on career women.7
However, a pressing issue to an isolated segment of society
implicated by the Attorney General nominating process went
largely unnoticed. The national dialogue had a very real impact
on the lives of undocumented persons in this country. As a
result of the new public awareness, undocumented domestic
workers feared the loss of their jobs and worse? Furthermore,
the publicity intensified already simmering anti-immigrant
sentiment in a nation reeling from a n economic r e c e s ~ i o n . ~
This national discussion, however, was oblivious to its impact
on one of the most vulnerable groups in American society.
The human toll on the lives of two fairly ordinary
undocumented persons is telling. Contacted by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) after his identity came to
light in Baird's nomination process, Victor Cordero returned to
Peru rather than face likely deportation proceedings.'' His
estranged wife, Lillian Cordero, who had cared for Zoe Baird's
child, was fired immediately by a successor employer when her
immigration status became public and soon thereafter returned
to Peru." Despite a willingness to work a t jobs that citizens
apparently did not desire12 and despite the fact that they in
no way contributed to any of the social ills often attributed to
"illegal aliens,"13 the plight of the Corderos was buried in the
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, 5 1, at 22; Tumulty & Broder, supra note 5. This issue
was raised after the previously confirmed Commerce Secretary admitted that he
failed to pay social security taxes in c o ~ e c t i o nwith the employment of a parttime cleaning person.
7. See, e.g., Erica Jong, The Mother of All Debates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
1993, a t A23; Anthony Lewis, Abroad a t Home; It's Gender, Stupid, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 1993, at A17.
8. See Douglas Martin, After Wood and Baird, Illegal-Nanny Anxiety Creeps
Across Many Homes, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 15, 1993, a t A13.
(San
9. See Sergio Gdrcia-Rodriguez, Burdening the Care Giver, RECORDER
Francisco), Feb. 24, 1993, at 9. See generally infra text accompanying notes 82-129
(analyzing "new" nativism).
10. See Illegal Worhr Disappears, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, a t 8; see also
Linda Himelstein, INS Summons Peruvian Couple, LEGALTIMES,Jan. 25, 1993, a t
1 (explaining circumstances concerning INS attempt to contact Corderos).
11. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Inside the Whirlwind, AM. LAW.,Mar. 1993, a t 64,
69; Baird's Former Nanny Agrees to Leave the Country, INS Says, L.A. TIMES,Jan.
29, 1993, a t A24.
12. See Nomination of Za? E. Baird as Attormy General, Hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., FED.NEWS SERV., Jan. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Fednew File (testimony of Baird describing efforts to obtain
childcare).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92 (discussing scapegoating of
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discussion of the events. Their story went virtually untold. Its
absence from the public discussion lends credence t o the claims
of critical race theorists, as well as critics of other stripes, who
contend that the dominant in society often are ignorant of the
travails of the subordinated.14 The episode also offers some
revealing insights into immigration law and enforcement.
Why was the human tragedy of the Corderos and
undocumented workers for the most part ignored in the
Attorney General uproar? This Article attempts to shed some
light on this question as well as to sketch an explanation for a
broader phenomenon with ramfications for the interpretation
and enforcement of the immigration laws. The political
particularly those who come to the
insularity of non~itizens,'~
United States outside the avenues provided by the immigration
laws, has consequences on the enforcement of the laws and the
ability to change them. Many undocumented persons, marginalized through use of the label "illegal aliens,"16 live and work
immigrants).
14. A representative sample of some of my favorites in this genre includes
DERRICKBELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:THE ELUSIVEQUESTFOR RACIALJUSTICE
(1987); PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS,THE ALCHEMYOF RACEAND R I G ~ (1991);
S
Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2411 (1989); see also Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche
Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians
and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call
of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991). For a look at a few immigration law
landmarks through a storytelling lens, see Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My
Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial
History, 34 ST. LOUISU. L.J. 425 (1990).
As is expected in the wake of a critical movement, the use of narrative in legal
scholarship has provoked debate. Compare Farber & Sherry, supra note 1 (critically
analyzing narrative in scholarship) with Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in
School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND.L. REV. 665 (1993) (responding to
criticism).
15. The term "noncitizens" as used in this Article refers to two distinct
groups, persons in the country who are undocumented and persons who are lawful
permanent residents (LPR). An undocumented person is in the country in violation
of the immigration laws. Undocumented persons for purposes of this Article include
those who entered surreptitiously, see Immigration & Nationality Act (INA)
$0 241(aXlXB), 275(a) (codified a s amended a t 8 U.S.C. $8 1251(a)(l)(B), 1325(a)
(1988)), a s well as persons who entered lawfully but remain here without proper
documentation, for example, persons who overstayed their nonimmigrant visas, see
INA 8 241(a)(lXCXi), 8 U.S.C. 8 125l(aXlXCXi); see also T. ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF
& DAVID A. MMtTIN, IMMIGRATION:
PROCESSAND POLICY 215-58 (2d ed. 1991)
(discussing nonimmigrant visas). I n contrast, an immigrant lawfully admitted to
this country is an LPR. See INA 8 101(aX20), 8 U.S.C. $ llOl(aX20) (1988). After
five or more years of continuous residence in the United States, a LPR may be
eligible to become a naturalized citizen. See INA 8 316(a), 8 U.S.C. 8 1427(a).
16. See Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive Branch's Asylum
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in this country for lengthy periods without ever becoming
lawful permanent residents or naturalized citizens. A large
population of lawful permanent residents who never become
naturalized also remain indefinitely in this country. As
noncitizens, undocumented and lawful permanent residents
lack the right to vote." Though advocacy groups are able t o
exert some political pressure on their behalf, noncitizens cannot
directly participate in the electoral process. Indeed, if they
enter the political fray, noncitizens risk deportation by a
government that they fear. Government therefore proceeds
without direct input from a virtually invisible group of people
whose daily lives are most vitally affected by its workings.
Another factor minimizes the influence of noncitizens in
the political process. Many of today's "legal" and "illegal"
immigrants are people of color, especially from Mexico.18 As
has been the case with past immigrant generations, they have
been subject t o dis~rimination.'~Unlike their European
predecessors, however, the animus directed at the new
immigrants may enjoy greater resilience. The color of their skin
indefinitely ensures their weakness in the political process,
even for those "illegals" who navigate the arduous process to
become
It would be extraordinary if the political insularity of the
noncitizen population, which is most directly affected by the
immigration laws and their enforcement, had no consequences.
Though at times enjoying the support of diverse coalitions,2l
Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 279, 281 n.5; see also Ibrahim J . Wani, Truth,
Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in Immigration Law,
11 CARDOZOL. REV. 51, 53 (1989) (arguing that legal fictions in immigration law
often are "distortions and misrepresentations" that are "used to achieve ends that
would be unthinkable in other areas of American law and popular belief").
17. See infra text accompanying notes 41-42, 318-41.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 43-48.
19. See infia text accompanying notes 82-129.
20. See generally DERRICKBELL, FACES AT THE B ~ O OF
M THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCEOF RACISM(1992) (arguing that racism is a permanent part of United
States society).
21. See infia text accompanying notes 55-60. Such coalitions sometimes have
resulted in immigration laws notable for their compromises. See, e.g., IRCA
$5 lOl(a), 201, 302, 8 U.S.C. $5 1324% 1255a, 1159-60 (1988) (providing for
imposition of sanctions on employers who employ undocumented labor as well as
amnesty and special agricultural worker programs); CHARLES GORDON& STANLEY
MAILMAN, IMMIGRATIONLAW AND PROCEDURE:SPECIALALERT, M MIGRATION ACT OF
1990 8 1.02 (1991) (observing that Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,
104 Stat. 4978 (1990), has both "humanitarian" and "excessively severe"
components and that "[mlany practitioners and scholars will regard the statute as
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noncitizens lack the hard cash of electoral politicsvotes-essential
to protect their intereskz2 One therefore
might expect that noncitizens generally would find it
particularly difficult to persuade Congress to "override" harsh
interpretations of the immigration laws by the judiciary, a
difficult endeavor even for well-organized interest groups
composed of voting citizenry. This is true even when the
interpretation is inconsistent with majoritarian will.23
Moreover, without an electoral (or any other) check by the
group most deeply affected by enforcement of the immigration
laws, the bureaucracy hardly could be expected to correct
unlawful, or lawful but heavy-handed, conduct in the ordinary
course. Limited political power makes it inherently difficult to
curb the misconduct of immigration agencies, especially in their
everyday business which is effectively invisible to the average
Evidence supports the legitimacy of these concerns.
Congress has rarely overridden Supreme Court decisions
adverse to immigrants, particularly those of far-reaching
significance to the noncitizen community, and has failed to
Administrative
even scrutinize some of the most egregi~us.'~
agencies charged with enforcing the immigration laws, such as
the INS and its enforcement arm, the Border Patrol, have been
subject to persistent, credible, and deeply disturbing charges of
unlawful, overreaching, and abusive condu~t.'~Significant
changes have been slow in coming or have not come a t all.
Under these circumstances, neither the legislative nor

a mixed bag of beneficial and punitive provisions"); see also Peter H . Schuck, The
Politics of Rapid Legal Change: Immigration Policy in the 1980s, 6 STUD.AM. POL.
DEV. 37, 60-80 (1992) (analyzing circumstances surrounding the odd coalition
supporting passage of IRCA and the Immigration Act of 1990).
22. See infia text accompanying notes 49-81; see also Stephen H . Legomsky,
Political Asylum and the Theory of Judicial Review, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1205, 1208
(1989) ("[L]ike other classes of aliens, asylum applicants are politically powerless.
Unable to vote or to hold office, aliens lack the tools available to other
constituencies for influencing legislative and executive policy.") (footnote omitted);
Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1136 (1977) ("Aliens are unable to participate in the political
process-forming alliances, trading support, and acquiescing in certain losses in
order to make possible later gains-that permits other groups to promote their own
interests in the legislative forum.").
23. See infra text accompanying notes 181-278.
24. See infia text accompanying notes 262-317.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 181-261.
26. See injkt text accompanying notes 262-78.
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executive branches appear particularly accountable to the
people most directly impacted by immigration law and
enforcement. Judicial intervention that remedies this
deficiency, as we shall see, also is a rarity.
One initially might not be troubled by this scenario.
Although lawful permanent residents stand on different legal
footing:'
undocumented noncitizens by definition are in the
United States without legal authority. Consequently, some
might argue that neither Congress nor the executive branch is
obligated to consider the interests of the undocumented.
Rather, the argument goes, the federal government should be
able to treat the undocumented in the manner demanded by a
majority of the electorate. This is true in some respects. The
argument misses the mark, however, because of what I believe
are mistaken assumptions about majoritarian desires. With
respect to abuses by the immigration bureaucracy,
Congress-representing the people-has passed immigration
laws that are designed at least in part to protect noncitizens.
Under the law, the immigration bureaucracy is obligated to
serve the noncitizen community as well as enforce the integrity
of the borders. With respect t o overriding Supreme Court
decisions, it is entirely possible that a majority of the
citizens-call
it the Silent Majority-may
oppose the
interpretation of the laws and that, for reasons of practical
politics, Congress fails t o act. The point that this Article seeks
to emphasize is that, even when the interests of noncitizens are
supported by a majority of the electorate, they may well lose in
the political process. In other words, a dysfunctional political
system molds immigration law and enforcement.
Some may quarrel with the implicit assumption about
majoritarian desires on the ground that public opinion polls
suggest that a majority of the public consistently has desired
limits on immigrati~n.~~
Even assuming that these surveys
27. With respect to LPRs, the argument might be that, in order to participate
in the political process, LPRs need only satisfy minimum requirements to become
naturalized citizens. See infm note 50 (discussing some of requirements). I t is
uncertain how this justifies limiting their ability to obtain protection of laws
passed by Congress for their benefit before they become citizens. In any event, the
naturalization process may be significantly more difficult to navigate for noncitizens
than widely perceived. See generally DAVIDS. NOWTH,
THE LONGGRAYWELCOME:
A STUDY OF THE AMERICAN
NATURALIZATION
PROGRAM
(1985).
28. See Rita J. Simon, Immigration and American Attitudes, PUB. OPINION,
JulyIAug. 1987, at 47; see also Dianne Klein, Majority in State Are Fed Up with
IllegaZ Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, at A1 (reporting results of poll

1148 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993
accurately gauge public opinion on the question of reducing the
flow of immigrants to this country, it is not necessarily true
that a majority of citizens agree that unlawful and unfair
treatment of noncitizens by the immigration bureaucracy
should be the rule or that inflexible and unjust interpretations
of the immigration laws should remain intact.29 Admittedly,
nativism and restrictionism periodically command the views of
a maj~rity.~'
However, in light of deeply ingrained images in
the national consciousness about the virtues of immigrants~'
these times are not enduring, but rather are fleeting, though
recurring, chapters in this country's history. Rigid restrictionist
policies are in tension with democratic ideals.32 Consequently,
they are not likely to sustain majority support for an extended
period absent extraordinary circumstances. In any event, the
critical point for the purposes of this Article is that, even when
a majority of citizens side with noncitizens, such an alliance
may not prevail.

showing that 86% of those polled in California characterized immigration as a
moderate or major problem); Rich Thomas & Andrew Murr, The Economic Cost of
Immigration, NEWSWEEK,Aug. 9, 1993, a t 18-19 (reporting results of poll showing
that 60% of persons surveyed currently believed that immigration "is a bad thing
for this country today"); Americans Want to Reduce Immigration, Poll Shows,
REUTERNEWS REP., July 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File
(reporting that CNNlUSA TodayIGallup poll showed that 65% of adults "wanted
immigration levels decreased," a significant increase from a poll taken only a few
weeks before, and that 60% believed that too many immigrants were coming from
Latin American, Asian, and Arab countries). See generally RITAJ. SIMON& SUSAN
H. ALEXANDER,
THE AMBIVALENT WELCOME:PRINT MEDIA,PUBLIC OPINION AND
IMMIGRATION
(1993) (longer-term study of public opinion on immigration).
Surveys suggest that any proposal to open the borders would face s i ~ i c a n t
hostility. See generally OPEN BORDERS?CLOSED SOCIETIES?THE ETHICALAND
POLITICALISSUES(Mark Gibney ed., 1988); Symposium on Duties Beyond Borders,
98 ETHICS 647 (1988); cf. James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens
Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INTL
' L. 804 (1983) (analyzing obligations
under international law to admit immigrants).
29. See Vlae Kershner, Support for Wilson on Immigration, S.F. CHRON.,Aug.
19, 1993, at A1 (reporting results of Field Poll showing that those surveyed did
not fully support some of the harshest proposals for dealing with immigration).
30. The same has been said about the popularity of constitutional rights. For
that reason, constitutional rights, generally speaking, trump majoritarian desires.
The Constitution, a t least as interpreted by the Supreme Court, however, seldom
offers protections to noncitizens. See infia text accompanying notes 172-80
(discussing the plenary power doctrine).
31. See infra text accompanying note 61.
32. See JOHN
HIGHAM,SENDTHESE TO ME: JEWS
AND OTHERIMMIGRANTS
IN
URBAN AMERICA30 (1975) ("Any restrictive policy . . . inevitably entails
discriminations; and a system of discrimination that does not offend the democratic
conscience has proved as yet unattainable.").
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Part I1 of this Article describes today's new immigrants,
analyzes the recent increase in anti-immigrant sentiment in
the United States as two factors relevant to their political
power, and considers a tragic example of the electoral
powerlessness of noncitizens. Part I11 analyzes the evidence
that the noncitizen population lacks the requisite power to
respond effectively to adverse judicial interpretations of the
immigration laws or to monitor meaningfully t h e
administrative agencies administering those laws. This
analysis is based on a review of Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the comprehensive immigration statute, the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as
through June 1993, and available evidence of the enforcement
record of the INS, the agency primarily responsible for
immigration enforcement. Finally, Part IV sketches some
thoughts about strategies that might facilitate significant
change in the current situation of noncitizens. It argues that
images of the immigrant in the nation's consciousness must
change for the better before immigration law and policy will.

11. POLITICALPOWEROF THE "NEW"IMMIGRANTS

A brief review of the dynamics of immigration politics in
the United States offers considerable insight into the political
influence of immigrants. A popular refrain in present-day
political discourse about immigration is that increased
imniigration enforcement is necessary and that, because abuse
of the system is commonplace, tougher laws and policies are
required. Locked out of the political process, noncitizens face
formidable difficulties in challenging these restrictionist pleas
and stemming the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment in
difficult times. It seems doubtful that a majority of the
electorate, for any sustained period of time, supports closing
the door to all immigration and halting "abuse of the system"
whatever the cost. However, because the average citizen does
not perceive any direct impact from over-enforcement of the
immigration laws, she is unlikely to act at all in response to
such proposals. This is true even if immigration law and policy
in the aggregate has significant effects on the domestic
economy. More palpable bread-and-butter issues ( e g . , the

33. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
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economy, unemployment, inflation, taxes, etc.) animate the
political actions of much of the electorate in the United States.
Thus, even if a majority disagrees with the interpretation of a n
immigration law or the manner in which it is enforced,
corrective action through the political process often is unlikely.

A. Immigrants Past and Present
Before the late 1800s, the United States imposed relatively
.~~
few restrictions on i m m i g r a t i ~ nAlthough
often greeted with
suspicion and hostility,a5 European immigrant groups eventually managed to assimilate for the most part into American
society? Assimilation was facilitated by the fact that immigrants of this era typically became naturalized citizens. Local
political machines courted the new citizens, thereby ensuring
their integration into the political processs7 and assimilation
into society as a whole.38
The "new" immigrants differ in salient respects from their
European predecessors. Perhaps most importantly, the number
of persons who have entered or remain in the United States in
contravention of the immigration laws, often referred to as
"illegal aliens," grew dramatically by some accounts in the
34. See generally SELECTCOMM'N
ON IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE
POLICY,
U.S.
INTEREST:
STAFFREPORT161-216 (1981)
IMMIGRATION
POLICYAND THE NATIONAL
[hereinafter SCIRP REPORT](describing briefly the history of immigration to the
United States).
BEYOND THE
35. See generally NATHANGLAZER& DANIELP. MOYNIHAN,
MELTINGPOT (2d ed. 1970) (analyzing hostility faced by new immigrants to the
United States).
36. See generally K e ~ e t hL. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and
Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986) (analyzing immigrants' historical
tendency toward assimilation and group solidarity).
37. See ROBERTA. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?
DEMOCRACY
AND POWERIN AN
AMERICANCITY 32-51 (1961); Oscar Handlin, Why the Immigrant Supported the
Machine, in THE CITY BOSS IN AMERICA98 (Alexander B. Callow, Jr. ed., 1976);
see also THOMASP. OWEILL, MAN OF THE HOUSE9 (1987) (telling story of Irish
politician in Massachusetts who "would meet the new immigrants at the boat and
take them straight over to register to vote" and then help them fmd a job and
121-25 (2d ed. 1992)
place to live); MALDWYNA. JONES,AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
(noting the significant political activity of immigrants in the 1800s).
At various times in United States history, the impact of new immigrant citizens on the political process resulted in the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment.
See SCIRP REPORT,supra note 34, at 167-76 (discussing political genesis of "alien"
acts of late 1700s and rise of Know-Nothing Party in the 1800s); see also SAMUEL
138-51 (photo reprint 1969)
C. BUSEY, IMMIGRATION:
ITS EVILSAND CONSEQUENCES
(1856) (condemning "political power of foreign votes").
L. KARST, BELONGING
TO AMERICA:
EQUALC~IZENSHIP
AND
38. See KENNETH
THE CONSTITUTION
95-96 (1989).
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1980~.~'
The Justice Department estimated that, by 1987, between four and five million "illegal aliens" lived in the United
state^.^' Undocumented persons in this country cannot vote or
possess other benefits of citizenship. Although the Constitution
does not compel the result, the states have unanimously disenfranchised all noncitizens, lawful permanent residents (i.e.,
immigrants who by definition are here lawfully and permanently, but who have not been naturalized) as well as the undocumentede4'All noncitizens are lawfully excluded from the electoral process. Moreover, many lawful permanent residents
decline t o take the steps necessary to become citizens and thus
are indefinitely excluded from the e l e ~ t o r a t e . ~ ~
Besides the fact that a signifkant number are in the United States unlawfully$3 another characteristic of the "new" immigrants limits their political power. Many are people of color
from Mexico, Central America, Viet Nam, and other developing
nations.44For a variety of reasons, such as their color and lan39. See, e.g., RICHARDD. LAMM& GARYIMHOFF,THE IMMIGRATION
TIME
BOMB1-26 (1985).
AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE,U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
40. See IMMIGRATION
1991 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK
OF THE IMMIGRATIONAND NATURALEXTIONSERVICE
169 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 INS STATISTICS].This estimate, which showed a significant increase in the undocumented population from previous estimates, may not
accurately reflect the current state of affairs, particularly in light of the many people legalized under IRCA's amnesty provisions. See Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Undocumented Immigration Since IRCA: An Overall Assessment, in UNDOCUMENTED
MIGRATION TO THE UNITEDSTATES257 (Frank D. Bean et al. eds., 1990) (summarizing findings of several studies and concluding that "there has been a clear reduction in the flow of undocumented immigrants across the U.S.-Mexico border ip the
post-IRCA period") (emphasis deleted).
41. See Gerald L. Neuman, 'We Are the People": Alien Sumage in German
and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INVL L. 259, 291-310 (1992); Jamin B.
Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Sumage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1393-94 (1993); Rosberg, supra note 22.
42. See 1991 INS STATISTICS,supra note 40, at 142 (showing that only about
37% of LPRs who immigrated here in 1977 became naturalized through f ~ c a year
l
1990).
43. See Simon, supm note 28, at 49 (reviewing public opinion polls on immigration and concluding that people "hold more negative attitudes toward the undocumented immigrants than they do toward refugees and immigrants generally");
see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Good Aliens, Bad Aliens and the Supreme Court,
in 9 IN DEFENSEOF THE ALIEN 46 (1987) (arguing that Supreme Court was influenced in immigration cases by whether noncitizen was lawfully in country ("good
alien") or not ("bad alien")).
44. See 1991 INS STATI~ICS,
supra note 40, at 20 (presenting data of immigrants granted lawful permanent residence in the United States in fiscal year 1991
showing that 14 of the top 15 nations that sent 77.5% of new immigrants (with
nearly 52% from Mexico) to United States were developing nations populated by

1152 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

guage difference^:^ these immigrants may not assimilate as
easily into dominant American society as their European predec e s s o r ~ Nativism
.~~
reinforced by racism toward the new immigrants therefore may enjoy greater staying power than that
directed a t past immigrant generations. The nagging persistence of discrimination against Asian-Americans, many of
whose families immigrated here generations ago, lends support
to the concern.47 This presence of racism also is consistent
with the resurgence in hate crimes against immigrants of
people of color); see also Peter H . Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang, Continuity and
Change: Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990, 45 STAN.L.
REV. 115, 133 (1992) (finding that in 1989-90 about 70% of the judicial immigration caseload came from countries populated predominantly by people of color:
CaribbeanKentral America, Mexico, East Asia, Middle East, and South Pacific).
45. See LAMM& IMHOFF,supra note 39, a t 99-124 (emphasizing that, because
English is the "tie that binds" American society, increasing immigration of nonEnglish speakers threatens domestic tranquility); Michael S. Teitelbaum, Right
Versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy in the United States, 59 FOREIGNAFFAIRS 21, 43 (1980) (noting growing numbers of Spanish speakers immigrating to
United States and the fear of linguistic divisions similar to those that exist in
JR., THE DISUNITINGOF AMERICA109
Canada); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
(1992) ("[A] common language is a necessary bond of national cohesion in so heterogeneous a nation as America.").
The push for "English only" laws may be one reaction to the language differences of many of today's immigrants. See, e.g., Juan F . Perea, Demography and
Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 340-50 (1992). Not coincidentally, John Tanton, who
helped found the restrictionist Federation for American Immigration Reform, see
infra text accompanying notes 94-95 & note 95, established U S . English, an organization advocating a constitutional amendment designating English a s the official
language in the United States. See id. a t 341 & n.401.
46. See US. COMM'NON CML RIGHTS, CML RIGHTS ISSUES FACINGASIAN
AMERICANS
IN THE 1990s 23 (1992) [hereinafter CML RIGHTS COMM'N]("Not only
do most [Asian] immigrants have limited English proficiency . . . but they bring
with them cultures and religions that are unfamiliar to the American public. These
differences often generate misunderstandings that contribute to antiAsian sentiments."). But see infra text accompanying note 107 (observing indicators that a t
least some immigrants in f a d are assimilating).
47. See, e.g., CML RIGHTS COMM'N,supra note 46, a t 22-48 (documenting
hate crimes against Asians, including numerous murders).
48. See, e.g., Michael J. Nuiiez, Note, Violence at Our Border: Rights and Status of Immigrant Victims of Hate Crimes and Violence d o n g the Border Between
the United States and Mexico, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 1573 (1992) (discussing violence
against Mexican citizens seeking entry to United States); Deborah Sontag, Across
the U.S., Immigrants Find the Land of Resentment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, a t
A1 (reporting hate crimes against various immigrant groups, primarily people of
color). Hate crimes often go unreported, or are reported without mention of any
racial component. See, e.g., CML RIGHTSCOMM'N,supra note 46, a t 30-31 (noting
that intense media average of massacre of minority schoolchildren in Stockton,
California failed to mention the possibility that the killings were racially motivated,
which the California Attorney General ultimately concluded was the case); see also
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1. Limitations on noncitizen influence
Noncitizens lack access to the political process. Because
noncitizens cannot vote, politicians and administrators have
limited incentive to respond to noncitizen demands, legitimate
or not, particularly when facing resistance from a voting constituency. Perhaps more importantly, many undocumented persons fear apprehension by the INS and deportation. In other
words, they risk removal from the country if they become politically visible.49 Lawful permanent residents fear jeopardizing
their legal status and possible deportation as well as undermining their eligibility for nat~ralization.~'No other group faces
such dire consequences from political action. Especially when
combined with disenfranchisement, fear of retaliation might
naturally be expected to chill noncitizens from engaging in
political activity to challenge the status quo.51 It therefore
should not be surprising that noncitizens in the United States
generally tend to shy away from politics.
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2327 (1989) (observing that the racist nature of certain
crimes is often ignored by media).
C. HARLEs, POLITICSIN THE LIFEBOAT:IMMIGRANTSAND THE
49. See JOHN
AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC
ORDER6-7 (1993).
50. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 US. 580 (1952) (upholding constitutionality of deporting LPR for past membership in communist party); Philip
Monrad, Comment, Ideological Exclusion, Plenary Power, and the PLO, 77 CAL. L.
REV.831, 835 11.21 (1989) (describing case in which INS sought to deport Palestine
Liberation Organization members who were LPRs on account of political activities);
see also Katherine L. Pringle, Note, Silencing the Speech of Strangers: Constitutional Values and the First Amendment Rights of Resident Aliens, 8 1 GEO. L.J.
2073 (1993) (noting various restrictions on First Amendment rights of LPRs).
Naturalization requires, among other things, that a LPR establish "good moral
character" and "attachment to constitutional principles." INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C.
8 1427(a) (1988). These requirements might tend to make any LPR considering
naturalization cautious of acting politically. Certain political actions may indeed
undermine eligibility for naturalization. See INA 8 313, 8 U.S.C 8 1424 (1988)
(listing political organizations, including Communist Party, in which membership
bars naturalization); see, e.g., Price v. INS, 962 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3451 (1994) (denying petition for naturalization because LPR refused to specifically list every political organization with which he had been al&
ated); see also Petition of Williams, 474 F. Supp. 384 (D. Ariz. 1979) (denying
naturalization petition on ground that LPR who stated that religious beliefs prevented her from voting, being active in politics, serving on juries, and bearing
arms and who refused to perform any obligations of citizenship that conflicted with
religious beliefs, was not "attached" to constitutional principles).
51. Even without the chilling effect of possible deportation, other factors, such
as difficulties with English, lack of familiarity with political institutions in the
United States, and cultural differences may make political participation difficult for
some noncitizens. See HARLES, supra note 49, at 111-12.
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Because undocumented noncitizens by definition remain in
this country unlawfully, they might arguably be deserving of
similar treatment (at least in terms of voting rights) as convicted felons who in many states lose voting rights for violating
the social contract. (The same argument obviously cannot forcefully be made with respect to lawful permanent residents.)
Imprisoned felons therefore cannot use the vote to "check"
prison administrators. Still, consistent with the terms of their
incarceration, they in theory may attempt political activity
such as writing their legislators without risk of officially sanctioned, or a t least lawful, r e t r i b ~ t i o n .Convicted
felons re~~
leased from prison, even if prohibited from voting, may engage
in other political activities without qualification. Undocumented noncitizens, in contrast, run the daily risk that, if they engage in political activities of any sort, they will come to the
attention of the INS and be deported. By necessity, they place a
premium on low visibility and avoid the community prominence
that political activity might bring.
Put simply, the persons most directly and detrimentally
affected by INS enforcement excesses and deficiencies in providing services lack both formal and informal standing in the
political system. To exacerbate the difficulties of political mobilization, undocumented noncitizens who may be adversely affected by overzealous INS enforcement tomorrow often are not
in the United States to complain today. The transient nature of
part of the undocumented population therefore is a critical
piece of the puzzle. Although not easy to organize other
disempowered (and sometimes transient) groups such a s the
homeless" or welfare recipients," it is inherently more difficult to mobilize people not physically present in the jurisdiction
who may be affected by government conduct within the jurisdiction in the future.

52. Although prison oficials may limit the activities of prison unions organized to improve prison conditions, the mere existence of such organizations illustrates that some political activities by this disenfranchised group-even when incarcerated-are tolerated. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433
U.S. 119 (1977).
53. See Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making
Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
535, 557-63 (198788) (discussing novel strategies to empower homeless).
54. See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALEL.J. 1049
(1970) (describing efforts to organize welfare recipients).
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To avoid exaggerating the one-sidedness of the political
dynamic, we must acknowledge that noncitizens in fact have
some input into the political process. Immigrant and refugee
rights groups lobby the legislatures and agencies and advocate
in the courts to protect noncitizens. These groups, with the
assistance of others, have enjoyed some success in convincing
Congress to enact laws, such as the Refugee Act of 1 9 8 0 , ~ ~
and a t times to override Supreme Court decisions.56 Perhaps
more importantly, immigrant advocates have served as a moderating influence on immigration legislation. As certain provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986~'
and the Immigration Act of 1990 attest:8 the "immigrant lobby," including influential organizations such a s the American
Immigration Lawyers Association and the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Education Fund, have significantly influenced immigration legislation by ameliorating some harsh
provisions and including some favorable to noncitizens, a s well
as delaying so-called reform bills for lengthy periods." At various times, business interests (particularly agricultural ones)
desirous of cheap labor have joined coalitions with immigrant
rights organizations in supporting the easing of restrictionist
policies.60

55. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
56. See infia text accompanying notes 181-261.
57. See, e.g., IRCA 8 274B, 8 U.S.C. 8 132433 (1988) (barring discrimination
based on national origin or citizenship status in hope of limiting negative impact of
IRCA's provisions prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented labor); infia text
accompanying note 238 (describing IRCA's amnesty provisions).
58. See infia note 134 (citing to 1990 Act's new "temporary protected status"
provisions).
59. See infia note 238 and accompanying text (discussing lengthy debate over
IRCA and resulting compromises).
U.S. IMMIGRATION
LAW AND THE CONTROL
OF LABOR:
60. See KITm CALAVITA,
1820-1924, at 151-57 (Z. Bankowski et al. eds., 1984) (documenting efforts of business to loosen immigration restrictions during "labor shortage" in 1920s); John A.
Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U . MIMI L.
REV.819, 836 (1982) (recognizing goal of business to ease restrictive immigration
policies); see also JULIAN
SAMORA,
LoS MOJADOS:THE WETBACKSTORY
33-57 (1971)
(arguing that Border Patrol's enforcement efforts were closely related to labor
needs of agribusiness); Carl Hampe, Intent of Congress Behind Certain Provisions of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 2 GEO. IMMIGR.L.J. 499, 502 (1988)
(statement of minority counsel for Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Committee on the Judiciary, stating that IRCA's special agricultural
workers program "was put in place only to provide labor for U.S. agricultural employers"); Legomsky, supra note 22, at 1208 (noting that "aliens sometimes benefit
from the lobbying activities of groups with whom they share common interests"
and giving example of grower support for agricultural provisions of IRCA that
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Moreover, immigrant advocacy groups periodically have
tapped into a sympathetic public sentiment. Citizens, through
their elected representatives, a t times have been willing to
protect noncitizens and would-be immigrants. In particular,
refugees fleeing political, religious, and other sorts of persecution traditionally have held a special place in a national
psyche molded by the proverbial notion that the United States
is a "nation of immigrants," as exemplified by the Statue of
Liberty's imagery." Despite embracing these lofty ideals, citizens generally are not keenly aware of the intricacy of immigration issues and lack the personal interest that might motivate them to mobilize politically around them. The daily lives
of the vast majority of the American public have little to do
with the INS, the Executive Office for Immigration Review,
which adjudicates certain immigration claims,62 or the Immigration and Nationality A d 3 Moreover, the dealings that the
ordinary citizen might have with the immigration bureaucracy
generally are not extended, frightening, or particularly memorable.64 Indeed, the average citizen's only exposure to the subject of immigration may be hearing immigrants blamed in
times of societal stress for the social ills of the day.65 On the
other hand, noncitizen encounters with immigration laws and

benefited noncitizens).
61. See David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the
Coast of Bohemia, 138 U . PA. L. REV. 1247, 1266 (1990). This is illustrated by the
emergence in the 1980s of the Sanctuary Movement designed to protect refugees
fleeing violent tumult in Central America. See generally ANN C R ~ E N D ESANCTUN,
ARY: A STORYOF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE
AND THE LAW IN COUISION (1988);
IGNATIUS
BAU,THIS GROUNDIS HOLY-CHURCHSANCTUARY
AND CENTRAL
AMERICAN REFUGEES
(1985). Maw churches and cities, as well as two states, declared
themselves to be places of relbge for Central Americans. See Todd Howland et al.,
Safe Haven for Salvadorans in the Context of Contemporary International Law-A
Case Study in Equivocation, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671, 680 (1992). At various
times in this nation's history, immigrants generally have been much revered. See,
(Sam Holmes & Charles
e.g., JOHNF . KENNEDY,A NATIONOF IMMJGRANTS
Reynolds eds., rev. ed. 1964).
62. See 8 C.F.R. 8 3.0 (1993); see also infba text accompanying notes 286-91
(discussing Executive Office for Immigration Review).
63. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. (1988)).
64. But see, e.g., Murrillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487, 490-97 (W.D. Tex.
1992) (enjoining verbal harassment and physical abuse by Border Patrol of Chicano
high school students and employees, all citizens, because of skin color and appearance).
65. See infia text accompanying notes 82-129.
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enforcement, and their views about immigrants generally, are
distinctly different in kind and quality.
As is true of other interest groups, the political power of
noncitizens ebbs and flows with political and economic tides.
Economic concerns in particular deeply affect the electorate's
views on immigration and immigrants. Consequently, similar
t o United States economic history, anti-immigrant sentiment
has had a cyclical character to it? Noncitizens and their advocates therefore have been weaker in the political marketplace
at some times than at other times. This is an important part of
the dynamic concerning the influence of noncitizens.
In the end, it is important to remember that noncitizens in
good times and bad have lacked the political power necessary
t o most effectively protect their interest^.^^ Even if adequately
represented in the political process, noncitizens as a distinct
numerical minority composed of a large number of people of
color necessarily would encounter severe disadvantages." For
this reason, they constitute the quintessential discrete and
insular minority deserving of judicial protection in the Carolene
Products sense.69 Surprisingly enough, immigration laws af66. See WAYNEA. CORNELIUS,
AMERICA IN THE ERAOF LIMITS:NATMST RE'NEW' IMMIGRATION
5-9 (1982) (briefly summarizing causes of antiimmigrant feeling in United States). For a fascinating historical analysis of the
politics behind the rise and fall of various restrictionist immigration policies in the
United States, see HIGHAM,supra note 32, at 29-66.
67. But cf. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84
COLUM.L. REV. 1, 23 (1984) (stating that in some states, ethnic groups, including
disenfranchised "aliens," exert considerable political power); Michael S. Teitelbaum,
Advocacy, Ambiualence, Ambiguity: Immigration Policies and Prospects in the United
States, 136 PROCEEDINGS
AM. PHIL. SOCV208, 218-21 (1992) (contending that interest groups, including growers and "Mexican-American political activists," are able
t o forestall desire of public to restrict immigration). Congress, at times, has been
protective of certain groups of immigrants, such as the Irish and the Cubans, with
significant constituencies in the United States. See, e-g., Immigration Act of 1990
9 132, 104 Stat. 4978, 5000 (codified at 8 U.S.C. $ 1153 (Supp. 1992)) (providing in
carefully crafted language that Irish receive 4m of visas for three-year period);
Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (providing that
Cubans paroled into country may be eligible to become lawful permanent residents
in shorter period of time than persons of other nationalities).
68. See JOHN
H. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST:A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 161-62 (1980) (advocating judicial review to facilitate representation of
"discrete and insular" minorities in political process and arguing that "aliens" deserve such protection because of lack of right to vote, the American tradition of
hostility toward "foreigners," the fact that legislatures are almost entirely composed
of citizens who have spent their entire life in United States, and the stereotyping
of recent immigrants).
69. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
("[Plrejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition . . .
ACTIONS TO THE
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fecting the noncitizen minority generally receive a minimum of
judicial scrutiny.70
2.

The vocal, sometimes successful, minority

In light of the political impotence of noncitizens, one might
expect a vocal minority of citizens, particularly well-funded organizations, to successfully pressure the executive branch to
pursue anti-immigrant agendas.?' This in fact does occur a t
times. Some might not be concerned if a majority of the voting
public desired the pursuit of restrictionist policies and such policies were enacted through the appropriate processes into law.
However, the making and pursuit of policy by a well-organized
minority contrary to majoritarian desires, even if weakly held
ones, raises a number of serious concerns.
A brief, though perhaps superficial, look a t the commitment of major interest groups to immigration issues helps
illustrate how in certain circumstances minority sentiment
might prevail over majority will. First, the Vocal Minority is
composed of people committed to restricting immigration and
increasing enforcement and willing to devote the time and
resources to further that end. Second, the Silent Majority believes that the immigration laws, including its service provisions, should be fairly and uniformly administered and that
enforcement is one element of an overall immigration policy.72
curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."). But cf. Martin, supra note 61, a t 1364-65, 1368 (advocating limited
judicial review of asylum decisions because applicants see asylum as a "loophole"
on which they might as well "try their luck"); Katherine L. Vaughns, Taming the
Asylum Adjudication Process: An Agenda for the Twenty-First Century, 30 SAN
DIEGOL. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing that, because courts lack competence in immigration matters, political branches should make decisions on such issues and courts
should defer to the decisions).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 167-80 (discussing plenary power doctrine).
71. See infra text accompanying note 94 (discussing Federation for American
Immigration Reform); see also Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for
Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1442 (1991) (offering an example of white
minority prevailing over the majority); J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REV.
551, 563-65 (1993) (arguing that cohesive minority may prevail over majority in
elections); Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional Representation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U . PA. L. REV. 1991
(1993) (advocating proportional representation because of potential for plurality,
rather than majority, to win election in winner-take-all scheme).
72. See Peter H. Schuck, The Emerging Political Consensus on Immigration
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Although adhering to those views, the Silent Majority a s a
group is not vitally committed to these value^.'^ It, for example, is unwilling to act in the political marketplace with the
vigor necessary to ensure that the balanced immigration program it supports is implemented. Third, noncitizens, documented and lawful permanent residents alike, obviously are
those most vitally concerned with fair implementation of the
service provisions of the immigration laws. In addition, they
probably are less concerned with border enforcement, but certainly are opposed to abuse of the enforcement power. Their
political influence primarily is a function of the force exerted by
immigrant advocacy groups, including the votes of its members
as well as those that the group influences, and citizens, including the Silent Majority, who tend to be "pro-immigrant" on
service and some enforcement issues. Business (particularly
agricultural) interests, in pursuit of a ready labor supply, sometimes might side with noncitizens.'* The Silent Majority and
noncitizens would be expected to be natural political allies with
respect to their view on service issues and to curtail enforcement abuses. They may differ, however, in their views about
the need for enforcement.
At any one time, each of these groups i n theory has a certain amount of influence on the various actors in the political
process. As political scientists tell us, that influence is a function of a wide variety of factors, including the percentage of the
group willing to participate in political activities, the cohesiveness of the group, the resources it is willing to devote, the effectiveness of their organization, and economic and other circumstances at that time. At times, the Vocal Minority-mobilized,
organized, and committed-might be expected to have greater
Law, 5 GEO.IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 19-21, 25-26 (1991).
Other groups may align themselves with the Silent Majority. Governments of
countries from where immigrants came also have been known to protest INS enforcement practices. See, e.g., Roberto Sanchez, Border Patrol Accused of Illegal
Searches, PHOENIX
G A Z ~ EFeb.
,
25, 1993, at B1. There also presumably exists a
group of voters who are indifferent to immigration issues. Although not necessarily
in agreement with the Silent Majority, their inaction, which is not based on support or antipathy for immigrants' rights, more resembles that of the Silent Majority than the Vocal Minority.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 49-70 (discussing reasons for lack of
citizen commitment to immigration issues).
74. See supra text accompanying note 60. However, unlike the Vocal Minority,
business interests often focus on other sorts of legislation, such as farm subsidies,
rather than immigration matters. Distracted by other agendas, these groups may
behave as members of the Silent Majority do.
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influence than would the weakly committed Silent M a j ~ r i t y . ? ~
Noncitizens are not willing, or perhaps not able, to organize
politically and participate in the activities necessary to change
the dynamic.
Although this phenomenon might be characteristic of a
number of subject areas where strong (often referred to pejoratively as "special") interest groups might prevail over a majority,?' it may be more likely to occur on immigration matters.
Though vaguely supportive of fair enforcement and service,
members of the Silent Majority perceive themselves as only
tangentially involved with and generally uninterested in the
immigration laws and their enforcement. Few close analogies
come to mind. For example, welfare and social security disability programs may not be perceived as directly affecting the
average citizen. Still, those affected by those laws in theory
have recourse to direct political participation,77 and have suecessNly engaged in political action in certain circumstance^.'^
75. See Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM.L. REV. 1, 5 n.18 (1988) ("[Elven a majority of voters may not control the content of federal programs. The national electorate has become so large, and its majority so difise, that federal legislators and
administrators may be more responsive to special interest groups and lobbyists
than to the majority's will.") (footnote omitted); see also infra text accompanying
notes 188-89 (discussing characteristics of groups likely to successhlly obtain congressional overrides).
76. See ROBERTA. DAHL,A PREFACETO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY124-31 (1956);
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON.371, 392 (1983); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN.L. REV. 29 (1985) (arguing that judicial review
should be exercised to ensure that the public good has been promoted and that
government has not simply capitulated to powerfbl private groups). Public choice
theory, which attributes voting decisions to the economic power of interest groups,
is roughly consistent with this thesis. For contrasting, though equally interesting,
discussions of this theory and its impact on judicial review, compare DANIELA.
FARBER& PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:A CRITICAL~JTRODUCTION
(1991) with GLEN0. ROBINSON,AMERICAN
BUREAUCRACY:
PUBLIC
CHOICEAND PUBLIC LAW (1991).
77. Of course, these groups encounter difficulties because they comprise a
minority of the population. In other words, the poor and minorities are
marginalized by the very fact that they are poor and minorities. See K e ~ e t hL.
Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1 (1988); see
also Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1277, 1278-79 (1993) ("[Tlhe poor are generally recognized a s a politically
powerless minority . . . .").
78. See generally LAWRENCE
N. BAILIS, BREADOR JUSTICE:
GRASSROOTS
ORGANIZING IN THE WELFARERIGHTSMOVEMENT
(1974) (analyzing welfare rights movement in Massachusetts); FRANCIS F. PIVEN & RICHARD
A. CLOWARD,
POOR
PEOPLE'S
MOVEMENTS
(1977) (analyzing mobilization of unemployed and workers, welfare
recipients, and civil rights activists).
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The Vocal Minority differs from other numerical minorities,
such as the homeless, social security recipients, and others,
including noncitizens, who pressure legislatures and administrative bodies. They are not the persons most directly affected
by the enforcement of the immigration laws. However, they are
the only group that actively represents voters on the single
issue of immigration. Though their self-interests are not as
central to immigration decisions as those of noncitizens, this
minority may prevail in the political process.79
A final ingredient further complicates the dynamic. The
powers of the Vocal Minority might be expected to increase
exponentially during times of increased anti-immigrant sentiment, which in turn is roughly correlated with the relative
level of societal stress.80 In relatively calm times when immigration is not a major item on the political agenda, the Vocal
Minority, the Silent Majority, and noncitizens oftentimes may
.~~
not
play to a stalemate in the political m a r k e t p l a ~ e Though
as powerful as interest groups representing voting constituents,
immigrant rights advocates may derail punitive measures i n
calm times. Fewer such measures are proposed and limited
resources can be directed to defeat them. Even when there is
pressure for legislation not in the interests of noncitizens, advocacy groups may be able to ameliorate some of the harsher
provisions in the legislation. I n contrast, when nativist sentiment is a t its zenith, the Vocal Minority, with little resistance,
may be able to prevail. More "reform" measures will be proposed and the Vocal Minority even may grow in number. This
is true even when the Silent Majority remains a majority and
opposes the Vocal Minority's proposals. Ambivalence of the
Silent Majority due to general societal tension, as well as other
more tangible political and economic concerns, may result in its
unwillingness to vigorously resist the direction in which the
Vocal Minority seeks to take the political process.
79. Cf. PAULJ. QUIRK, INDUSTRY
INFLUENCE
IN FEDERAL
REGULATORY
AGENCIES 4-21 (1981) (discussing concept of "agency capture" occurring when powerhl
private interests "capture" the agency regulating them); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1684, 1687
(1975) ("[Iln carrying out broad legislative directives, agencies unduly favor organized interests . . . at the expense of diffise, comparatively unorganized interests . . . .").
80. See infra text accompanying notes 82-129 (discussing "new* nativism and
historical predecessors).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 183-89 (recognizing similar phenomenon
with respect to congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions).
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B. The "New"Nativism and Its Impact
Nativism and racism have a lengthy pedigree in United
States immigration history.82 A few examples should suffice to
illustrate this point. Chinese immigrants in the late 1800s were
subject to a series of draconian laws, many of which remained
on the books until the 1940s, virtually eliminating immigration
from China.83 Mexicans, along with some Chicanos, were repatriated en masse during the Great ~ e ~ r e s s i and
o n ~subject
to a n INS deportation effort with the racist moniker "Operation
Wetback" in 1 9 5 4 . ~Internment
~
of Japanese-Americans, many
of whom were not recent immigrants at all, but were nativeborn citizens, is an infamous chapter in United States constitutional law? President Truman unsuccessfully sought to veto
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 because of its
national origin quota system, which remained the central organizing principle of United States immigration law until
1965.'~ History may look back on the executive branch's treatment of Haitian asylum-seekers as another such epi~ode.~'
These harsh measures all arose in times of turmoil. Unfortunately, other examples are plentiful.
This nation historically has been susceptible to the search
for scapegoats for the woes of the nation, particularly during
lagging economic times.89 I t often is not feasible for politicians
82. See generally JOHN
HIGHAM,STRANGERS
IN THE LAND:PATTERNSOF
AMERICAN
NATMSM1860-1925 (2d ed. 1955).
& MARTIN, supra note 15, a t 1 (referring to laws restrict83. See ALEINIKOFF
ing Chinese immigration passed by Congress in 1882, 1884, 1888, and 1892 as
"statutes-like many later immigration laws-[that] were the product of economic
and political concerns laced with racism and nativismn); see also FREDW. RIGGS,
A STUDY OF THE REPEALOF CHINESEEXCLUSION
(1950)
PRESSURESON CONGRESS:
(discussing repeal of exclusion laws, which was motivated in part to improve relations with an ally (China) during World War 11). See generally BILL ONG HING,
ASIAN AMERICATHROUGH IMMIGRATIONPOLICY1850-1990
MAKINGAND REMAKING
(1993) (analyzing impact of exclusionary immigration policies on development of
Asian-American community); RONALDTAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT
OF ASIAN AMERICANS
79-131 (1989) (chronicling harsh treatment
SHORE:A HIS~ORY
directed at Chinese immigrants).
UNWANTED
MEXICAN
AMERICANS
IN THE
84. See generally ABRAHAM HOFFMAN,
GREATDEPRESSION
(1974).
N
OPERATION
W~BACK
THE
: MASS DE85. See generally JUANR A M ~GARC~A,
POR'I'ATION OF MEXICANUNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS
IN 1954 (1980).
86. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
87. See H. DOC. NO. 520, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4-5 (1952) (veto message of
President Truman).
88. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 130-59 (analyzing the plight of
Haitians).
236-38 (abridged
89. See GORDONW. ALLPOW, THE NATUREOF PREJUDICE
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to blame, as Karl Marx did, economic downturns on the cyclical
nature inherent in the capitalist system. Immigrants, often
viewed as outsiders to the community, periodically have been
one of the groups singled out for blame in the political proc e ~ s . ~This
'
scapegoating function unfortunately is alive and
well today. Antipathy toward the immigrant has increased i n
the United States, if not the world.g' With a slow economy,
current political discussion of immigration in the United States
tends to focus on how to stop the "flood" of "illegal aliens" from
entering the United States and displacing "American" workers.92
ed., Anchor Books 1958) (1954) (analyzing use of immigrants and other minorities
a s scapegoats by "in-groups").
90. See E.P. HUTCHINSON,
LEGISLATIVE
HISTORYOF AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION
POLICY 1798-1965, a t 62 1-43 (1981) (summarizing political party platforms from
1848 to 1964 on immigration, many of which included anti-immigrant planks).
91. A unified Germany, with a significant refugee population, also has seen a
resurgence of concern with the numbers of refugees coming to the country that, as
the increase in hate crimes against immigrants illustrates, is explained in part by
racism. See Daniel Kanstroom, Wer Sind Wir Wieder? Laws of Asylum, Immigration, and Citizenship in the Struggle for the Soul of the New Germany, 18 YALEJ.
INTL
' L. 155, 155-61 (1993).
FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATIONREFORM,IMMIGRATION
92. See, e.g., FEDERATION
2000, at 1-114 (1992) [hereinafter FAIR, IMMIGRATION
20001 (collecting literature
arguing that immigration has impeded improvements for minorities, displaced native workers, and depressed domestic wages). Immigrants in recent memory also
have been blamed for a myriad of social ills. See, e.g., Bill Stall & Patrick J.
M c D o ~ e l l ,Wilson Urges Stiff Penalties to Deter Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1993, a t A1 (reporting that California Governor Pete Wilson, in open
letter to President Clinton published in The New York Times, proposed numerous
policies to halt illegal immigration because of its adverse impact); Ronald J.
Ostrow, Faster Deportation of Criminals Sought, L.A. T~MES,June 24, 1992, a t A3
(reporting that Attorney General William Barr proposed increased efforts to deport
"criminal aliens," stating that "[wle will not tolerate aliens who come here to prey
on the American people"); Ronald J. Ostrow, LA. Police Too Small to Do Job
Needed, Barr Says, L.A. TIMES,May 19, 1992, a t B1 (quoting Attorney General
Barr's statement that "illegal aliens" accounted for one-third of those initially arrested in Los Angeles rebellion and that "there is a significant problem of illegal
aliens in the Los Angeles area, and I think [the 'riot'] was a manifestation of the
scope of the problem"); Ronald J. Ostrow, Action Urged on Stalled Immigration
Reform; Meese Links Illegal Aliens, Drug Traffic, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1986, a t 23
(quoting Attorney General Edwin Meese I11 as advocating immigration reform because "[illlegal immigration is contributing to the drug problem"); FEDERATION
FOR
OUT THE FUTURE:WORLDPOPULATION
AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION REFORM, CROWDING
GROWTH,U.S.IMMIGRATION,
AND PRESSURES
ON NATURAL
RESOURCES
(1992) (discussing impact of immigration on the environment). This, of course, is eerily reminiscent of the "evils of immigration" articulated over a century ago. See, e.g.,
BUSEX, supra note 37, a t 107-30 (claiming that poverty, crime and low intelligence
were prevalent among immigrants).
THOMAS
MULLER,IMMIGRANTS AND THE AMERICAN CITY (1993) offers a balanced
discussion from a variety of perspectives on the pros and cons of immigration. See
also Gerald P. Mpez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: I n Search of a Just Immt-
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In the 1992 presidential campaign, for example, both Democratic and Republican candidates promised to increase immigration enforcement efforts.g3Organizations advocating limits
on immigration have become increasingly visible with growing
political influence. The well-financed Federation for American
Immigration Reform, which stridently advocates the need to
place a moratorium on immigration, has embarked on an increasingly effective publicity campaign.g4 Local grass roots

gration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV.615, 630-39 (1981).
93. See Bush, Clinton Differ on Immigration, 69 INTERPRETER
RELEASES1030,
1030-31 (Aug. 24, 1992). To be fair, Bill Clinton focused on immigration enforcement to a lesser degree than did President Bush. See id.; see also D'Jamila Salem,
Where the Candidates Stand on: Immigration, LA. TIMES, May 16, 1992, at A20
(reporting that, among other measures, candidate Clinton favored strengthening
Border Patrol to reduce illegal immigration).
Increased enforcement was one of the more moderate positions taken on immigration in 1992. The 1992 Republican party platform advocated providing "the
tools, technologies and structures necessary to secure the borders" between the
United States and Mexico. See, e.g., Major Garrett, Bush Campaign May Find Free
Trade is a Hard Sell, WASH.TIMES,Aug. 13, 1992, at All. A successful Democratic candidate for Senate in California proposed use of the military to patrol the
Mexican border, see Tracy Wilkinson, California Elections: US. Senate; Candidates
Tough on Illegal Immigration, L.A. TIMES,O d . 19, 1992, at A3 (reporting position
of Democratic Senate candidate Dianne Feinstein), and as a Senator helped elevate
immigration to a high profile issue, see 139 CONG.R E . S8276 (daily ed. June 30,
1993) (floor statement of Senator Feinstein on immigration and outline of plan to
enforce borders); D i a ~ eFeinstein, Perspective on Illegal Immigration: We Can Get
a Grip on Our Borders, L.A. TIMES,June 16, 1993, at B7 (arguing that executive
branch should increase immigration enforcement efforts).
The bipartisan nature of anti-immigrant sentiment should not be surprising.
Traditionally liberal groups, such as organized labor, historically have complained
of the impact of immigration on the domestic labor market. See generally
GWENDOLYN
MINK, OLD LABORAND NEW IMMIGRANTS
IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT: UNION, PARTY, AND STATE 1875-1920 (1986) (discussing organized
labor's often restrictionist positions on immigration). In addition, some lee-leaning
environmental groups reportedly are moving toward supporting immigration restrictions. See Steve Albert, Environmental, Population Groups Buy In, RECORDER
(San
Francisco), July 14, 1993, at 14; Vlae Kershner, A Hot Issue for the '90s: California
Leads in Immigration-and Backlash, S.F. CHRON.,June 21, 1993, at Al.
94. See, e.g., FAIR IMMIGRATION 2000, supra note 92; see also SIMON& ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at 257-62 (noting groups, including the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) "with an annual budget of $1.7 million," representing organized opposition to-immigration and opining that FAIR is able to influence media because it is homogeneous and organized around a single issue); infia
text accompanying notes 188-89 (discussing characteristics of organizations obtaining congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions). FAIR claims, for example,
that excessive immigration has adversely affected employment, increased social
costs, especially crime, damaged the environment, and injured "our basic values."
See, e.g., Cut Off Aid to Immigrant., Group Urges, LA. TIMES,NOV.21, 1991, at
A42 (quoting Alan Nelson, former INS Commissioner and FAIR consultant); Dan
Stein, Drowning by Numbers, RECORDER
(San Francisco), Dec. 5, 1991, at 8 (com-
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restrictionist organizations, which not infrequently espouse
thinly veiled racist arguments for curtailing immigration, also
have grown in n ~ r n b e r ? ~
The woes of President Clinton in his attempt to select an
Attorney General illustrate how immigration has grown in the
national political consciousness. In the confirmation hearings of
Zoe Bairdg6and Janet Reno, a few senators interrogated the
respective nominee about immigration enf~rcement.~~
One
senator in particular fanned the anti-immigrant flames when
questioning Reno by gratuitously mentioning that an alleged
conspirator in a much-publicized bombing was an "illegal
alien," that an "illegal alien" may have been involved in killings
at the Central Intelligence Agency, and that some of the follow-

mentary by FAIR'S Executive Director articulating similar themes); see also Amy
Chance, Tough Laws Urged for Illegal Aliens, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Feb. 2, 1993, a t
A3 (quoting Alan Nelson as advocating that California lawmakers "declare war on
illegal immigration").
Besides engaging in publicity and lobbying efforts, FAIR sometimes files amicus
curiae briefs, see, e.g., Brief of Federation for American Immigration Reform, Amicus Curiae, Supporting Reversal, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2549 (1993) (No. 92-344), and lawsuits, see, e.g., Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Meese, 643 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (claiming that relatively
lenient treatment of Cuban nationals violated immigration laws); Federation for
American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C.), appeal
dismissed, 447 U.S. 916 (1980) (challenging inclusion of "illegal aliens" in census
figures).
95. See Amy Chance, Controls Defended a s Economic, Not Racist, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Jan. 24, 1993, a t A10 (quoting leader of newly formed restrictionist group:
"It's like animals. When there's scarcity, they don't breed. When there's plenty,
A NEW POLIthey breed."); see also LINDACHAVEZ,OUT OF THE BARRIO:TOWARD
TICS OF HISPANICASSIMILATION
92 (1991) (stating that Chavez, a well-known conservative, resigned from U.S. English, which also was founded by Tanton, see
Perea, supra note 45, at 341 & n.401, when she learned of this anti-Hispanic
statement); Amy Chance, Illegal Aliens Increasingly Blamed for State's Problems,
SACRAMENTO
BEE, Jan. 24, 1993, a t A1 (quoting FAIR founder, John Tanton: 'Will
the present majority peaceably hand over its political power to a group that is
simply more fertile? . . . On the demographic point, perhaps this is the first instance in which those with their pants up are going to get caught by those with
their pants down!").
96. See Confirmation Hearing for Zoe Baird, Attoney General-Designate: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Comm., FED. NEWS SERV.,Jan. 21, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Exec Library, Fednew File (questioning by Sen. DeConcini); Confirmation of
Attorney-General-Designate Zoe Baird: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Comm., FED.
NEWS SERV.,Jan. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Exec Library, Fednew File (questioning by Sen. Simpson).
97. See Nomination of Janet Reno to Be Attorney General: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Comm., FED. NEWS SERV.,Mar. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Exec
Library, Fednew File [hereinafter Nomination of Janet Reno] (questioning by Senators Metzenbaum, Simpson, and DeConcini).
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ers of a religious cult figure in a violent stand-off with federal
law enforcement officers in Waco, Texas were "thought to be
illegal aliens."98As one might expect in response to such grilling, the now-confirmed Attorney General nominee, Janet Reno,
promised to make immigration a priority?'
Racial animus may explain some of the vehemence behind
recent demands for increased immigration enfor~ement.'~
98. See id. (questioning by Sen. Simpson); see also Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 220 (May 4, 1993) (Rep. Harold Rogers (R-Ky) telling acting INS Commissioner that "I hope we do something before one of these illegal aliens commits
another terrorist act.").
This rhetoric has been sparked by the reporting that an alleged conspirator in
the bombing in the World Trade Center was an "illegal alien" and another, who
entered the United States as a result of a mistaken visa decision by the State Department, has an asylum claim pending. See, e.g, Ralph Blumenthal, $100,000 from
Abroad Linked to Trade Center Suspects, N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 25, 1993, at 45; Francis
X. Clines, The Twin Towers: After Bombing, New Scrutiny for Holes in Immigration
Net, N.Y. TIMES,Mar. 12, 1993, at Al; Michael Hedges, New York Bombing Suspect Arrested, WASH.TIMES,Mar. 5, 1993, at A10. In addition, press reports have
mentioned that a number of those in a besieged religious cult camp in Texas were
suspected to be "illegal aliens." See Mary Jordan & Sue Pressley, Freed Cult Members Depict Horror Scene, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1993, at Al. Spurred by these
events, along with the suspected involvement of an "illegal alien" in a shooting
outside Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, Congress began considering "reform" of the immigration and asylum laws in early 1993. See Holly Idelson, Immigration Distress Signals: Asylum System Under Siege, 51 CONG.Q. 1227 (1993); see
also infra note 121 (listing bills pending in Congress to amend asylum provisions
of INA).
The United States, in the name of fighting terrorism, hopefully will not overreact as it did in the infamous Palmer Raids during the "Red Scare" of World War
I. After a bombing of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's home, as well as some
other bombings, the Justice Department conducted a number of raids to round up
"subversives" resulting in the deportation of many alleged communist "aliens."
Many were active in leftist labor organizations. It never was established that any
of the persons deported were terrorists. See generally EDWINP. HOYT,THE PALMER
RAIDS 1919-20: AN ATTEMPTTO SUPPRESS DISSENT(1969); WILLIAMPRESTON, JR.,
ALIENS AND DISSENTERS
208-37 (1963); NATIONAL
POPULARGOVERNMENT LEAGUE,
PRACTICES O F THE UNITEDSTATESDEPARTMENT
OF JUSREPORTUPON THE ILLEGAL
TICE (1920) (prepared by committee of lawyers, including Roscoe Pound and Felix
Frankfurter).
99. See Nomination of Janet Reno, supra note 97. This questioning apparently
left an impression on Reno. See This Week with David Brinkky (ABC television
broadcast, June 20, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current file (interview with Reno in which she emphasized need for change in INS); Marcia Coyle et
' L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 11 (reporting that Attorney General
al., INS Overhaul, NATL
Reno visited INS offices during first full week on job).
100. See, e-g., Douglas Jehl, Buchanan Raises Specter of Intolerance, Critics
Say, LA. RMES,Mar. 17, 1992, at A1 (quoting Republican presidential candidate
Patrick Buchanan on immigration: "[Ilf we had to take a million immigrants in
say, Zulus, next year, or Englishmen, and put them up in Virginia, what group
would be easier to assimilate and would cause less problems for the people of
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The impact of a crackdown on "illegal" immigration unquestionably would fall disproportionately on people of color from
developing nations. The "new" immigrants, perhaps more appropriately called the "new" out-group,lO' tend to be people of
color. lo2 As many restrictionists readily admit, immigration
from Mexico is the focal point of their concern.lo3 This helps
explain why restrictionist rhetoric often is colored by not-sosubtle racist overtones. lo4

Virginia?"); Roger Worthington, Diverse Group Backs Duke's Narrow Pitch, CHI.
R~IB.,Dec. 29, 1991, at 19 (noting that "[olne of [Republican presidential candidate
David] Duke's issues is immigration and a fear that the U.S. is becoming a Third
World nation"); see also Lawmaker OffersApology for QffensivePoem, SACRAMENTO
BEE, May 20, 1993, at A3 (reporting that California legislator apologized for distributing poem to fellow legislators entitled " 'I Love America' in which a Mexican
immigrant boasts in broken English of coming to America 'in rags and Chebby
trucks' for welfare and free health care, and belittling U.S. taxpayers who foot the
billS).
101. See ALLPORT,supra note 89, at 33-35 (analyzing prejudice against immigrants by "in-groups").
102. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
103. See, e.g., Garrett, supm note 93 (discussing Republican party platform);
see also CORNELIUS,
supra note 66, at 15 (discussing survey showing that Mexican
immigrants were perceived as having more negative impact on American society
than immigrants from Canada and Western Europe).
1 0 4 ~See, e.g., supra note 95.
Because of the complexity of the political dynamic, however, the claim of racism must be considered carefully. A few of the open questions about the views of
minorities on immigration illustrate this point. It has been argued, for example,
that some African-Americans want to restrict immigration because of the alleged
preferences of whites to hire undocumented Latinos rather than black citizens. See
Jack Miles, Blacks us. Browns, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY,
O d . 1992, at 41; see also Lisa
C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African AmericanlKorean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. CU. L.
REV. 1581 (1993) (perceptively analyzing Korean-AmericanIAfrican-Americantensions in South Central Los Angeles, California and the Spring 1992 uprisings). But
cf. William Schneider, Americans lbrn Against Immigration, 25 NAT'LJ. 1900
(1993) (reporting poll results showing that less than 50% of blacks strongly felt the
need to limit immigration, the smallest percentage of any group). Some surveys
also suggest that Latino citizens desire less immigration, although they apparently
0.DE LA GARZAET AL., LATINO
do not view it as a high priority. See RODOLFO
VOICES:MEXICAN,PUERTO
RICAN& CUBANPERSPECTIVES
ON AMERICAN
POLITICS
87-89, 100-101 (1992) (reporting on a survey showing that although a majority of
Latinos agreed that "there are too many immigrants," less than 1% agreed immigration was the "principal national problem"); see also Vlae Kershner, Liberal Latino Wants Tougher Immiation Law, S.F. CHRON.,July 13, 1993, at A1 (reporting
that a Latino California legislator, known as a champion of immigrant rights, supported a moratorium on legal immigration so long as "civil and constitutional
rights are protected"); Hispanics for Moratorium, PR NEWSWIRE,July 12, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Prnews Library (reporting that National Hispanic Alliance in a letter to the President urged a three- to five-year moratorium
on all immigration). As these examples suggest, it is overly simplistic to generalize
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Besides fears about the economic impact of immigration or
unconscious racism, uncertainty and insecurity caused by
changing demographics may enhance the concern with immigration.'" The new immigrants are changing more than simply the complexion of United States society. Many languages
other than English today are commonly spoken in this country,
particularly in large urban centers?" The new immigrants
also bring with them a variety of diverse cultures. Some say
that, although there is evidence to the contrary, today's immigrants are less interested in assimilating (or maybe less able to
assimilate) into mainstream America than past immigrant
generations.lo'
Most members of the in-group understandably are comfortable with the status quo. Some feel threatened by change, particularly change that goes to the heart of daily life. Moreover,
the often-unstated fear-a fear that may come to pass in some
states in the near future, and already is true in a few large
citieslo8-may be that the current majority soon will become

and conclude that all attempts to limit immigration are racist. It is fair to say,
however, that the restrictionist efforts of some are motivated by conscious or unconscious racism. See supra text accompanying notes 100-104.
105. See Nathan Glazer, The Integration of American Immigrants, 21 LAW&
CONTEMP.PROBS. 256, 265-69 (1956); Schuck, supra note 72, at 23.
This reminds me of two very different stories relayed to me within months of
each other about the changing demographics of Monterey Park, a suburb of Los
Angeles, which suggests the importance of perspective in evaluating the changes
taking place. See NATIONAL
BOARDOF THE CHANGING
RELATIONS
PROJECT,NEWCOMERS AND ESTABLISHED
RESIDENTS
IN U.S. COMMUNITIES
14-16 (1993) (studying
six cities with large foreign-born populations and noting that Monterey Park's foreign-born population grew from 8% in 1950 to 51.8% in 1990). On the one hand,
an Asian-American student rejoiced in the fact that, due to the rapid growth of the
Asian immigrant population, the city was changing. On the other hand, my aunt
(who later moved), a long-time resident of the area, lamented the fact that she felt
as if she lived in a foreign country. Tensions in Monterey Park evidently have resulted from the changes. See LA. Chung, State's Asians Stung by Immigration
Backlash, S.F. CHRON.,June 22, 1993, a t A7.
106. See Felicity Barringer, For 32 Million Americans, English Is a Second
Language, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, a t A18 (reporting that 1990 Census showed
that persons for whom English was foreign language increased by one-third from
1980).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48. But cf. DE LA GARZAET AL.,
supra note 104, at 42 (reporting survey results showing that over 6Wo of US.-born
Mexican-Americans spoke only English or spoke more English than Spanish in the
home).
ABSTRACTOF THE UNITED
108. See U.S. BUREAUOF THE CENSUS,STATISTICAL
STATES:1992, at 34 (112th ed. 1992) (presenting statistics showing that Los An. geles and Miami metropolitan areas had a population composed of a majority of
people of color); Chris Kelley, Texas' Predicted to Mirror California's Ethnic Diver-
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a minority and transform the in-group into an out-group.'Og
One of history's clearest lessons is that the majority in a society has not always been fair t o the minority.
Whatever the cause, the new nativism is alive and well.
California, especially hard-hit by the national recession, has
proved to be fertile soil for the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment."' As of March 1993, over twenty proposed bills pending in the California legislature, several patently unconstitutional, were designed to punish the undocumented."' A Demsity, DALLAS
MORNING
NEWS,Apr. 27, 1993, at 12A (reporting that the majority of
both California's and Texas's populations may soon be "minorities"); see also Ramon
G. McLeod, U.S. Population in 2050 Will Be Half Minorities, S.F. CHRON.,Dec. 4,
1992, at A1 (reporting United States Census estimate that a majority of United
States population will be non-white by 2050).
supra note 45, at 120.
109. See SCHLESINGER,
110. See William Hamilton, Harvest of Blame; Californians Tun on Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POST, June 4, 1993, at Al; Robert Reinhold, A Welcome for Immigrants Turns to Resentment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, at Al; Nancy Cleland,
Rising Violence Against Migrants, SANDIEGOUNION-TRIB.,June 13, 1993, at A1
(reporting hate crimes against undocumented migrants and increasing number of
anti-immigrant groups, including one that produced a video on immigration entitled
'Wetbacks"). For an analysis of the impad of immigration on California in the
19809, see THOMASMUUER & THOMASJ. ESPENSHADE,THE FOURTHWAVE:
(1985).
CALIFORNIA'S
NEWESTIMMIGRANTS
111. See Assembly Bill (AB) 150, Cal. Legislature, 1993-94 Sess. (requiring
Medi-Cal providers to report undocumented patients to INS to receive reimbursement); AB 151 (denying workers' compensation benefits to undocumented workers);
AB 263 (limiting Aid to Families with Dependent Children to "aliens" residing in
state for less than twelve months); Senate Bill (SB) 406 (prohibiting workers' compensation for psychiatric injury to undocumented employees); SB 733 (requiring employment and job training agencies to verify legal status of persons seeking to use
services); SB 1131 (requiring person seeking emergency or pregnancy-related services from Medi-Cal program to establish legal immigration status); AB 983 (prohibiting Department of Motor Vehicles from renewing drivers licenses or identification
cards absent proof of citizenship or legal status); AB 2171 (similar but also requiring persons authorized t o be in United States for limited time to have license or
identification expire at end of authorized stay); SB 976 (similar and. making it a
misdemeanor to assist undocumented person to obtain a drivers license or
identification); AB 149 (prohibiting allocation of state funds for education of "undocumented aliens"); AB 180VAB 2228 (prohibiting any student "not lawfully residing
in United States" from enrolling in any public post-secondary school); AB 1968
(requiring school district to report to INS names of students who cannot establish
legal status); AB 299 (requiring housing programs to request proof of legal status);
AB 86 (making any alien residing in state guilty of misdemeanor upon first conviction and felony upon second conviction); AB 87 (requiring study to estimate costs
of building prison for undocumented aliens or residents in Baja California); AB
1043 (requiring state to refer prisoners to INS);AB 1525 (allowing governor to call
into service National Guard to patrol U.S.-Mexico border); SB 345 (requiring Department of Corrections to provide prison facilities, transportation, and general
support for expediting deportation hearings); SB 691 (prohibiting local ordinances
forbidding cooperation between local law enforcement officers and INS); SB 284
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ocratic mayoral candidate in Los Angeles in 1993 claimed that
gangs of "illegal aliens" killed over 100 citizens in the past year
and, to avoid the necessity of time-consuming trials, criminal
aliens should be immediately deported.ll2 Efforts to "Light
Up the Border" through the use of automobile headlights i n
hopes of deterring border crossings have been organized to
"stop the Me~icans.""~
This anti-immigrant fervor may have indirectly fueled
already simmering racial tensions. In California's capital, Sacramento, fire bombings were directed at a state anti-discrimination agency as well as African-American, Jewish-American,
and Japanese-American targets."* A Japanese-American congressman, whose family spent World War I1 in a n internment
camp as a result of a xenophobic fear of the Japanese, attributed the crimes to the fact that so many politicians-liberal as
well as conservative-had
scapegoated immigrants for
California's problem^."^ Such claims, though not empirically
verifiable, raise troublesome concerns that have been voiced by
immigrants' rights attorneys.' l6
(making citizenship status available for public inspection under California Public
Records Ad); Assembly Concurrent Resolution 16 (resolution declaring intent to
"ensure that only legal immigrants receive specified employment and public benefits"); see also Eric Bailey & Dan Morain, Anti-Immigration Bills Flood Legislature,
L.A. TIMES,May 3, 1993, at A3 (discussing immigration bills pending in California
legislature).
The bills that would bar educating undocumented children are squarely contrary to Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating Texas law prohibiting
public education of undocumented children). Nonetheless, Governor Wilson threatened to sign them into law if passed by the legislature. See Amy Chance & HerBEE, Feb. 6,
bert A. Sample, Wilson's Latest Jab at Immigrant Laws, SACRAMENTO
1993, a t Al.
112. See Frank Clifford, Houston Calls for Deporting Illegals in Two Deadly
Gangs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at B1; see also Frank Clifford, Local
ElectionslLA. Mayor: Woo Seeks to Deport Illegal Immigrants Charged with
Crimes, L.A. TIMES,May 2, 1993, at B1 (reporting that Democratic mayoral candidate, who happened to be an Asian-American, called for the deportation of illegal
immigrants charged with serious crimes).
113. See John H. Lee, Army Announces Plan to Illuminate Border, LA. TIMES,
MEXICAN
Sept. 10, 1992, at Al; "Light up the Border" Makes a Comeback, NOTIMM
NEWSSERV.,Jan. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Notirnx file.
114. See California Anti-Bias Department Fire Bombed in New Hate Attack,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at A24.
115. See Stephen Magagnini, Matsui: Rhetoric Fosters Hate Crimes, SACRAMENTO BEE, Od. 30, 1993, at B1; Immigrants Taking Bum Rap from Both Parties,
Rep. Matsui Says, S.F. CHRON.,Od. 30, 1993, at A7.
116. Anti-immigrant sentiment also touched my relatively quiet, rural campus
a t the University of California at Davis. An undergraduate student, a Mexican immigrant who had become a lawful permanent resident during her freshman year
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More broadly, the new nativism has had an impact on
immigration policies in the United States."' It almost inevitably influenced the nearly blanket INS opposition to the
claims of persons seeking asylum in the United States in the
1980s as well as the INS'S pursuit of policies designed to deter
Central American asylum-seekers from pursuing their
claims. l8 At various politically opportune times, the executive branch has attempted to show a renewed commitment to
as has C o n g r e ~ s . ' ~ ~
halt illegal immigration from Mexi~o,"~
and who had also become politically active, allegedly was accosted by two assailants who threatened her with a knife, cut her hair, beat her, threatened her life,
and wrote "wetback" and other epithets on her. See Dan Morain, Immigrants Advocate Tells of Racial Assault, LA. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, at A3. The next night,
she was stopped in the hallway in a campus building after leaving a student meeting, pushed into a stairwell and punched in the mouth. See id. The student ironically had previously been featured in a local newspaper as a success story of the
immigrant community. See Amy Chance, A Success Story for UC Davis Student
BEE, Jan. 24, 1993, at A10. The incident illustrates the
from Mexico, SACRAMENTO
heightened tensions surrounding the issue of immigration and the volatility of the
hostile feelings about immigrants in California today.
117. See Dick Kirschten, Catch-up Ball, 25 NAT'LJ. 1976 (1993) (reporting that
the Clinton administration felt political pressure to take tough stands on immigration issues and was doing so). Besides the executive and legislative branches, nativism also may affect judges reviewing immigration decisions. See STEPHENH.
LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION
AND THE JUDICIARY:
LAW AND POLITICSIN BRITAINAND
AMERICA241-53 (1987) (arguing that social, political, and economic forces may
affect judicial review of immigration decisions in United Kingdom and United
States); see, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 975 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc),
aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (rejecting Haitians argument on the
ground that "it would ultimately result in our losing control over our borders").
118. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990)
(enjoining various practices of INS, including detention, that discouraged
Salvadorans from pursuing right to apply for asylum). By labelling the influx of
Central Americans in south Texas as "asylum abuse," the INS justified unprecedented, expedited procedures that virtually assured quick denial of mostwellfounded as well as baseless-asylum claims. See A.B.A. COORDINATING
COMM.ON
IMMIGRATION
LAW,LIVESON THE LINE: SEEKINGASYLUM IN SOUTHTEXAS(1989);
see also Robert E. Koulish, Systemic Deterrence Against Prospective Asylum Seekers:
A Study of the South Texas Immigration District, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE529 (1992) (documenting INS and immigration court practices in South
AND NATUTexas that deterred asylum-seekers from pursuing claims); IMMIGRATION
RALIZATION SERVICE,
U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE
ENHANCEMENT
PJAN FOR THE SOUTHERN BORDER(1989), reprinted in Appendix 6 to Central American Asylum-Seekers:
Hearing Before the Subconam. on Immigration, ReMees and International Law of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, l O l s t Cong., 1st Sess. 288-308 (1989)) [hereinafter
Central American Asylum-Seekers] (discussing enhanced enforcement efforts to deal
with "widespread abuse of the asylum process by applicants who make frivolous
claims"); id. at 32-51 (prepared statement of Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service on the need to increase enforcement efforts to
combat "asylum abuse").
119. See, e.g., Tim Golden, U.S. BZocku.de of Workers Enmges Mexican Town,
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Further restrictionist changes in immigration law and
policy have been encouraged by the depiction of "asylum abuse"
by the popular media.12' Well-publicized efforts to smuggle
Chinese, some of whom may have legitimate asylum claims, in
deplorable conditions on ships into the United States1% have
fueled proposals for reform, including one from President
Clinton with bipartisan
In addition, public and
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1993, at A3 (discussing impact of Border Patrol's policy of
deploying hundreds of officers along border between El Paso, Texas and Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico); John H. Lee, Bank of Lights Planned to Deter Border Activity,
L.A. TIMES,Sept. 10, 1992, at A3 (reporting Army Corp of Engineers' plan to erect
floodlights along border); Burr Vows to Defend Border Integrity, LA. TIMES,Feb.
11, 1992, at A24 (reporting that Attorney General told local law enforcement officials that he wants "to get tough on illegal immigrants who are 'crashing in the
back door' "). The INS released statistics a week before the 1992 Presidential election that it claimed showed that the Border Patrol had begun to "regain control" of
the border. See Around the Nation, WASH.POST,Nov. 1, 1992, at A10.
120. See, e.g., House, Senate Approve 1994 Appropriations for INS, State Dept.,
RELEASES1033 (1993) (summarizing congressional debate in which
30 INTERPRETER
House of Representatives violated its own budget rules by increasing INS appropriation so that more money could go to border patrol); 139 CONG.REC. H4429 (daily
ed. July 1, 1993) (Rep. Traficant stating that "America is being literally overrun
with illegal immigration . . . . We cannot complain about illegal aliens jumping our
fence without putting in the funds and backing up the p e r s o ~ e to
l handle that.").
121. The popular television show "Sixty Minutes" presented a decidedly onesided account alleging widespread abuse of the asylum process and emphasizing
that an alleged co-conspirator in the World Trade Center bombing was seeking
asylum. See 'Sixty Minutes' Segment Reveals Massive Asylum and Immigration
Fraud, PR NEWSWIRE,
Mar. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Prnews
File. Soon after, Congress began considering various pieces of asylum "reform"
legislation, which among other things would have provided for summary exclusion
of applicants at ports of entry, would have overridden an important Supreme Court
decision (in favor of the noncitizen) interpreting the asylum laws, and generally
would have made it more difficult for certain noncitizens to apply for and obtain
asylum. See Asylum Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 1679, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.; Exclusion and Asylum Reform Amendments of 1993, H.R. 1355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.;
Immigration Preinspection Act of 1993, H.R. 1153, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.; Terrorism
Prevention and Protection Act of 1993, H.R. 1301, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Some persons who previously had been granted asylum could have been denied the
opportunity even to apply if some of the bills had been in effect at the time of
their entry into the United States. See Bob Herbert, In America: Send Them
Back?, N.Y. TIMES,June 30, 1993, at A15 (telling stories of two young men from
Afghanistan who used fraudulent documents to come to the United States and
later were granted asylum but would have been returned to Afghanistan if some of
the proposed legislation had been in effect); see also Jeffrey J. Chase, "Mummy,
We're Free!"-In
Defense of Asylum Rights, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1993, at A20
(asking Congress to consider impact of summary exclusion proposals on legitimate
refugees fleeing persecution).
122. See, e.g., Steven L. Myers, Captain and Crew Charged in Voyage of Chinese to United States, N.Y. TIMES,June 8, 1993, a t Al; Eric Young, Chinese Found
at Mall Part of a Larger Group, L.A. TIMES,June 8, 1993, at B1.
123. See Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Seeks More Powers to Stem Ilkgal Im-
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congressional attention has been focused on the story of a blind
Muslim cleric seeking asylum who was implicated (and later
indicted) as the "mastermind" of a much-publicized bombing? Even if the allegations are true, one isolated incident
obviously does not mean that all asylum applicants, or even
more than a handful, have engaged in criminal activities of
that magnitude. The mere fact that so much attention was
focused on a single incident lends support to its extraordinary
nature.'* Few could suggest that any significant percentage
of asylum-seekers from Haiti, Central America, or many other
nations come to the United States to engage in "terrorist" acts
or less extreme abuses of the asylum system. Even if some do,
there are ample means for the immigration bureaucracy to deal
with any would-be asylum-seeker who poses a danger to the
community. 126
The backlog of asylum applications also has been pointed
to as an indicator of systemic abuse.12' One oft-ignored possimigration, N.Y. TIMES,July 28, 1993, at A13 (describing Clinton proposal); see also
Remarks on the Nomination of Doris Meissner to Be INS Commissioner and a n
Exchange with Reporters, 29 WEEKLYCOMP. PRES. DOCS. 1110, 1110-11 (1993)
(President Clinton announcing INS Commissioner nomination and outlining proposal to limit smuggling of Chinese into country).
124. See Mary B.W. Tabor, Specter of Terror; US. Indicts Egyptian Cleric a s
Head of Group Plotting War of Urban Terrorism', N.Y. TIMES,Aug. 28, 1993, a t
A1 [hereinafter Tabor, Terror]; supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing
World Trade Center bombing). The Department of Justice originally concluded that,
because there was no "concrete evidence" that Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman had participated in terrorist ads, it would not detain him during the pendency of the
appeal of his asylum claim. See Mary B.W. Tabor, US. Rejects Sheik's Jailing a s
Too Costly, N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 22, 1993, a t B1. I t later decided to detain him, see
Richard A. Semano & John J. Goldman, Islamic Cleric Arrested Amid Cheers and
Jeers, L.A. TIMES,July 3, 1993, a t A23, and ultimately indicted him for allegedly
conspiring to bomb the World Trade Center, see Tabor, Terror, supra. For a detailed description of the numerous irregularities, including blunders by United
States officials (including CIA operatives), resulting in Sheik Rahman's admission
into the country, see Sleuthing Shows Signif~antSlip-ups in Sheik Saga, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES1207 (Sept. 13, 1993).
125. See Terrorism, Asylum Issues and US. Immigration Policy: Hearing Before
the I m m i a t w n and Refugee M a i r s Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (testimony of Neil Gallagher, Chief, FBI Counter Terrorism Section) ('While the entry of illegal aliens into the United States does represent a concern, the fact remains that since 1983, only two a d s of international
terrorism have been conducted within the United States."), reprinted in REUTER
TRANSCRIPT
REP., May 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
126. See, e.g., INA 4 208(d), 8 U.S.C. 4 1158(d) (1988) (providing that person
convicted of aggravated felony is ineligible for asylum); id. $6 2430(2)(B),
1253(h)(2)(B) (providing that persons convicted of particularly serious crimes are
ineligible for withholding of deportation).
127. See Tim Weiner, Pleas for Asylum Inundate System for Immigration, N.Y.
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bility is that the number of applications may be due to increased political or other persecution in the world.'" The
backlog also may be the result of bureaucratic ineffi~iency.'~~
In light of the other possibilities, as well as the grave life and
liberty interests a t stake in the making of an asylum decision,
one should be extremely cautious before labelling a n increase
in asylum requests as "abuse" and rashly making far-reaching
policy judgments. Such care is missing &om the debate on the
need for asylum reform.
Although the growth in restrictionist sentiment has had an
impact, we do not know how many voters strongly share the
desire for increased immigration enforcement and restrictions
at any cost. Even if a Silent Majority opposed the proposed
changes in policy, it for whatever reason-ambivalence, distraction by other issues, indifference toward people unlike
them, to name a few possibilities--does not appear to have
emerged as a significant force in the political process. The Vocal Minority for the moment has prevailed.

TIMES,Apr. 25, 1993, at 1.
128. See U.S. COMM.FOR REFUGEES,
WORLDREFUGEE
SURVEY:1989 IN REVIEW
5, 30-31 (1990) (showing that world's refugee population totalled 15 million in
1990, up about 50% from five years before). The current human rights abuses in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, which some have claimed are the most horrible since Nazi
Germany, suggest that this may be the case. See Sara Fritz, Hawks, Doves Among
Public Switch Sides, LA. TIMES, May 9, 1993, at A1 ("[A] powerful image that
haunts Americans whenever they see pictures of the brutality in Bosnia is that of
the Holocaust in Nazi Germany.").
129. See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States:
A Case S t d y on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.CHANGE433, 456-57 (1992) (finding
that principal causes of delay in asylum adjudication may be bureaucratic inefliciencies, particularly the nearly two-year delay in providing transcripts of immigration court proceedings necessary for appeal); Meissner Praised in Senate Confirmation Hearing, REFUGEE
REP., Sept. 30, 1993, at 8-9 (stating that, during confirmation hearings, Doris Meissner, now INS Commissioner, attributed "asylum abuse"
as resulting primarily from delays by government in deciding asylum cases). This
l
of asylum applications have declined
is supported by the fad that a ~ u a filings
since 1989. See 1991 INS STATISTICS,
supra note 40, at 78. In addition, the backlog
is due in part to the executive branch's settlement of a lawsuit claiming discrimination against thousands of Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum-seekers that required a de novo rehearing of all their claims. See infivc text accompanying notes
283-84 (discussing American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796
(N.D. Cal. 1991)).
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C. Political Failure and Haitian Repatriation

A recent example of the political marginalization of the
noncitizen population is the executive branch's grudging treatment of Haitians fleeing political violence in their homeland.
Immigrant and refugee groups, with the assistance of Haitian
and African-American advocacy organizations, unsuccessfully
pressed three presidents to halt a program of interdicting Haitians on the high seas before they could reach the shores of the
United States to apply for asylum. Indifferent to the pleas, the
executive branch ratcheted up the severity of the measures to
halt the flow of Haitians fleeing a violent military coup. Congress and the judiciary refused to intervene. Consequently,
interdiction combined with repatriation remain the official
policy. 130
In 1981, in response to increasing numbers of Haitians
coming to the United States on boats, President Reagan commenced an unprecedented program under which Coast Guard
cutters interdicted Haitians and interviewed them on board the
ship to determine whether they should be brought to the United States to pursue claims to a~ylum.'~'With judicial approval,lsz the policy continued unbroken for a decade until, in the
fall of 1991, a military coup toppled the democratically elected
government in Haiti. The State Department concluded that
political violence in the coup's wake was rampant? Al130. For a more thorough study of the Haitian interdiction and repatriation
programs, see Symposium, The Haitian Refugee Crisis: A Closer Look, 7 GEO.
IMMIGR.L.J. 1 (1993).
131. The interdiction program, which was harshly criticized, see, e.g., Arthur C.
Helton, The Mandate of U S . Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under International Human Rights Law, 100 YALEL.J. 2335 (1991); Stephen H. Legomsky, The
Haitian Interdiction Programme, Human Rights, and the Role of Judicial Protection, INT'L J. REFUGEEL. 181 (spec. ed. Sept. 1990), was commenced pursuant to
the U.S.-Haiti Interdiction Agreement, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241 (Sept. 23, 1981); Exec.
Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R.
180 (1982); Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg.
48,107 (1981).
132. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
OF STATE,103D CONG., ST SESS., COUNTRY
REPORTSON
133. See DEPARTMENT
HUMANRIGHTSPRACTICES
FOR 1992, at 421 (Joint Comm. Print 1993) ("Haitians
suffered frequent human rights abuses throughout 1992 including extrajudicial
killings by security forces, disappearances, beatings and other mistreatment of
detainees and prisoners, arbitrary arrest and detention, and executive interference
with the judicial process . . . . At year's end, widespread abuses continued, and
there was no evidence either that the military was willing to stop such practices
or that the civilian Government was able to bring the military under control.");
DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., COUNTRYREPORTSON HUMAN
FOR 1991, at 633-34 (Joint Comm. Print 1992) ("Following the
RIGHTSPRACTICES
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though President Bush briefly lifted the interdiction program,
he quickly reinstituted it and refused to grant "temporary protected status" to Haitians in the United s t a t e ~ . ~ ~ ~
Interviewing persons on-board ships became onerous in
light of the increasing numbers fleeing Haiti and the administration began detaining them in Guanthamo Bay, Cuba to
screen for bona fide asylum-seekers. After that policy was upheld by the courts,135the executive branch took, and the Supreme Court upheld, the extraordinarily stringent measure of
immediately returning interdicted persons directly t o Haiti
without any screening for legitimate asylum-seekers.ls6 Thus,
in the face of its obligations under international law,ls7 the
United States returned at least some Haitians to a land where
they faced likely political persecution.

coup . . . the [Haitian] army resorted to brutality and massacre to control the
population . . . . [Tlhe army employed violence on several occasions to intimidate
opposition political supporters, popular organizations, the urban poor, and the media, and otherwise to discourage antiregime activity . . . . Hundreds were killed in
political violence during 1991.").
134. See Susan Beck, Cast Away, AM. LAW.,Oct. 1992, at 54; see also Immigration A d of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 8 302, 104 Stat. 4978, 5030 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. 8 1254a) (authorizing Attorney General to declare that persons from certain countries are eligible for "temporary protected status" in United
States). Because of violence within their borders, several nations including El Salvador, Somalia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Liberia, Lebanon, and Kuwait have been
granted temporary protected status since the Immigration Act of 1990 was passed.
See id. 8 303(a) (El Salvador); Extension of Designation of Somalia Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,898 (1993); Extension of Designation of Bosnia-Hercegovina Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 58 Fed.
Reg. 40,676 (1993); Extension of Designation of Liberia Under Temporary Protected
Status Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 7898 (1993); Extension of Designation of Lebanon
Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 2931 (1992) (status terminated by 58 Fed. Reg. 7582 (1993)); Designation of Kuwait Under Temporary
Protected Status ProgrG, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,163 (1991) (status terminated 57 Fed.
Reg. 2930 (1992)).
135. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
136. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
The various administrations' decisions to implement increasingly extreme policies were partly attributable to the Supreme Court's unswerving deference to the
executive branch's judgment in a series of recent immigration decisions. See, e.g.,
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial
Acquiescence to the Executive Branch's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic Agendas in Immigration Matters: The Case of the Haitian Asylum-Seekers, 7 GEO.
IMMIGR.L.J. 1, 27-37 (1993).
137. See Carlos M. Vhzquez, The "Self-Executin& Character of the Refugee
Protocol's Nonrefoulement Obligation, 7 GEO. IMMIGR.L.J. 39 (1993) (analyzing
obligations of states toward refugees under international law).
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A variety of factors acting in confluence explain the inhospitable treatment accorded the Haitians? The executive
branch's impermissible consideration of the foreign policy consequences of refugee admissions is perhaps the prime culprit.
The long history of disparate treatment of Haitians from a
fervently anti-communist nation and Cubans from a communist
The Haione is explicable by reference to foreign p01icy.l~~
tians also ran head-on into a generally unsympathetic attitude
among a segment of the electorate toward irnmigrati~n."~
Election year politics necessarily helped contribute to the Bush
administration's escalating hard line on Haitian asylum-seekers. The treatment of the Haitians was criticized to some degree but countervailing forces, including restrictionist groups
preaching the harms of excessive immigration, helped maintain

138. This analysis is elaborated in Johnson, supra note 136.
139. See, e.g., United States Refugee Programs: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980) (Senator Dennis DeConcini
commenting to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance: "If you are a boat refugee from
Cuba, INS automatically considers you a refugee. If you are a boat refugee from
Baby Doc's Haiti, INS automatically considers you an illegal alien coming to the
United States for economic purposes."). A recent example of this phenomenon is
the arrest of a Haitian who hijacked a plane to Miami and was charged with air
piracy, while a Cuban who did the same was not. See Howard Kleinberg, A Hijacker Is a Huacker, Whether from Cuba or Haiti, STAR TRIB., Mar. 24, 1993, at 15A.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 82-129 (discussing "new" nativism).
The executive branch also might have been concerned that the Haitian exodus
might turn into a repeat of the Marie1 boatlift, in which thousands of Cubans later
found to be undesirable came to this nation. See Mark D. Kemple, Note, Legal
Fictions Mask Human Suffering: The Detention of the Muriel Cubans Constitutional,
Statutory, International Law, and Human Considerations, 62 S . CAL. L. REV. 1733
(1989). Another possible explanation for the strength of the resistance to the admission of Haitian asylum-seekers may be that a number carried the HIV virus.
Until ordered by a court to do so, the executive branch refused to bring Haitians
found to have a credible fear of persecution to the United States to pursue their
asylum claims and instead detained them in Guanthamo Bay, Cuba. See Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); see also id. at 1038
(referring to Guantinamo Bay detention facility as "nothing more than an HIV
prison camp"); Clinton Continues Summary Return of Haitians; U S . Lawyers Inuestigate In-Country Processing, REFUGEEREP., Jan. 29, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Return
of Haitians] (quoting Professor Harold Koh as referring to facility as "the first HIV
concentration camp in history"). In enacting legislation allowing for the exclusion of
HIV-positive persons to the United States, see National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, 5 2007, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993),
congressional debate often centered on the Haitians. See 139 CONG.REC. S1719
(1993) (Sen. Nickles expressing concern that HIV population in Haiti may be as
high as eleven percent and fear of spread of disease in United States); see also id.
(denying that racism motivated HlV exclusion legislation and finding an anomaly
in the fad that laws bar importation of diseased fruit but not immigration of diseased people).
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the status quo. President Clinton, reneging on a campaign
promise, continued to pursue Haitian interdiction and repatriation. 141
The color of the Haitians, apparently the only group ever
singled out for the extraordinary interdiction and repatriation
program, may have indirectly influenced the formulation of the
executive branch's evolving interdiction and repatriation policies and decisions to allow them to remain in ~ 1 a c e . Subtle
l~~
racism inevitably diminished the domestic resistance to a harsh
program directed exclusively at a group of black noncitiz e n ~ . As
' ~ ~aspiring immigrants of color, the Haitians were on
the margins politically. Few strong political allies rallied to
their cause.
For whatever reason, the executive branch continued the
interdiction and repatriation program. Congress showed its
unwillingness to intervene. The House of Representatives rejected a proposal that would have afforded temporary protected
status in the United States to all ~aitians.'" Although the
House passed a bill that would have dforded limited relief to
Haitians then in United States custody, it died in the Senate.145Debate of this modest act often focused on anti-immi-

141. During the campaign, candidate Bill Clinton harshly criticized President
Bush's policies toward the Haitians. See, e.g., Arthur Brice, Immigration: One Candidute Grabs Issue, ATLANTAJ. & CONST.,Mar. 6, 1992, a t B1. President-elect
Clinton promised to change the administration's policy of immediate return of all
Haitians. See Norman Kempster & Mike Clary, Clinton Says He'd Cancel Order of
Haitians' Return, L.A. TIMES,Nov. 13, 1992, at A20. Shortly before the inauguration, Clinton announced that his administration a t least temporarily would continue
the repatriation policy, though it hoped to improve processing of asylum claims
filed in Haiti. See Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Says US. Will Continue Ban on Haitian
Exodus, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 15, 1993, a t Al.
142. See Brief of the NAACP, Transafrica, and the Congressional Black Caucus
a s Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113
S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344) (claiming that Haitian policies violated Equal Protection Clause); Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN.L. REV.687 (1993)
(claiming that racism influenced harsh treatment of Haitians); see also supra text
accompanying notes 82-88 (discussing historical influence of racism on immigration
law and policy in the United States).
143. See James Harney, Critics of US. Policy See Racist Overtones, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 1992, a t 2A (quoting Professor Stephen Legomsky a s stating that the
public "would never stand for [treatment of the Haitians] if the boat people were
Europeans").
144. See 138 CONG.REC. H808, 817-18 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1992).
145. See Haitian Refugee Protection Act of 1992, H.R. 3844, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (19921, 138 CONG.REC. H802, 824 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1992).
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grant themes, such as the loss of "American jobs" and the fear
of a Haitian "tidal wave."146Thus, Haitians were the losers in
the political branches, in which their influence was limited.
The judiciary, in turn, deferred to the judgment of the
political branches in the treatment of the Haitians. After pressure applied by some advocacy groups on the executive branch
failed t o halt the program, a full-blown litigation strategy was
pursued to no avail.14' The Supreme Court first denied certiorari in a case upholding one version of the program14' and
later reversed a decision enjoining a harsher version.14'
Perhaps because of the efforts to eliminate the entire program, little attention was paid t o the failings of the immigration bureaucracy in implementing the few protections that
existed for Haitians. For example, when a screening program
was in place, although the INS determined that some interdicted Haitians had a credible fear of persecution, faulty
recordkeeping resulted in the mistaken return of at least fifty
of them t o Haiti.lso In addition, in-country processing of asyIn advocating legislative relief for the Haitians, one member of Congress observed:
[Tlhe hypocrisy of [the interdiction policy] is glaringly evident. In the
early 1980's, we opened our borders to hundreds of thousands of Cuban
refugees fleeing the dictatorship of Fidel Castro. And it was not long ago
that the administration was criticizing the British Government in Hong
Kong for returning Vietnamese rehgees to their homeland against their
will. Yet when a few thousand Haitian refugees desire to enter the United States, the administration closes the door and turns out the light.
Id. a t 810 (statement of Rep. Collins). The hypocrisy failed to convince Congress to
act.
146. See, e.g., 138 CONG.REC. H808 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1992) (statement of
Rep. Stearns opposing Haitian Refugee Protection Act and emphasizing that "[tlhe
fear that many Floridans have expressed to me is that [the a d ] will create additional waves of Haitians coming into Floridan); Cuban and Haitian Immigration:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration, and Refkgees of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 182, 193 (1991) (prepared statement of Daniel A. Stein, Executive Director, Federation for American Immigration
Reform opposing end to interdiction program and emphasizing, among other things,
the high unemployment rate and the problems caused by Haitians displacing domestic labor).
147. See infra text accompanying notes 342-56 (discussing efficacy of litigation
in facilitating social change).
148. See Haitian Rehgee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
149. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
150. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE,REFUGEES:U.S. PROCESSING OF HAITIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS2 (Apr. 9, 1992). The report, however, cautioned that, because INS records were incomplete, it might have understated the problem. See id.
at 2-3.
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lum applications, which President Clinton promised to improve
while continuing interdiction and repatriation, appears problematic.lsl Besides encountering lengthy delays, bona fide
asylum-seekers may be intimidated and afraid to apply in Haiti
i n light of the omnipresent political vi01ence.l~~
To make matters worse, the opportunity to apply for asylum in the United
States is little known in rural areas where political violence
often is most prevalent. The inherent weaknesses of in-country
processing were perhaps best illustrated by the arrest, while
United States officials helplessly watched, of a Haitian found to
be eligible for asylum. ls3
The plight of the Haitians should trouble anyone aware of
a few details of the political violence in Haiti. Extrajudicial
executions, including that of twenty-five year old Matine
Remilien, co-founder of a new political party calling for deposed
President Jean Bertrand-Aristide's return to power, are commonplace as are torture and mistreatment of perceived political
opponents, arbitrary arrests, and detention. l" Amnesty International has documented incidents of persecution of supporters
of the democratically elected Aristide by the military, in particular the "disappearance" of Adelin Telemaque who was severely beaten i n front of witnesses when caught writing a proAristide political slogan on a wall.ls5 After being told by the
United States consulate to secure additional proof of his claim
of persecution, Carl Henri Richardson, who had campaigned on
behalf of Aristide, was arrested by soldiers and beaten into
~ n ~ ~ n s ~ i ls6
~ ~ s n e s ~ .

151. See supra note 141.
152. See Return of Haitians, supra note 140, a t 5 (quoting Professor Harold
Koh: "In-country processing is a rich person's option that is available to people who
have time to wait, who can afford to be seen repeatedly in public, and who have
the means to travel repeatedly.").
153. See DeWayne Wickham, Janet Reno Faces Big Job: Turn Things Around
a t Justice, GANNETTNEWSSERV.,Mar. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gns File.
154. See William G. OWeill, The Roots of Human Rights Violations in Haiti, 7
L.J. 87, 108-14 (1993). For an interesting article drawing parallels
GEO. IMMIGR.
between the Holocaust and Haitian repatriation through the use of narrative, see
Peter Margulies, Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law: Haitian and Holocaust
Refugee Narratives, 6 ST. THOMASL. REV. (forthcoming 1993).
155. See AMNESTY INT'L REPORT1992, a t 34 (1992); see also AMNESTYINT'L
REPORT1993, a t 146-49 (documenting numerous other similar incidents).
156. See Asme Fuller & Andrew Levin, US Haitian Refugee Policy-A Brutal
'Mternative', CHRISTIANSCI. MONITOR,Sept. 8, 1992, a t 19.
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The stories of individual Haitians are not well known.
Rather, there is a more general sense of chaos and violence in
the so-called Third World among desperately poor peoples,
which when presented in abstracted form,15' is less than gripping to the ordinary citizen.15' If the political system accurately gauged the will of the public, would the United States
have treated the Haitians in this way?lSg We will never
know.

D. Preliminary Observations
The noncitizen population in the United States is composed
of people who live and work on the margins. While contributing
to the economy, they are blamed by some for a litany of
society's woes. Barred by law from the political process,
noncitizens have limited ability to resist the attacks, protect
their interests, and improve their lives. Many are further
marginalized by their color, a stigmatizing attribute that also
limits the political power of citizens. The plight of Haitians
seeking asylum in this country is only one recent example of
the weakness of noncitizens in the political arena. Although
often less than clear, a majority of voters may agree with
noncitizens but fail to act. Further exploration will make this
clearer.
TO CHANGETHE
111. THE ABILITY OF NONCITIZENS
LAWAND ITS ENFORCEMENT

Part I1 sketched some impressionistic thoughts about the
political power of noncitizens. This Part presents and analyzes
further evidence bearing on the ability of noncitizens to influence the process.
157. See, e.g., Kenneth Freed, Perils a t Sea Fail to Deter Haitians Fleeing PovNov. 26, 1991, a t A8.
erty, Repression a t Home, N.Y.TIMES,
158. See Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of
Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 956 (1991) (contending that
the dominant in society "focus[] our attention on abstraction, when it is particularity and real-world detail that alone move us"); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking
Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning,
64 NOTREDAME L. REV. 886, 893-94 (1989) (criticizing "abstraction" in law and
legal reasoning).
159. There is some evidence that the United States would not have treated
Haitians a s it did. See Cathy Booth, Send 'Em Back, TIME,July 8, 1992, a t 43
(reporting that 57% of persons in Miami, an area that would be most affected by
generous treatment of the Haitians, favored giving them temporary refuge in the
United States).
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A. Overriding Suprem Court Decisions
Before reviewing congressional overrides of Supreme Court
decisions, some preliminary observations are in order. Salient
characteristics of the immigration laws, as well as the nature of
judicial review of immigration decisions, suggest that the power
of noncitizens and their proxies is limited. Perhaps most importantly, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is well
known for its generous delegations of discretion to the executive branch.I6' Congress, one might guess, generally does not
delegate such unbridled discretion to agencies adjudicating the
rights of citizens. In the immigration realm, Congress may
conveniently dispose of thorny policy judgments with limited
political payoffs (because the rights of a voting constituency are
not at stake) by dumping the problem on the agency?
The immigration laws also include substantive provisions
that are difficult to reconcile with generally applicable legal
prin~ip1es.l~~
For example, the INA barred the admission of
communists for almost forty years,1" a prohibition in direct
160. See Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1987) ("By statutory
enactment, Congress has delegated its unusually broad dominion in the immigration field to the Attorney General."); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 965-67 (11th
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (referring to "sweeping delegations of congressional authority"
in INA to Attorney General and stating that "the Attorney General . . . is the
beneficiary of broad grants of discretion under the statute"), afd on other grounds,
472 US. 846 (1985); see, e.g., INA 8 244, 8 U.S.C. 8 1254 (1988) (affording Attorney General discretion to grant relief of suspension of deportation); id. 8 245, 8
U.S.C. 8 1255 (affording Attorney General discretion to grant relief of adjustment
of status); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The
Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV.
413, 455-56 (1993) (analyzing the special impact of plain meaning interpretation of
immigration laws resulting from broad discretion delegated by INA to executive
branch).
For criticism of the delegations of unbridled discretion based on a case study of
INS decisionmaking, see Abraham D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication an& Enforcement, 72 COLUM.L. REV. 1293 (1972), and Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal
Agency Process, 1 J. LEG. STUDIES
349 (1972). See also Maurice A. Roberts, The
Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immigration Laws, 13 SANDIEGO
L. REV. 144 (1975) (former Board of Immigration Appeals chair arguing for articulation of standards governing exercise of discretion by administrative actors under
immigration laws).
161. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 237 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Perhaps because of the intractability of the problem, Congress-vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our borders and legislating with respect
to aliens-has not provided effective leadership in dealing with [the illegal alien]
problem.").
162. See generally Schuck, supra note 67 (analyzing discrepancies between classical immigration law and mainstream legal doctrines).
163. See INA $8 212(aX28XD), (GXv), 212(d)(3XA), 8 U.S.C. $8 1182(aX28)(D),
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conflict with fundamental First Amendment principles.lB4Up~ ~ exclusion
held by the Court in Kleindienst v. M ~ n d e l , 'the
remained for the most part intact until Congress substantially
modified it in 1990.166
Nor do the courts generally have the power to interfere
with Congress's substantive judgments-even if those judgments would be patently unconstitutional if the rights of citizens were at stake. In addition to the now-popular deference
frequently accorded agency action,lB7the plenary power doctrine circumscribes judicial review of immigration decisions of
either Congress or the executive branch, the so-called political
branches.'" This judicial hands-off policy is unlikely t o
change in the near term. Congress obviously is one of the
doctrine's principal beneficiaries and thus lacks any incentive
t o require thorough judicial scrutiny of the immigration laws.
The executive branch, which enjoys a reservoir of delegated
discretion over immigration matters, naturally would not desire
any change in the status quo and has been lax to limit its discretion?' Crabbed judicial review, however, represents nothing less than a radical departure from elementary separation of
powers prin~ip1es.l'~Needless t o say, doctrines completely
(6)(v), 1182(d)(3)(A) (providing that "aliens" advocating "world communism or the
establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorshipn could be excluded
from United States).
164. See, e.g., John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the Academy, and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 TEX.L. REV. 1481 (1988);
Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents,
100 HARv. L. REV. 930 (1987).
165. 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (affirming the Attorney General's denial of visa to
Belgian journalist and Marxian theoretician).
166. See Immigration Act of 1990, $5 601, 602, 8 U.S.C. §$ 1182, 1251 (Supp.
1992) (amending provisions for exclusion and deportation and limiting ability to exclude or deport persons on account of their political views).
167. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984). See generally Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.L. REV.452 (1989) (critically analyzing Chevron deference).
168. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606, 609 (1889). But see
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term--Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HAW. L. REV. 43, 77 (1989) (arguing that "the usual characterization of executives and legislatures, but not the courts, as majoritarian exaggerates the differences between the institutions and distorts analysis"). The plenary
power doctrine has been harshly criticized. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Stephen H. Legornslry, Immigration Law and
the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255.
169. See Roberts, supra note 160.
170. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is em-
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precluding judicial review are few and far between when the
rights of citizens are a t issue.171
A few examples of invocation of the plenary power doctrine
demonstrate its dramatic implications. Draconian immigration
laws designed not only to discriminate against, but to punish,
Chinese immigrants were shielded by its immunity.172 The
doctrine in more recent years has been invoked to uphold congressional limitations on the eligibility of noncitizens for certain public benefits.173 In declining the invitation to invali-

phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is."); see also LEGOMSKY,
supra note 117, at 178 (discussing Marbury v. Madison
principles and observing that "[mlost are unaware that there is a vast . . . body of
[immigration] law that the [Supreme] Court has explicitly treated as an exception
to the principle of constitutional review"); Henkin, supra note 168, at 863 ("The
[Supreme] Court has left only immigration and deportation outside the reach of
fbndamental constitutional protections."); cf. MICHAELJ. GLENNON,
CONSTITUTIONAL
DIPLOMACY
319-20 (1990) (arguing that "the Executive almost always wins if the
courts sit on the sidelines" in foreign policy matters).
INDIAN
IN WESTERN
171. But see ROBERTA. WILLIAMS,JR., THE AMERICAN
LEGALTHOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES
OF CONQUEST
325 (1990) (arguing that Supreme
Court afforded "federal government plenary power to control Indian affairs unrestrained by normal constitutional values"); Nell J. Newton, Federal Power over
Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 199 (1984)
("The mystique of plenary power has pervaded federal regulation of Indian affairs
from the beginning."); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) ("The plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both
explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself.").
172. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). But see Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228, 233-34, 238 (1896) (invalidating on due process grounds law requiring that Chinese nationals unlawfully in United States "shall be imprisoned a t
hard labor for a period of not exceeding one year, and thereafter removed from the
United States" (citing Act of May 5, 1892 ch. 60 § 4, 27 Stat. 25)). For an analysis
of the impact of the plenary power doctrine on the development of constitutional
law in the immigration realm and the interpretation of the immigration laws, see
Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM.L. REV. 1625 (1992) (analyzing impact of plenary power doctrine in fostering procedural due process doctrines
protecting immigrants), and Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century
of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100
YALEL.J. 545 (1990) [hereinafter Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms] (analyzing impact of doctrine on statutory interpretation). See also Michael Scaperlanda,
Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965 (criticizing plenary
power doctrine as inconsistent with the evolving concept of state sovereignty under
international law).
173. For example, Congress enacted, and the Supreme Court upheld, a law
excluding LPRs without five years of continuous residence in the United States
from receiving certain medical insurance benefits. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
1382j(a)
67 (1976) (upholding 42 U.S.C. 8 1395(2)(B) (1988)); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
(1988) (attributing income of an alien's sponsor to the alien, thereby limiting access
of certain LPRs to some benefit programs); INA
245A(k)(1), 8 U.S.C.
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date such laws, the Supreme Court observed with candor that
"Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizen^."'^^
Despite strong reasons for not applying the doctrine, the
Court recently reaffirmed this approach to the judicial review
of immigration law and policy. The Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a new regulation promulgated by the Justice
Department generally requiring the detention of undocumented
children unless released to parents, close relatives, or legal
~~
guardians but not to respodsible, unrelated a d ~ 1 t s . lIn
doing, the Court emphasized that
[flor reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for
regulating the relationship between the United States and
our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches
of the Federal Government. [Olver no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete. Thus, in the
exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.176

The plenary power doctrine thus shielded the Attorney
General's judgment even though the INS failed to establish the
need for the new regulation, which represented a change in
policy.177Further, when the regulation was adopted, the detention conditions by the INS'S own admission were "deplorable,"17' thus making deference appear anomalous.

$ 1255a(h)(l) (1988) (barring aliens eligible for amnesty from participation in major
federal benefit programs for five years after obtaining temporary resident status).
See generally John W. Guendelsberger, Equal Protection and Resident Alien Access
to Public Benefits in France and the United States, 67 TUL.L. REV. 669 (1993)
(comparing access to benefits in two countries).
None of this is to suggest that the Court never has deviated from the plenary
power doctrine. The Court sporadically has protected LPRs, sometimes even undocumented ones. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that states
cannot bar undocumented children from public schools); Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (striking down statute limiting civil service employment
to citizens); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (striking down exclusion of LPRs
from law practice).
174. Mathews, 426 U.S. a t 80 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
175. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1993).
176. Id. a t 1449 (emphasis added) (second bracketed letter in original) (citations and quotations omitted).
177. But cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
US. 29 (1983) (reviewing carefully agency change in policy).
178. See Flores, 113 S. Ct. a t 1460-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mi-
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The plenary power doctrine has a profound, though subtle,
impact on the interpretation of the immigration laws. When
the courts interpret an ordinary statute, the Constitution
serves as a moderating influence that tends to limit the possibility for extreme construction^.'^^ Invocation of the plenary
power doctrine, however, eliminates any constitutional constraints in interpreting the immigration laws, thereby freeing,
if not requiring, judges to allow extreme interpretations of the
statute by the executive branch to stand.lgOThus, the doctrine allows the agency and the courts far greater freedom in
interpreting the INA than is generally available under other
bodies of law. Consequently, a plenary power world creates the
distinct potential for immigration law and policies to linger a t
the fringes of lawfulness.
I n summary, Congress a t various times in our history-perhaps a t the behest of vocal minorities active at the
time-has enacted laws that adversely affect noncitizens. The
executive branch not infrequently acts in an even less solicitous
manner. Nor can the courts, constrained by the plenary power
doctrine, be depended upon to intervene to correct a dysfunctional political process. Under those circumstances, it would
seem inherently difficult for noncitizens to override adverse
judicial interpretations of the immigration laws (even those
that run afoul of majoritarian spirit) and curb agency conduct
that violates the law.

chael A. Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children: Detention, Due Process, and
Disgrace, 2 STAN.L. & POL'Y REV. 159, 160-61 (1990) (describing conditions in
which INS detained undocumented juveniles).
179. See T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A
Response to Martin, 44 U. P m . L. REV. 237, 258-59 (1983) (arguing that certain
applications of plenary power doctrine precluded dialogue between the courts and
Congress on due process protections); Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms,
supm note 172, a t 562 (articulating how equal protection bar to racial discrimination affected Supreme Court's interpretation of Internal Revenue Code and conclusion that statute prohibited federal tax exemption for nonprofit private schools
that discriminate); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasizing that Court should interpret
statutes in a manner so as to avoid constitutional questions). I owe this thought
(and many others) to Hiroshi Motomura.
180. See Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 172, at 580600.
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1. Overrides generally
In theory, if Congress disagrees with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of a statute, it may amend the statute.lsl That,
however, is easier said than done. Professor William Eskridge's
empirical study of congressional overrides of Supreme Court
decisions in the 90th (1967-68) through the lOlst (1989-90)
Congresses found that Congress overrode only 121 Supreme
Court decisions and 220 lower court decisions.182
In light of the hundreds of Supreme Court decisions over
the time period, the number of overrides is relatively small.
This may be a product of the fact that Supreme Court cases
"involve big stakes and sharply clashing interests" in which the
winners are able to stave off override attempts.183 This might
be expected in the few high-profile, controversial immigration
cases.lg4 The federal government, a strong lobbyist,lS5 com181. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)
("Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative
power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.")
(citations omitted).
182. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991).
183. See id. at 377.
A recent non-immigration example is Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991), in which the Court "borrowed" a limitations
period for an implied private right of action under 5 lo&) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to fill a statutory gap. Some objected to the length of the period selected. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Securities Fraud a n d the Mirage of Repose,
1992 WIS. L. REV. 607; Barbara Roper, Stop the Clock on Swindlers, N.Y.TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1991, a t A25; 137 CONG.REC. H11,812 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Bridging the Gap: Some
Thoughts About Interstitial Lawmaking and the Federal Securities Laws, 48 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 879, 890-914 (1991) (analyzing Lampf in light of Supreme Court's
vacillating jurisprudence on interstitial lawmaking). Business-related interests
fought successfully to halt efforts to override the decision and extend the limitations period, although Congress limited Lampf's retroactive application. See Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242,
3 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (adding 5 27A to Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. 5 78aa-1, providing that 5 lo&) actions filed on or before date of decision
would be governed by limitations laws then applicable in jurisdiction); see also
Lyman Johnson, supra, at 610-11 n.6 (outlining circumstances behind congressional
response to Lampfl.
On the other hand, when business interests lose in the Supreme Court, they
may face formidable dificulties obtaining passage of remedial legislation. See
Eskridge, supra note 182, a t 366-67 11.103 (describing unsuccessful efforts of business to override Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481-500 (1985), which allowed
criminal racketeering statute to be applied to commercial dispute).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 130-59 (discussing Haitian repatriation
and Supreme Court's upholding of program).
185. Cf.Eskridge, supra note 182, a t 366-67 & n.103 (noting instances in
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bined with restrictionist groups that have come to the forefront,lS6 might be expected to effectively resist a pro-immigrant override. One might expect that overrides are more likely
in low stakes matters without "sharply clashing interests." As
we shall see, many if not most of the few congressional overrides of Supreme Court interpretations of the Immigration and
Nationality Act do not implicate hotly contested question^.'^'
Based on the results of his study, Professor Eskridge hypothesized that "[gJroups are most likely to organize when they
are small, cohesive, and sociopolitically privileged. Difusion,
heterogeneity, and political marginalization render groups less
likely to become organized, but sometimes potentially more powerful if organized."'" Organization obviously is critical to any
override attempt. For that reason, consumers, welfare and
other benefit recipients (i.e.,diffuse, heterogeneous, or politically marginalized groups), for example, generally are unlikely to
command the legislative interest that business and labor organizations, women, the disabled, and environmentalists (i.e.,
small, cohesive, or sociopolitically privileged groups) do.''
Whatever the cause, the paucity of overrides has implications. The Supreme Court may read its own preferences into a
statute without colorable threat of congressional overridelso
or, if it agrees with Congress's policy choices, defer to it
through invocation of some sort of deference doctrine. Consequently, the judiciary, and often the executive branch through
its interpretations of the laws,'" enjoy the final say about the

which the Justice Department successfully lobbied against RICO overrides).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
187. See infra text accompanying notes 192-261.
188. Eskridge, supra note 182, at 361 (emphasis added); see also id. at 358-59
("Congress will generally not override Supreme Court statutory decisions unless a
politically salient group presses for an override and unless other relevant groups,
especially government officials and political party leaders, acquiesce . . . .") (footnote omitted).
189. See id at 362-63. Even organized groups, however, may find it dimcult to
override Supreme Court decisions. For example, passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (cowed as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.), which had broad support from liberal interest groups, took a
significant concentration of resources and several efforts, including a concerted campaign after a presidential veto. See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106 HAFW. L. REV. 896, 897-906 (1993) (summarizing
history).
190. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 416-17.
191. See Chevron USA. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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meaning of laws. As shall become apparent, this is especially
true in immigration law.
2. The Immigration and Nationality Act: 1952 to June 1993

Intuition suggests that noncitizens, because of their
"[dliffusion, heterogeneity, and political marginalizati~n,"'~~
would find it difficult to engage in the necessary organization
to override Supreme Court decisions. Professor Eskridge's
study shows that 3% (4 of 121) of congressional overrides of
Supreme Court decisions from 1967-90 were immigration cases,
which placed immigration in a tie for eleventh out of twentytwo subject matter categories.lg3 The small number of overrides of immigration decisions prevented the formulation of any
generalized conclusions on the subject.'%
In light of the insularity of immigration law, one might
even be surprised that there were four overrides. One explanation may be that the powerful Senate and House Judiciary
Committees have jurisdiction over immigration matters.lg5
These committees had primary or exclusive jurisdiction over
54% of the overrides during 1967-90.1g6The number of immigration overrides thus may be attributable more to the vagaries
of committee assignments than to the political clout of
noncitizens.
The complex nature of the immigration laws,19' and the
courts' difficulty in interpreting them, also might necessitate
more overrides in the immigration area than in other areas.
Their complexity may only be outmatched by their lack of clarity, a further factor militating in favor of frequent judicial inter192. See Eskridge, supra note 182, a t 361.
193. Id. at 344. The top ten subject matters were criminal law (15%); antitrust
(9%); civil rights (9%); bankruptcy (8%); federal jurisdiction and procedure (7%);
environmental law (7%); income tax (7%); copyright, trademark, and patent law
(7%); intergovernmental relations and federalism (5%); and longshoreman and shipping (5%).
The study further concluded that noncitizens gained in 2% (two cases) of the
total cases overridden within 10 years of the Court's decision. See id. a t 348. From
1978 to 1984, 8Wo of the Supreme Court decisions (four of five cases) in which
noncitizens lost were not overridden by Congress. See id. a t 351.
194. See id. at 376.
195. See d.a t 344.
196. See rd.; see also id. a t 339 (noting great increase in size of staffs of
House and Senate Judiciary committees).
197. See Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (referring to INA and
stating that "Congress . . . has enacted a baffling skein of provisions for the I.N.S.
and courts to disentangle").

1190 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993
vention.Ig8 Moreover, due to substantive controversies separate and apart from Supreme Court decisions, Congress has
revisited immigration policy a number of times.''' That fact
alone has increased the likelihood of overrides, particularly
when change without controversy can be achieved through
inclusion in a n omnibus piece of immigration legislation.200
Even so, any success enjoyed by noncitizens in overriding
Supreme Court decisions might well overstate their influence
in the political process. The vast majority of immigration decisions, of which Congress generally is unaware, are finally decided in the lower courts.201Most adverse lower court decisions therefore are left wholly intact.202Professor Eskridge,
for example, located a single override of a lower court decision
interpreting the INA during 1967-go.203That override attempted to facilitate criminal immigration e n f ~ r c e m e n t . ~ ~

198. See, e.g., infi-a text accompanying notes 206-21 (discussing Errico and
Reid, two Supreme Court decisions grappling with an opaque provision of INA).
199. See 1991 INS STATISTICS,supra note 40, a t A.l-12 to A.l-21 (identifymg
57 separate pieces of "immigration and naturalization legislation" from passage of
INA in 1952 through 1990).
200. See infra text accompanying notes 222-40 (discussing overrides of Boutilier
and Phinpathya).
201. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 415-16.
202. A particularly troubling example of a lower court case not even considered
by Congress is Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 826 (1987). In that case, the court of appeals affumed the Board of Immigration Appeals denial of asylum to a Salvadoran woman forced to watch relatives
dismembered and murdered and later was raped while political slogans were chanted, on the ground that she had not been persecuted "on account of . . . 'political
& MARTIN, supra
opinion.' " Id. at 288. Although harshly criticized, see ALEINIKOFF
note 15, at 811 n.36 (referring to Campos-Guardado as a "stunning example of a
nearly inexplicable hard-line decision, using highly restrictive 'on account of' doctrine"); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of 'Persecution' in United States Asylum Law, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEEL. 5, 25 (1991) (criticizing decision in similar vein),
Congress apparently never scrutinized the case.
203. See Eskridge, supra note 182, a t 428.
204. See IRCA $ 112, 8 U.S.C. $ 1324 (1988) (overriding United States v.
Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd sub nom. United States v. ZayasMorales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982)). After the district court dismissed an
indictment against defendants accused of violating criminal immigration laws, Congress amended the laws to expand their scope and permit future indictments based
on the same conduct. The House Report left no doubt that the amendment was designed to further enforcement goals: "Without the threat of criminal prosecution,
there is no effective way to deter potential transporters from inundating U.S. ports
of entry with undocumented aliens." H.R. REP. NO. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 66
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5670; see id. a t 112, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.AN. 5716 (stating that Reagan administration supported the amendment).
Another example of Congress overriding lower court decisions (before the 196790 time frame scrutinized by Professor Eskridge) to pursue enforcement goals can
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Moreover, default principles endorsed by the Supreme Court
circumscribe appellate review of agency immigration decis i o n ~ ? ~I'n this light, the override of less than a handful of
Supreme Court decisions i n almost a quarter-century has limited significance in evaluating the political influence of the noncitizen community. Scrutiny of the four immigration decisions
overridden from 1967-90 sheds further light on the issue.
a. Four overrides: 1967-1990

(1) INS v. Errico (1966) and Reid v. INS (1975).
Two of the Supreme Court decisions overridden during 196790 involved the same section of the INA. In INS v. E r r i ~ o , ~ ' ~
the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, interpreted
section 241(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which at
the time provided as follows:
The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of
aliens within the United States on the ground that they were
excludable a t the time of entry as aliens who have sought to
procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or
entry into the U.S. by fraud or misrepresentation shall not
apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry

be seen in the Refugee Resettlement Amendment, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504
(1960). Sections 8 and 9 of that Act overrode Mendoza-Rivera v. Del Guercio, 161
F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1959), and RojasGutierrez v. Hoy, 161 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.
1959), which held that marihuana was not a "narcotic drug" for exclusion and deportation purposes under the INA. Congress amended the INA to make it clear
that exclusion or deportation could be based on "narcotic drugs or marihuana"
convictions. See S. REP. NO. 1651, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), reprinted in 1960
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3135 (explaining changes as consistent with "original intent of
Congress" and that "concern with violation of laws relating to marihuana was as
great as its concern with violations of laws relating to other narcotic drugs").
Congress also overrode Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), which held that the term "psychopathic personality" for purposes of exclusion was unconstitutionally vague if read to
include homosexuality. Congress amended the provision to provide that persons
deemed to suffer from a 'sexual deviation" could be excluded from the United
States. See Pub. L. No. 89-236, $ 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (1965); see also infra text
accompanying notes 222-32.
Finally, two lower court decisions involving the applicability of the INA that
favored noncitizens were overridden along with United States v. Menasche, 348
U S . 528 (1955). See In re Naturalization of Wolff, 270 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960); Medalion v. United States, 279 F.2d 162 (2d Cir.
1960); see also infra Appendix.
205. See generally Johnson, supra note 160.
206. 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
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who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a U.S. citizen or of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.207

Two noncitizens, both of whom had children born in the
United States (thus making the children citizens), attempted to
invoke the protections of section 241(f). The INS sought to
deport them on the grounds that they employed fraud in entering the country to avoid then-existing national origin quota
restrictions and therefore were not "otherwise admissible at the
time of entry.'"08 Liberally construing the statutory provision,
the Court held that, despite the fact that the fraud was designed to evade quota restrictions, the noncitizens were entitled
to the mandatory section 241(f) waiver.
Because Errico and its apparent deviation from the plain
meaning of the statute resulted in some divergent interpretations in the lower courts, the Court revisited section 241(f) in
Reid v. INS.'' In Reid, the INS sought to deport the Reids,
who attempted to invoke section 241(f), on the ground that
they entered the United States without inspe~tion;'~ even
though they entered the country through use of false documentation. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, interpreted section 241(f) so as to af'firm the agency's deportation
order.211Noting that "Errico was decided by a divided Court
over a strong dissenting opinion,"212the Court limited that
holding to cases in which the INS sought to deport noncitizens
because entry was obtained through fraud, not when deportation was based on the separate ground of entry without inspection as in the case before the Court.213

207. Id. at 215 (emphasis added) (quoting INA 8 241(f), 9 U.S.C. § 1251(0).
This section was added to the INA by Pub. L. No. 87-301, 8 16, 75 Stat. 649, 655
(1961).
208. Errico, 385 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted). The INS sought deportation
under INA 8 241(a)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. fi 1251(aXl)(A) (1988), which allows deportation
of "aliens" who were excludable at the time of entry. See Errico, 385 U.S. at 215
& n.2.
209. 420 U.S. 619, 620-21 & n. 1 (1975) (citing inconsistent lower court authority); see also Elwin Grifflth, Reforming the Immigration and Nationality Act: Labor
Certifxation, Adjustment of Status, the Reach of Deportation, and Entry by Fraud,
17 U. IMICH. J.L. REF. 265, 290-91 (1984) ("Needless to say, the Errico approach
left the lower courts in a state of confusion about the appropriate application of
section 241(f).").
210. See INA 8 241(aXlXB), 8 U.S.C. 8 1251(aXlXB) (1988).
211. See Reid, 420 US. at 624-31.
212. Id. at 628.
213. See id. at 624-31.
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The complexities of the interpretation and application of
section 241(f) after these two Supreme Court decisions should
be obvious. Not surprisingly, the lower courts encountered
difficulties reconciling Errico and Reid?14 The 1981 amendments to section 241(f) represent a response to the confusion
sown by the two divergent interpretations of the section. The
House Report states the following:
[Tlwice litigation involving the proper interpretation of [section 241(f)l has reached the Supreme Court with no clear
resolution. . . . The Committee amendment reconciles the
confusing and conflicting judicial and administrative interpretations of the scope of this provision, and clarifies that the
waiver is only intended to apply to immigrants and that it is
available for innocent (as well as fraudulent) misrepresentation~.~'~

The 1981 amendments, however, definitely had a substantive slant. They made it clear that the section 241(f) waiver
applied t o willful or innocent fraud and, more importantly, that
its relief was discretionary rather than mandatory (as it previously had been)? The amendment thus afforded the agency

214. Compare Persaud v. INS, 537 F.2d 776, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1976) (minimizing
Reid's limitation of Errico) with Pereira-Barreira v. United States Dep't of Justice,
523 F.2d 503, 508-09 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that Reid limited Errico to its facts).
See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO.L J .
1361, 1435, 1438 (1988) (listing Reid as decision "disavowing significant reasoning"
of Errico).
215. H.R. REP. NO. 264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2577, 2594; see also id. a t 9-10, reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 257879 (stating that amendments were designed to "improve the efficiency of the [INS]
by streamlining certain . . . procedures, clarifying various ambiguities in current
law and eliminating unnecessary reporting requirements," and that the House Judiciary Committee "attempted to restrict the scope of this legislation to those reforms
which are urgently needed and noncontroversial").
216. INA 8 241(f), 8 U.S.C. 8 1251(f) (repealed and recodified as amended in
1990). As amended, § 241(f) read, in pertinent part, as follows:
The provisions of this section relating to deportation of aliens . . . on the
ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have
sought to procure or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry
into the United States, by fraud or misrepresentation, whether willful or
innocent, may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be waived for any
alien . . . who(i) is the spouse, parent, or child of a citizen . . . or of an alien
lawfully admitted . . . for permanent residence; and
(ii) was in possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document
and was otherwise admissible . . . at the time of such entry except
for those grounds of inadmissibility . . . which were a direct result of
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the discretion, which obviously would substantially limit judicial review on the question of section 241(f)'s applicability, in
deciding whether the noncitizen was entitled to the benefits of
the section. The ultimate victor in the congressional response
to the Court's decisions in Errico and Reid thus was the INS.
The executive branch, not surprisingly, supported the override.
The acting INS Commissioner testified that "differing administrative Ad judicial interpretations have left the law in a
state of confusion which makes it virtually impossible for the
The DepartINS t o uniformly administer Section 241(f).77217
ment of Justice in a previous attempt to "clarify" the section
had argued that "litigants have sought to expand Section 241(f)
into a charter of amnesty, waiving all restrictions for those who
had entered the United States through fraud."218
In short, Congress attempted to clarify confused Supreme
Court caselaw in favor of the government S o obviate the need
for further litigati~n.'~'~
The override apparently reflects the
handiwork of diligent committee staffers2" and the power of
the federal lobby.221
(2) Boutilier v. INS (1967). In Boutilier u.
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Clark, relied on legislative
history in interpreting "psychopathic personality," which could
that fraud or misrepresentation.
(emphasis added).
217. H.R. REP. NO. 264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2577, 2594.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 345 (attributing overrides in "low visibility" issues of criminal law, bankruptcy, and federal jurisdiction and procedure as
the "result of ambitious codification and reform efforts by judiciary subco~nmittees
responsible for each of those areas of law").
221. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. Congress later repealed
8 241(f) and recodified it as amended when it revamped the deportation and exclusion provisions of the INA. See also Immigration Act of 1990, 8 602(a)(l)(H), 104
Stat. 4978, 5079 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 8 1251(a)(l)(H)).
222. 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967) ("The legislative history of the [Immigration and
Nationality] Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended
the phrase 'psychopathic personality' to include homosexuals . . . ."); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., GadamerlStatutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM.L. REV. 609,
609-11, 639-46, 651-59, 661 (1990) (analyzing Boutilier's method of statutory interpretation).
In dissent, Justice Douglas emphasized that "[]he term 'psychopathic personality' is a treacherous one like 'communist' or in an earlier day 'Bolshevik.' A label of
this kind when freely used may mean only an unpopular person. It is much too
vague by constitutional standards for the imposition of penalties or punishment."
Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 125 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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serve as the basis for exclusion under section 212(a)(4) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act:23 to include homosexuality.
Repeated concerted override attempts were unsuccessful in the
1 9 ~ 0 s Congress
. ~ ~ ~ finally overruled Boutilier in the Immigration Act of 1 9 9 0 . ~ ~ ~
The override reflects, among other things, the increased
political strength of the organized lesbian and gay community.226The overriding of Boutilier became an important issue
to lesbian and gay organization^,^^^ similar in some respects
to the current controversy concerning the ban on lesbians and
gays from serving in the military.228The issue did not appear
to animate the advocacy efforts of immigrant and refugee
groups to the same degree.229Changing social mores also influenced the congressional response.230 Moreover, the fact
that the provision was enacted in a much larger amendment of
the INA, the Immigration Act of 1990, with a large number of
--

223. 8 U.S.C. 5 1182(a)(4) (1988) (amended 1990) (providing that excludable
aliens include "[alliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation,
or a mental defect") (emphasis added).
224. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 358 & n.77 (collecting citations to proposed override legislation).
225. Immigration Act of 1990, 5 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (1990) (codified at 8
U.S.C. 5 1182 (Supp. 1992)).
226. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 357-59, 411-12.
227. See, e.g., Letter from Association of Gay and Lesbian Psychiatrists to Rep.
Barney Frank (June 17, 1987), in Exclusion and Deportation of Mens: Hearings
on H.R. 1119 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 266 (1987) [hereinafter Exclusion and Deportation Hearings]; Letter from National Organization of Gay
and Lesbian Scientists and Technical Professionals to Rep. Romano Mazzoli (June
17, 1987), in Exclusion and Deportation Hearings, supra, at 387.
228. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Race and Sexual Orientation in the
Military: Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, 2 RECONSTRUCTION
52 (1993); Thomas
B. Stoddard, Why We Are Marching, NEWSDAY,Apr. 23, 1993, a t 64; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason:
Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALEL.J. 333, 347-52 (1992) (book review)
[hereinafter Eskridge, Critique] (criticizing Richard Posner's analysis of military
exclusions of lesbians, gays, and women).
229. See, e.g., Statement of Ira J. Kurzban, Esq., President, American Immigration Lawyers Association, in Exclusion and Deportation Hearings, supra note
227, at 257 (discussing elimination of ideological exclusions and not mentioning
lesbian and gay exclusion); Statement by International Human Rights Law Group
(1987), in Exclusion and Deportation Hearings, supra, a t 325 (same); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, in Exclusion and Deportation Hearings, supra, at 337
(same).
230. See H.R. REP. NO. 723, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6736 (stating that exclusion is "out of step with current notions
of privacy and personal dignity" and "inconsistent with contemporary psychiatric
theories").
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significant
made its passage much more likely.232In light of these facts, the override should be treated
cautiously in calibrating the political strength of noncitizens.
(3) INS v. Phinpathya (1984). In INS u .
Phinpathyay the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, literally interpreted the "continuous physical presence" requirement for eligibility for relief known as suspension
of deportation under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality ActO2=In so doing, the Court deviated from longstanding lower court precedent and endorsed the harsh decision of the agency to deny relief t o a person who had interrupted a stay of eight years (as of the year that she applied for
relief) in the United States with a three month trip to her native country.235Two years later, Congress in a comprehensive
amendment to the INA, the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, overrode Phinpathya by providing that a noncitizen had established a ''continuous physical presence" so long as
any "absence from the United States was brief, casual, and innocent and did not meaningfblly interrupt the continuous physical presen~e."~

231. See ALEINIKOFF
& MARTIN,supra note 15, at 61-62 (noting that the 1990
Act "worked a major overhaul of the legal migration system" by, among other
things, expanding employment-based immigration, adding visa numbers, creating a
new category of "diversity immigrants," rewriting exclusion and deportation
grounds, and creating "temporary protected status" for persons fleeing civil war and
the like).
232. See infia text accompanying notes 237-40 (noting similar phenomenon in
override of Phinpathya).
233. 464 U.S. 183 (1984).
234. See INA, 8 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1988) (providing that applicant
for suspension of deportation must have "been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding
the date of . . . application").
235. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION
LAW AND POLICY 524 (1992) (referring to Phinpathya as "a bombshell" and noting that the Court %ok on an issue that was not raised by the facts, that no one had argued or briefed, that required the disapproval of twenty years of virtually unbroken case law, that reached
a result at odds with the [Board of Immigration Appeals] interpretation, and that
produced law far more extreme than what even the INS had sought"); Eleanor
Pelta, INS v. Phinpathya. Literalist Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court,
23 SAN DIEGOL. REV. 401, 406-11 (1986) (criticizing Court's interpretation of statute for, among other things, being inconsistent with a long line of authority, including the Court's interpretation of similar language in a different INA provision
in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963)).
236. IRCA 315@)(2), 8 U.S.C. 5 1254@)(2) (1988). The House previously had
passed a bill five months aRer Phinpathya that would have overridden the decision. See 130 CONG.REC. 16,348-50 (1984). However, the bill died in the Senate.
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Except to immigration practitioners, the "continuous physical presence" requirement for suspension of deportation is little
known. It is, of course, important to undocumented persons
seeking to become lawful permanent residents through suspension of deportation. From that respect, the override's more
liberal treatment of brief trips out of the country was a significant gain. The issue, however, definitely did not rise to the
significance in the eyes of public and Congress as, for example,
such matters as the treatment of asylum-seekers~37and
therefore was an unlikely candidate to draw significant opposition. This is especially true because, as was the Boutilier override, the Phinpathya override was buried in a law with more
significant changes to the immigration laws that dominated
congressional debate over the bill. The lengthy debate over
IRCA primarily focused on the controversial issues of employer
sanctions and amnesty for certain undocumented immigrants,
not on whether a provision of the INA concerning suspension of
deportation would be changed.2s8 Of course, immigrants'
rights groups supported the change in the face of executive
branch opposition.23sAs with previous overrides we have considered, the override of the Supreme Court's plain meaning
interpretation may have been facilitated by an active and informed Judiciary Committee ~ t a t f . ~ ~ '
(4) Common features. After reviewing the Supreme
Court decisions that were overridden, the political power of
noncitizens appears all the more limited. Two of the four overrides favored the executive branch rather than the noncitizen.
Factors other than noncitizen influence played critical roles i n
ensuring passage of the two overrides i n their favor. The over237. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 130-59 (discussing Haitian repatriation).
238. See H.R. REP. NO. 682(I), supra note 204, at 51-56, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5655-60 (summarizing lengthy history of legislation and major issues
of debate, which did not focus on Phinpathya). The central issues of debate are
reflected in IRCA's three purposes: "to control illegal immigration to the U.S.,
make limited changes in the system for legal immigration, and provide . . . for
certain undocumented aliens who have entered this country prior to 1982." Id. a t
45, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649. For a discussion of the many compromises in
IRCA's legalization provisions, see Bill Ong Hing, The Immigration and Naturalization Service, Community-Based Organizations, and the Legalization Experience:
Lessons for the Self-Help Immigration Phenomenon, 6 GEO. IMMIGR.L.J. 413, 47591 (1992) (Appendix B).
239. See H.R. REP. NO. 682(1), supra note 204, at 116, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5720 (statement of administration position).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 195-96, 220.
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rides also tended to involve narrow, noncontroversial questions
of little general significance to the noncitizen community.
b. The bigger picture. This section attempts to take a
more complete look a t the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and congressional
responses to those decisions. From December 1952 when the
INA went into effect241through June 1993 (the end of the October 1992 Term), the Supreme Court decided 71 cases, which
are listed in the Appendix, that interpreted or applied the
INA.242At the outset, it is important to note that the relatively
241. See INA $ 407, 66 Stat. 163, 281 (1952).
242. Let me describe the methodology employed to compile the Appendix. Cases referring to the Immigration and Nationality Act initially were identified
through computer searches of United States Supreme Court decisions. Each decision uncovered through this search was read and a summary of the important
characteristics of the case prepared. All decisions that were determined to interpret
and apply the INA were included in the Appendix. To locate any other INA cases
not revealed through computer searches, research assistants reviewed the index of
each volume of the Supreme Court Reporter from 1952 to the present and identified a few cases that were added to the Appendix. These cases also were read and
summarized.
The selection of cases "interpreting or applying" the INA required some
judgment calls. The primary criterion used in deciding to include a case was
whether interpretation or application of the INA was necessary to the decision. To
avoid overcounting decisions, I excluded reversals and remands in light of a recent
decision or a change in the statute. I also excluded one case in which a lower
court decision in favor of the noncitizen was affirmed per curiam by a n equally
divided court. See Brownell v. Rubinstein, 346 U.S. 929 (1954) (per curiam).
Determining "winners" and "losers" as a general rule was fairly straightforward.
However, a few judgment calls were made based on my reading of the decision
and its impact. Some of the more difficult judgments are explained in the Appendix.
In determining whether Congress "overrode" a decision, see infra note 243 (defining override), research assistants reviewed the legislative history for all enacted
public laws involving immigration that were reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. All reports
on immigration legislation enacted by Congress during the relevant time period
that were reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. were reviewed for references to court decisions.
Legislative history not reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. also was reviewed in some instances.
One final caveat is in order. The sample did not include all cases involving the
INS, or all decisions having some impact on immigration law and policy. Nor are
decisions interpreting immigration laws other than the INA included. Rather, the
sample is limited strictly to decisions interpreting or applying the INA. A wider
sampling of cases might reflect even more skewed results in favor of the government, particularly in recent times. A number of recent non-INA cases involving
immigration-related issues have been decided adversely to the noncitizen and in
favor of the executive branch. See, e.g., United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S.
Ct. 541 (1991) (holding that Haitian asylum-seekers were not entitled under Freedom of Information Act to certain information relevant to their claim); Ardestani v.
INS, 112 S. Ct. 515 (1991) (holding that successful asylum applicant may not recover attorneys' fees from government under Equal Access to Justice Act).
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small sample size militates in favor of caution in drawing inferences from the study. The Appendix also lists the INA section interpreted, the winner and loser, whether the decision
was overridden:43 and, if so, who the "ultimate winner7'-the
group that obtained the benefit of the override-was.
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the results in cases involving noncitizens and the federal government, and citizens and
the federal government.

In reviewing the Court's immigration decisions, I saw one pattern worthy of
mention that is not directly related to my purpose in reviewing the cases. Besides
frequently dissenting from decisions against noncitizens, see, e.g., supra note 222
(discussing Justice Douglas's dissent in Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967)),
Justice Douglas repeatedly voted to grant certiorari in immigration cases because
of the important life and liberty interests at stake, see, e.g., Cheng Fu Sheng v.
INS, 393 U.S. 1054 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ng
Kam Fook v. Esperdy, 375 U.S. 955 (1963) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); see also United States Congress, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Special
Subcomm. on H. Res. 920, Associate Justice William 0.Douglas, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 66-69 (1970) (investigating propriety of Justice Douglas's letter to INS Commissioner stating that, based on knowledge of the region, a Kurd resisting deportation to Iraq would be subject to "severe persecution" if returned there). As a young
man with acquaintances in the Industrial Workers of the World, Douglas was well
aware of President Wilson's mass deportation of noncitizen union members. See
WILLIAM0. DOUGLAS,GO EAST, YOUNGm: THE EARLYYEARS77-80 (1974); see
also supra note 98 (mentioning Palmer Raids during this time period).
243. "Overrides" are defined here as changes to the law in which Congress
consciously responds to a Supreme Court interpretation of the INA and attempts to
change the result achieved by the interpretation. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at
332 n.1 (employing similar definition). A classic override purports to "correct" a
misinterpretation by the Court. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, $ 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Similar to Professor Eskridge's study, this one
classifies congressional action as an override only when legislative history focuses
on one or more Supreme Court decisions. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 332 n.1.
I distinguish between an override and a change in the statute. Congressional
action was classified as a "change" when the section was amended not because of
any disagreement with the Supreme Court's interpretation but to change the policy
preferences reflected in the statutory provision. An example is when Congress
amends a statute after the Court upholds its constitutionality. See, e.g., supm text
accompanying notes 165-66 (discussing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)).
The Appendix does not purport to be a comprehensive list of all changes to the
INA section interpreted by a particular decision but generally only lists those
changes that somehow are tied to a Supreme Court decision (for example, when a
House or Senate report mentions the decision).
I recognize that, for some of the more recent decisions, especially those decided
in the 1990s, Congress still may override the decision. As of this date, however,
they have not. If past history proves to be a reliable guide, Congress will override
few if any of the more recent Supreme Court decisions.
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TABLE1
Noncitizens Versus
Noncitizens Prevailed
Cases (%)

Government Prevailed
Cases (%)

17 (32.7%)
Total Decisions: 52

Citizens Versus Government
Citizens Prevailed
Cases (%)

Government Prevailed
Cases (%)

Total Decisions: 15

As Table 1 shows, the government, often the INS, prevailed in approximately two-thirds of the decisions over
noncitizens. This victory percentage seems high, particularly in
light of the abundance of criticism levelled a t the immigration
bureaucracy over the years.245 The raw numbers must be
treated with some caution, however, because they do not account for the relative importance of the decisions. Although
noncitizens were net losers by a large margin in the Supreme
Court in the 1980s, this was not always the case. INS v.
Cardoza-F0nseca,2~~
for example, was an extremely important
victory for asylum-seekers.247Similarly, several losses in the
244. All percentages stated in this Section are rounded to the closest .I%.
In compiling Table 1 dealing with decisions involving noncitizens and the government, the following should be noted. In one case, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), which invalidated a legislative veto of an agency immigration decision, the
noncitizen and the executive branch had roughly congruent interests in the outcome and the Court ruled in their favor and against Congress. In two other cases,
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), and Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982),
noncitizens were adversaries to entities other than the federal government.
Noncitizens won one of those cases (Toll) and lost the other (De Cams). In Saxbe
v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974), the government prevailed in pressing its interpretation of the INA that benefited noncitizens (and, incidentally, agricultural interests)
over a farm labor union. None of these four cases is included in Table 1, which
exclusively considers cases in which noncitizens and the federal government are
adversaries. If all Supreme Court decisions requiring interpretation or application
of the INA (including these four cases) in which noncitizens were parties to a case
are considered, noncitizens prevailed in about 35.7% of the total (20 of 56).
245. See znfra text accompanying notes 262-317.
246. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
247. See Deborah Anker & Carolyn P. Blum, New Trends in Asylum Jurispru-
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Court for noncitizens involved relatively narrow issues that
may not be of general significance to the noncitizen community.248
One of the more startling, and completely unexpected,
revelations from the review of the Supreme Court's decisions
also is reflected in Table 1. Citizens, in suits in which the executive branch was an adversary (often actions attempting to
strip them of their citizenship in denaturalization or expatriation proceedings), won almost three-quarters of their cases in
the Supreme Court. Thus, while noncitizens lost two-thirds of
their cases against the federal government, citizens won threefourths of their cases. Put simply, the Court in the aggregate
was much more likely t o protect citizens than noncitizens. The
pattern suggests that the Court places a high value on citizenship and is willing t o protect citizens resisting its loss.249The
equities intuitively may appear to weigh more heavily in favor
of naturalized citizens who may have been in this nation for
many years than for noncitizens who may have been here for a
shorter time and know that their presence here is unlawful.

dence: The Aftermath of the US. Supreme Court Decision in INS v. CardozaFonseca, 1 Im J. REFUGEEL. 67 (1989); Arthur C. Helton, INS v. CardozaFonseca: The Decision and Its Implications, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE35
(1987-88).
248. See, e.g., INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992) (revolving around procedural morass involving motion to reopen deportation proceedings); infra text accompanying notes 306-17 (discussing Doherty).
249. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("American
citizenship . . . is 'one of the most valuable rights in the world today . . . .'")
(citation omitted); United States v. Zucca, 351 US. 91, 99-100 (1956) ("The mere
filing of a proceeding for denaturalization results in serious consequences to a
defendant. Even if his citizenship is not cancelled, his reputation is tarnished and
his standing in the community damaged."); United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179,
193 (1956) (Black, J., concurring) ("Former cases have held that Congress has full
power to bar or exclude aliens from the country. But citizenship, whether acquired
by birth or by naturalization, cannot be taken away without a judicial trial in
which the Government carries a heavy burden.") (citations omitted).
It is uncertain whether the lower courts share the Supreme Court's solicitude
for citizens in denaturalization proceedings. For example, John Demjanjuk, an accused Nazi war criminal known as "Ivan the Terrible," was denaturalized, see United States v. Demjanjuk, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982),
and later extradited to Israel, see Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986), vacated, No. 85-3435, 1993 WL 469786
(6th Cir. Nov. 17, 1993). Israel's Supreme Court later found that Demjanjuk was
not Ivan the Terrible and that the case was one of mistaken identity. See Court in
Ismel Clears Demjanjuk of Being Ivan,' a Nazi Criminal, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
1993, at Al.
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Table 2 reflects a breakdown by decade of Supreme Court
decisions between noncitizens and the federal government.

Noncitizens Versus Government by Decade

Total

Government Prevailed

Noncitizen Prevailed

Cases (%)

Cases (%)

35

17

Total

52

Except for the 1960s (not coincidentally the heyday of the
Warren Court) when noncitizens prevailed in exactly one-half
of the cases, they always have been considerably less successful
than the federal government (the executive branch and Congress) in the Supreme Court. Moreover, in recent years,
noncitizens have been markedly less successful. Since 1980, the
executive branch has prevailed in over 80% of the INA cases,
which is significantly greater than the 67% success rate for the
entire time period. One explanation is that an increasingly
more conservative Supreme Court has shown greater willingness to defer to the judgment of the immigration bureaucracy
and Congress.250Another entirely consistent explanation is
that the current Court is not particularly sympathetic to the
claims of noncitizens.
With respect to congressional overrides of Supreme Court
interpretations of the INA, Congress overrode seven of the
including the four from 1967seventy-one decisions (9.~%),2~'
90 previously discussed. This may seem to be a relatively high
percentage. Only three other INA decisions were overridden
250. See Johnson, supra note 160, at 459-98. See generally Thomas W . Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALELJ. 969 (1992) (analyzing
generally Court's deference to agency interpretation of statutes).
251. Note that this might overstate matters because two of the decisions that
were overridden (Errico and Reid) involved the same esoteric provision of the INA.
See supra text accompanying notes 206-21.
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from 1952-66 and 1991-93, the time period not covered by Professor Eskridge's study. Each involved overrides sought by the
federal government to the detriment of noncitizens. In United
States v. Menas~he:~~
the Court narrowly interpreted Section
405(a) of the INA t o allow the noncitizen to apply for relief
under a more generous predecessor statute. Congress overrode
that interpretation in 1961 as "contrary t o the intent of Congress" and bound noncitizens to the provisions of the INA.253
In Shaughnessy v. P e d r e i r ~and
~ ~ ~Brownell v. Tom We
S h ~ n gthe
, ~ Court
~ ~ interpreted the INKS judicial review provisions liberally to allow multiple avenues for review. By making the court of appeals the sole avenue for judicial review of
deportation orders and habeas corpus the exclusive mode of appeal of exclusion orders, Congress overrode the interpretations
because of alleged lengthy delays caused by lawsuits filed by
"undesirable aliens."256
In five of the seven overrides (71.4%),the ultimate winner
was the go~ernment.~"Noncitizens were the ultimate winners in two of the seven overrides (28.6%). The government
clearly was more able than noncitizens to convince Congress t o
override an adverse Supreme Court decisi~n.~"This appears
particularly true when one considers that several lower court
decisions adverse to the government have been overridden.25s

,

252. 348 U.S. 528 (1955).
253. H.R. REP. NO. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2981-82; see Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301 $ 17, 75
Stat. 649, 656 (1961).
254. 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
255. 352 U.S. 180 (1956).
256. H.R. REP. NO. 1086, supra note 253, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950,
2967 (expressing a desire to halt delays in deportation by "judicial actions being
instituted by undesirable aliens whose cases have no legal basis or merit, but
which are brought solely for the purpose* of delay, particularly by "subversives,
gangsters, immoral [sic], or narcotics peddlers"); see Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L.
No. 87-301, 6 5, 75 Stat. 649, 651-53 (1961).
257. The "ultimate winner" is the group that gained the benefits of the override. Thus, it generally was the loser in the Supreme Court. This is true with
respect to all but Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975), in which the government prevailed and the statute was amended as sought by the executive branch to narrow
the provision further than had been done by the Court's interpretation. See supra
text accompanying notes 206-21.
258. This is consistent with the observation that the federal government can
be an effective lobby. See supra note 185.
259. See supra note 204 (discussing congressional overrides of lower court decisions). This review did not attempt to identify all congressional overrides of lower
court interpretations or applications of the INA. My research, however, identified
five lower court decisions that were overridden by Congress. See supra note 204

1204 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNTVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

Table 3 illustrates the elapse of time between the Court's
decision and the congressional override.
TABLE3
Decision (Year)

Year of Override

Menasche (1955)

1961

Shaughnessy (1955)

1961

Brownell (1956)

1961

Errico (1966)

1981

Boutilier (1967)

1990

Reid (1975)

1981

Phinpathya (1984)

1986

Mean Difference :
As one might expect, it generally takes some time before
Congress overrides the Court's construction of a statute, if it
ever does. If one throws out the overrides of Menasche,
Shaughnessy, and Brownell, which alleviated perceived problems in the early interpretation of a new, complex
and
Phinpathya, which may not have been overridden so quickly if
not for the fact that Congress was considering comprehensive
immigration reform a t the time, then the average time between
decision and override would be closer to fifteen (about 14.67)
years. However, it is difficult to base firm conclusions on review of such a small sample.
Several inferences may be drawn from a review of the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the INA and congressional
overrides from 1952-93. Noncitizens, particularly today, are
unlikely to prevail against the immigration bureaucracy or
Congress in the Supreme Court. The difference between the
success rate of noncitizens and citizens is dramatic; citizens are
much more likely than noncitizens to prevail. I n addition, although some Court decisions involving the INA are overridden,
issues to the noncitizen community
few that involve significant

(referring to cases).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 252-56; infra Appendix (describing
decisions).

-
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are. The most divisive immigration decisions, such as the one
allowing Haitian repatriation or the one defining political pers e c u t i ~ n , ~are
~ ' not likely to be overridden. Moreover, when
there is a n override, it is likely to favor the government.

B. Policing the Immigration Bureaucracy?
The immigration bureaucracy, particularly the INS, has
been much maligned for most of recent memory.262The General Accounting Office, for example, has identified, among other
deficiencies, coordination problems, enforcement shortcomings,
mismanagement, faulty recordkeeping, and poor fiscal cont r o l ~ . ~ "Despite unrelenting criticism, major reforms have
been few and far between. To the extent that administrative
agencies theoretically are politically accountable through the
~
lack the franchise
election of the P r e ~ i d e n t ? noncitizens
necessary to ensure accountability of the immigration bureau~ r a c y . ' ~Because administrative agencies with control over
261. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (defining narrowly "persecution on account of . . . political opinion" for purposes of asylum).
& MARTIN,supra note 15, at 102 ("INS was once re262. See ALEINIKOFF
spected as a relatively well-run and efficient administrative agency, even by those
who disagreed with many of the policies carried out. But those days are long in
BELEAGUERED
BUREAUCRACY
87the past."); MILTOND. MORRIS,IMMIGRATION-THE
88 (1985) ("In recent years, few agencies of the federal government have been as
vigorously or persistently criticized as those engaged in enforcing immigration policy. The INS in particular has been a target of widespread criticism, even among
public officials."); see also H. REP. NO. 216, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (entitled
"The Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overwhelmed and Unprepared for
the Future").
263. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, CUSTOMS
SERVICEAND INS:
SHOULDBE ENDED
DUAL MANAGEMENT
STRUCTUREFOR BORDERINSPECTIONS
MANAGEMENT:
STRONG
(1993); U.S. GENERALACCOUNTING
OFFICE,IMMIGRATION
REFORMS
NEEDEDTO ADDRESSSERIOUSPROBLEMS
LEADERSHIP
AND MANAGEMENT
(1991); U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT:
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICELACKS READY ACCESSTO ESSENTIALDATA
EN(1990); U.S. GENERALACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PROSPECTS
DIM FOR EFFECTIVELY
FORCING IMMIGRATIONLAWS (1980).
264. See Chevron U.SA. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984) ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . ."). This theory of political accountability of
administrative agencies was seriously questioned long before Chevron. See generally
J. LOW, THE END OF LIBERALISM
195-97, 271-94 (2d ed. 1979). I find
THEODORE
this theory to be deeply problematic, particularly when it comes to the immigration
bureaucracy. Few voters appear to base their choice in selecting a presidential
candidate on the candidate's position on immigration.
265. I previously have touched on this theme in Johnson, supra note 160, at
443-54.
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the life, liberty, and destiny of many immigrants in fact are not
subject to the "check" of the ballot box, the political process
cannot be relied upon to correct unlawful or simply heavyhanded conduct. Put differently, noncitizens are not a constituency with the power to influence, much less "capture," the
agency that has great powers over them.266
The immigration laws are administered by the INS and the
Executive Office for Immigration Review, both organizationally
located i n the Justice Department.267The location of the immigration agencies in a department primarily devoted to law
enforcement and headed by the nation's chief law enforcement
officer, may place pressures on these agencies to emphasize
immigration enforcement even if the laws passed by Congress
call for a more balanced approach. Because an electorate composed exclusively of citizens generally does not elect the President on the basis of the administration's immigration policy,
this imbalance is unlikely to be corrected through electoral
politics. Congress, for the same reasons that it is unlikely to
override Supreme Court interpretations of the immigration
laws, cannot be expected to intervene.
The accountability question, however, becomes considerably more complicated once the multi-faceted nature of the
immigration bureaucracy's constituency is considered. The
diverse constituency results from the INS'S dual functions of
enforcement and service, which at times place conflicting demands on the agency that are difficult to reconcile.268 The
266. See supra note 79 (citing authorities describing phenomenon of "agency
capture?.
267. See INA 8 103, 8 U.S.C. 8 1103 (1988 & Supp. 1992); 8 C.F.R. 8 3.0
(1992).
ON CML RIGHTS,THE TARNISHED
GOLDENDOOR:CML
268. See U.S. COMM'N
RIGHTSISSUESIN IMMIGRATION
40 (1980) (The root of the problems encountered
by United States citizens and residents in the service side of INS stem in large
part from the conflicting missions of INS-service and enforcement."); SUSANG.
BAKER,THE CAUTIOUS
WELCOME:THE LEGALIZATION
PROGRAMS
OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORMAND CONTROL ACT 133-34 (1990) (concluding that competing missions
of INS impeded implementation of IRCA's legalization program in New York City);
see also znfra text accompanying notes 363-64 (discussing proposals of two former
INS Commissioners that might alleviate conflict).
The conflicting functions are exemplified by an INS sting operation in which
the INS sent a letter to undocumented persons and invited them to appear to
obtain a work permit. Those that appeared were arrested and deported. See H.G.
Reza, Immigrants Deported in INS Sting Operation, L.A. TIMES,July 31, 1993, at
Al. Such operations clearly inspire fear of the INS in the immigrant community
and are likely to hinder the INS in attempts to gain the trust of that community
necessary t o perform its service function.
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INS serves noncitizens through adjudicating applications for
the various forms of relief provided by the Immigration and
Nationality Act. In serving noncitizens, the INS acts in accordance with the desires of the Silent Majority who desire humanitarian and fair treatment of noncitizens and admission of
certain immigrants into the national community. At the same
time, the INS is obligated to enforce the integrity of the borders, thereby serving those citizens (particularly the Vocal
Minority but to a lesser degree, the Silent Majority) placing a
premium on immigration enf~rcement.~"When the INS vigorously pursues enforcement priorities a t the expense of all
others, it acts in a manner entirely consistent with the demands of one of the agency's primary constituencies.
The problem boils down to the fact that the INS, being
responsive primarily to the enforcement constituency, might be
expected to overemphasize enforcement. The group of voters
strongly favoring strict enforcement may be perceived as the
only one likely to apply political pressure of any significance,
thereby holding the agency accountable if it does not act a s
desired. Particularly today, this group, even if only a Vocal
Minority, is vigilant and appears willing to act.270 Consequently, the INS may fear most groups that strongly advocate
increased immigration enforcement, such as the Federation for
American Immigration Reform (FAIR). As is the case in lobbying Congress, small, cohesive, sociopolitically privileged, and
homogeneous groups, like FAIR, might well enjoy a distinct
advantage over other groups i n influencing agency action.271
It is true that immigrant and refugee rights groups monitor the INS and attempt to make it accountable to a "constituency" lacking the right to vote. Without doubt, these groups
have influenced some agency decisions. For example, the INS

A similar structural conflict of interest situation exists in the Department of
Interior, which houses the Bureau of Indian Affairs and also is the "federal
government's primary land and resource management agency . . . . [Tlhere are numerous examples of conflicts between Indian interests and other Interior agencies."
CASESAND MATERIALS
ON FEDERAL
DAVIDH. GETCHES& CHARLESF. WILKINSON,
INDIAN
LAW234 (2d ed. 1986). As is immigration law and policy, United States
Indian policy frequently is criticized. See, e.g., WILLIAMS,supra note 171; see also
supm note 171 (citing sources criticizing the "plenary power" of federal government
over regulation of Indian tribes).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 71-81.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95 (discussing activities of FAIR
and local affiliates).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
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revamped the affirmative asylum decisionmaking process by
creating a group of asylum officers with some independence
from INS enforcement operations.272 The proposal originally
would have eliminated the immigration court's role in certain
asylum decisions.273In response to objections from immigrant
advocacy groups, the INS removed that part of the proposal
from the fmal rule.274Similarly, after discussions with noncitizen advocates, the INS relaxed its policy of detaining all asylum applicants in exclusion ~r0ceedings.Z~~
Of course, this analysis begs the question whether
noncitizens, who cannot vote, are a constituency of the immigration bureaucracy or, for that matter, legislative representatives. One could argue that disenfi-anchised noncitizens are not
because they cannot vote and because some are not in this
country lawfully. The problem with these arguments is that the
laws passed by representatives of the citizenry protect
noncitizens in various ways. By so doing, the laws transform
noncitizens into de facto constituents or, in contract parlance,
third party beneficiaries. Moreover, because they are directly
affected, noncitizens are the most self-interested in bureaucratic compliance with the law on service issues and in curbing enforcement abuses. Consequently, they are the most likely
(and, in law and economics jargon, the most cost-effective)
monitors of the immigration bureaucracy.
In any event, despite monitoring by advocacy groups, the
root causes of the pattern of enforcement problems remain
uncorrected. The explanation perhaps is the dynamic resulting
in the Vocal Minority prevailing over the Silent M a j ~ r i t y . ~ ' ~
To reiterate, the average citizen is not directly affected by the
INS on anything resembling a regular basis. Immigration enforcement is not a visible part of the daily life of the average
American. Outside of border communities, the most visible
enforcement takes place far away from our homes and further
272. See 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674 (July 27, 1990) (codified in scattered sections of 8
C.F.R. (1992)). See generally Martin, supra note 61 (discussing asylum officer system).
273. See Martin, supra note 61, at 1322-24.
274. See id.
275. See INS Liberalizes Policy for Releasing Asylum-Seekers, 69 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 503 (Apr. 27, 1992); see also INS Pilot Project to Parole 200 Detained
Asylum Applicants, 67 LNTERPRETER RELEASES530 (May 7, 1990) (discussing INS
pilot project of paroling detained asylum applicants that led to decision to change
policy).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 71-81.
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away from our collective consciousness. Indeed, the desperation
of the persons seeking to enter a t the border by whatever
means may be unpleasant for many to ponder. In a different
vein, immigration enforcement affects people from a different
culture who often are "foreign" in many respects. Citizens intellectually troubled by frequent reports of abuse at the borders
cannot be expected to explore beyond the headlines, much less
mobilize politically to cease questionable practices, particularly
when the abuse involves different people figuratively in a different world. In any event, it is dacult to believe that a majority of the public, even the Vocal Minority endorsing tough border enforcement, supports the more egregious Border Patrol
abuses.277 Still, because the Vocal Minority demands more
enforcement, it seems unlikely that it would be as ready to act
to halt such
1. Trends in immigration litigation in the 1980s
Professor Peter Schuck and Theodore Wang drew two conclusions from their empirical study of immigration litigation i n
the 1980s that are particularly relevant here: (1) the immigration bureaucracy is not especially responsive to criticism, and
(2) structural flaws in the administrative structure may impede
its ability to fairly apply and enforce the immigration laws.279
Evidence supporting the conclusions included the fact that the
success rates for affirmative challenges to statutes, regulations,
and patterns or practices in the circuit courts increased from
20% in 1979 to 32% in 1989-90.280

277. See infia text accompanying notes 292-305.
278. See, e.g., Ellen Gamerman, New Panel Would Probe Charges of Border
Patrol Abuse, STATESNEWS SERV.,May 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (quoting claim of Dan Stein, Executive Director of FAIR, to the
effect that criticism of Border Patrol for abuses of noncitizens was "political").
279. See Schuck & Wang, supra note 44, at 177.
280. See id. at 154-56. Overall, however, there was a higher affirmance rate of
INS decisions in all reviewing courts in statutory review decisions-primarily
claims to relief under the INA as opposed to affirmative challenges to statutes and
regulations-from 1979 (68%) to 1989-90 (71%). See id. at 169 11.262; see also Peter
H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKEL.J. 984, 1022 (analyzing data for 1984-85
in full, a
showing that 83% of INS rulemakings reviewed by courts were
rate higher than that of several other agencies); 1991 INS STATISTICS,supra note
40, a t 166 (stating that United States prevailed in over 91% of habeas corpus proceedings challenging exclusion orders and over 64% of appeals of deportation orders
in 1990). Nationals of El Salvador, however, enjoyed a relatively high success rate
on their asylum claims, especially when compared to the low success rate before
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The critical summary of the study's conclusions stated the
following:
[Alliens often prevail over the INS in asylum litigation and
impact litigation. These results suggest that the government
currently contests many meritorious claims by aliens, which
in the interests of all parties would best be resolved a t an
early, pre-litigation stage . . . .
In particular, aliens were successful in overturning administrative denials of asylum requests . . . . The fact that all

these valid claims had been considered. . . by the [Executive
Officefor Immigration Review], and i n many cases by district
directors as well, is indicative of a major failing in the Justice
Department's processes for screening, adjudicating, and deciding to litigate these claims, and thus presents important opportunities for reform. Furthermore, aliens and advocacy
groups were also highly successful in impact lawsuits, most of
which challenged the INS' failure to implement new immigration policies in the manner prescribed by Congress. The nature and quality of these lawsuits, coupled with Congress'
failure to overturn their results, provide a clear signal that
some important aspects of the INS' administrative performance are deeply and systematically flawed . . . .

[Olur impact litigation data furnish much unmistakable
evidence that the INS' enforcement orientation has often hindered its ability to provide effective services and fair adjudication. The many successful challenges to the INS' asylum and
legalization programs suggest that the problem of integrating
enforcement, service, and adjudication functions to produce
consistent, judicially-approved standards may be an endemic

the INS and the immigration courts. See Schuck & Wang, supra note 44, at 166.
The Supreme Court has demonstrated a general willingness to defer to the
immigration bureaucracy's judgment .in all types of cases in recent times. See generally Johnson, supra note 160 (analyzing Court's deference to judgment of the INS
despite red flags suggesting impropriety of deference). Two recent examples are the
Court's refusal to disturb the unprecedented version of the Haitian interdiction program, see supra text accompanying notes 130-59, and the sanctioning of the denial
of an asylum hearing to former Provisional Irish Republican Army member Joseph
Patrick Doherty, who claimed a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to the
United Kingdom, see infra text accompanying notes 306-17.
281. Schuck & Wang, supra note 44, at 176-78 (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
In reviewing the success of impact litigation geared toward agency reform, the
study noted that
[tlhe success of aliens in impact litigation reflects the INS' difficulties in
implementing the Refugee Act and IRCA. The INS adherence to its tradi-
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The empirical study's conclusions stand as nothing less
than a stinging indictment of the immigration bureaucracy.
Some well-publicized pieces of litigation illustrate the problems
identified by the study. In Orantes-Hernandez u.
Th~rnburgh:~~
the court of appeals affirmed a broad injunction barring the INS from engaging in policies that the district
court found to be designed t o deter Salvadorans from seeking
asylum and that interfered with the right to counsel. That
lengthy litigation lasted for nearly a decade, through numerous
appeals, only for the INS t o lose on all counts. In American
the executive branch setBaptist Churches v. Thornb~rgh;~~
tled a class action by Salvadorans and Guatemalans challenging the impartiality of the adjudication of their asylum claims.
The settlement required the federal government to rehear the
claims of over 100,000 class members:% obviously a timeconsuming and costly endeavor not agreed to lightly. Finally, in
INS u. Jean,285the Court found that the INS, in defending its
tional strategies for preventing aliens from entering the United States illegally probably caused it to interpret too narrowly the rights the new statutes conferred on aliens . . . . Another problem for the INS was its continued use of ideological and geographic factors in asylum adjudications,
despite the Refugee Act's repeal of such provisions in favor of a more
universal human rights standard. The INS, i t appears, remained wedded
to the old criteria.
Id. a t 160 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
282. 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990).
283. 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
284. See Carolyn P. Blum, The Settlement of American Baptist Churches v.
Thornburgh: Landmark Victory for Central American Asylum-Seekers, 3 INT'L J .
REFUGEEL. 347 (1991) (describing settlement and its impact); supra note 129 (discussing possibility that backlog of asylum applications resulted from large number
of cases reheard under terms of settlement).
285. 496 U.S. 154 (1990) (holding that INS was required to pay attorneys' fees
under Equal Access to Justice Act in class action). As the district court in the case
summarized,
The government took an unusually unwaivering [sic] and litigious position
throughout the litigation. Many of the government's contentions and litigating postures were unwarranted and unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. The government used all of its considerable resources in opposing
Plaintiffs' contentions at every turn. From pre-trial discovery, through
trial and successive appeals, the government moved for stays of Court
Orders, forced repeated applications for emergency relief, put Plaintiffs in
a posture requiring a brief on all pleaded issues, on every motion, and
opposed, in fact as well as law, each and every important issue asserted
by Plaintiffs.
Louis v. Nelson, 646 F. Supp. 1300, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 1986); see also Jean v. Nelson,
863 F.2d 759, 762 (11th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 496 U.S. 154 (1990) (describing case as
"a long, complex, and bitterly contested lawsuit").
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detention policies toward Haitian asylum-seekers and expedited exclusion proceedings in the 1980s, asserted wholly unjustified legal positions that required nearly ten years of litigation.
The INS is not the only agency whose decisionmaking has
been questioned. The Executive Ofice for Immigration Review
~
(EOIR), in charge of immigration a d j u d i c a t i ~ n ; ~generally
has not been the subject of the trenchant criticisms levelled at
the INS. However, as the conclusions of Schuck and Wang's
empirical work suggest, the available evidence places in serious
doubt whether the EOIR has remained faithful to the laws
passed by Congress. For example, in addition to the success
enjoyed by asylum applicants in the courts of appeals, impermissible foreign policy, and possibly numbers-conscious, bias is
suggested by the overall pattern of asylum decisions.287Structural characteristics of the organizational hierarchy no doubt
contribute to the concerns. The Attorney General appoints the
members of the EOIR's appellate body, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).288 The BIA not surprisingly is composed
primarily of persons with immigration enforcement b a c k g r ~ u n d s . ~
286. The immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals were removed from the INS in 1983 when the Executive Office for Immigration Review
was created. See 48 Fed. Reg. 8038 (1983) (amending 8 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 100) (final
rule).
ACCOUNTING
OFFICE,A m W : UNIFORMAPPLICATION
OF
287. See U.S. GENERAL
STANDARDS
UNCERTAIN-FEWAPPLICANTS
DEPOWED15, 22-23 (1987) (showing disparate treatment between asylum decisions of Poles and Iranians, who fled nations
having good U.S. relations, and Salvadorans and Nicaraguans, leaving countries
having bad U.S. relations and that, for the time period of the study, 96% of the
final agency dispositions of asylum claims agreed with the State Department's
advisory opinion on the application); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 202, at 8-10
(suggesting that BIA interpreted "persecution on account of . . . political opinion"
in "narrow and technical" manner possibly because of concern with increasing numbers of asylum-seekers); Johnson, supra note 16, at 346-47 (analyzing evidence of
possible bias in agency asylum decisions); Derek Smith, Note, A Refugee by Any
Other Name: An Examination of the Board of Immigration Appeals' Actions in Asylum Cases, 75 VA.L. REV. 681, 711-19 & 11.145 (1989) (concluding that BIA's decisions reflect foreign policy bias and noting that Board treats similar claims differently depending on applicant's nationality). Compare Matter of Salim, 18 Immig. &
Nat. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982) (finding that applicant from Afghanistan who fled forced
conscription into government army was eligible for asylum) with INS v. EliasZacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (affirming Board of Immigration Appeals ruling
that Guatemalan who fled forced conscription into guerrillas was not eligible for
asylum).
288. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1992); ALEINIKOFF& MARTIN,supra note 15, a t 11112 & all.
289. See Johnson, supra note 160, a t 448 11.156 (outlining career history of current Board members). Until 1993, nomination to the Board was treated like any
other political appointment. See "Plum Book" Reflects Few Political Immigration
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At least some practitioners believe that the immigration
judges, who conduct trial-style hearings in the immigration
courts, are unduly sympathetic with INS enforcement
goals.290The belief that the administrative hearing body is
biased toward those who practice before it is troubling. A system that lacks the appearance of even-handedness is not one
likely to inspire the confidence necessary to minimize the likelihood of appeals that slow down the system. In addition, a n
empirical study of adjudications in one immigration court
found, among other problems, that ideological bias and foreign
policy judgments not permitted by law influenced asylum decision~.~~~
-

2. INS enforcement excesses

The Border Patrol performs the INS'S enforcement function. In a time of renewed focus on border enforcement, there
have been all too frequent allegations of serious, shocking abuses by Border Patrol officers.292Officers have been charged
Openings Under Clinton, 69 INTERPRETERRELEASES1457 (Nov. 16, 1992).
290. See Gerald H. Robinson, A Paradox of Asylum Law-The More Due Process, the Harder the Case, 28 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 833, 835 (1992) ("To the extent
that INS personnel, or former INS p e r s o ~ e lfunctioning as IJs [immigration judges], are involved in the asylum process, for many, only the most obvious asylum
cases will be approved, regardless of the amount of legal authority cited to show
that a lesser burden of proof is required. For some IJs, a grant of asylum is tantamount to a personal gift, bestowed grudgingly on only a few, as if the trier of fact
omitted); Frederick M.
were made personally poorer by each award.")footnote
Muir, Legal Aid Raps Immigration Judge; Foundation Asks He Be Barred from
Hearing Its Cases, L.A. TIMES,Feb. 5, 1988, pt. 2 a t 7 (reporting claims that an
immigration judge repeatedly demonstrated bias against Central American asylumseekers); Susan Freinkel & Alexander Peters, Alien Justice, RECORDER
(San Francisco), Jan. 29, 1991, a t 6-7 (noting that attorneys had nicknamed one immigration
judge "Dr. Death" because of lack of sympathy for asylum claims and reporting
that four of six immigration judges in San Francisco district previously served as
trial attorneys for INS); see also Bruce J. Einhorn, Political Asylum in the Ninth
Circuit and the Case of Elias-Zacarias, 29 SAN DIEGOL. REV. 597, 612-13 (1992)
(article by immigration judge suggesting that the Ninth Circuit decision on imputed
political opinion doctrine was in error).
291. See Anker, supra note 129, a t 445-48; see also Martin, supra note 61, a t
1333-34 (describing subtle foreign policy bias of some immigration judges against
communist nations).
292. See, e.g., AMERICAS
WATCH,BRUTALITY
UNCHECKED:
HUMANRIGHTSABUSWITH MEXICO(1992) (reporting shootings, use of lethal
ES ALONG THE U.S. BORDER
force, physical abuse, and racially discriminatory conduct by Border Patrol); AMERICAN FRIENDSSERVICE
C O M M ~ E SEALING
E,
OUR BORDERS:
THE HUMAN TOLL(1992)
HUMANRIGHTSCOMM'N,REPORTON HUMANRIGHTSVIOLATIONS
(same); NATIONAL
OF MEXICANMIGRATORY
WORKERSON ROUTETO THE NORTHERNBORDERCROSSING
THE BORDER
AND UPON ENTERING
THE SOUTHERN
UNITEDSTATESBORDERSTRIP 52-
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with crimes ranging from first degree murder of a Mexican citizen293to a severe beating of a legal United States resident
believed to be a n "illegal."z94 An American Friends Service
Committee report documented some unfortunate byproducts of
increased border enforcement, such as psychological and verbal
abuse (including racial and ethnic insults), physical abuse
(such as shootings, beatings, sexual assaults, illegal or inappro66 (1991) (same); Haydeh Behbehani, Note, La Migra and the Voices of the UnL.J. 207, 214-18 (1993) (documenting
heard: The LA. Uprising, 7 GEO. IMMIGR.
INS enforcement abuses during and immediately after rebellion in Los Angeles in
the spring of 1992); Nudez, supra note 48 (collecting evidence of border violence);
Brae Canlen, Sun Diego Burning, CAL. LAW.,Aug. 1993, at 44 (reporting on violence against Mexicans on the border, including use of deadly force by vigilante
groups); Sebastian Rotella & Patrick J. McDo~ell,Calls Increase for Border Patrol
Reforms, L.A. TIMES,Apr. 24, 1993, at A1 (discussing call for reforms in wake of
reports of abuse); Sebastian Rotella & Patrick J. McDonnell, A Seemingly Futile
Job Can Breed Abuses by Agents, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at A1 [hereinafter,
Rotella & McDonnell, Futile Job] (reporting allegations that Border Patrol agents
used vehicles to force Mexicans attempting to cross border into Tijuana River,
which was at flood stages); Sebastian Rotella & Patrick J. McDonnell, 5 Killed as
Truck Fleeing Border Agents Crashes, L.A. TIMES,June 3, 1992, at A1 (reporting
that truck fleeing Border Patrol in high speed chase crashed into car outside high
school, killing four students and father driving son to school); see also ALlegations
of Violence ALong the Un'ited States-Mexico Border: Hearing Before the Subcornrn. on
Human Rights and International Organizations of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (hearing testimony of border violence); California Legislature, Joint Comm. on Refugee Resettlement, International Migration and Cooperative Development, International Migration and Border Region Violence (1990)
(same); Patrick J. McDonnell, Moschorak to Leave INS this Month, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1993, at B1 (reporting that INS district director was retiring and denying
any relationship between retirement and alleged physical attack on "female subordinate who reported him for attempting to expedite his wife's citizenship application"); Ex-INS Inspector Guilty of Corruption, LA. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at B2
(reporting conviction of INS inspector for, among other things, corruption and aiding and abetting importation of over 3000 pounds of cocaine); Sun Gabriel Valley
Digest: El Monte: Ex-INS Oficer Is Sentenced, LA. TIMES,Dec. 3, 1992, at 52 (reporting that INS officer was sentenced for sale of false immigration documents);
Peter Lewis, INS Agents Are Accused of Threats, SEATTLETIMES,Nov. 11, 1992, at
D4 (alleging that INS officers threatened to deport witness and his family unless
he cooperated with prosecutors in criminal immigration proceedings and that witness perjured himself before grand jury).
Border patrol abuses, of course, are not an entirely new phenomenon. See, e.g.,
Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 234-35 (1981) (describing case in which Border Patrol officer used excessive force-three shotgun blasts-that crippled a Mexican national who had been running away); United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239
(1974) (describing case of immigration inspector convicted of bribery and perjury).
See generally ALFREDOhrLIRANDk, GRINGOJUSTICE 107-45 (1987) (analyzing history
of Border Patrol and its abuses).
293. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Border Patrol Agent Charged in Murder Is
Linked to Drug Theft, L.A. TIMES,July 24, 1992, at A3.
294. See Sebastian Rotella, Border officer Pleads Not Guilty in Beating Case,
L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1992, at A3.
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priate searches), and illegal or inappropriate seizures.295Specific examples included threats by Border Patrol officers directed a t a Salvadoran woman and abusive language deriding her
mother,296 and taunts of a Guatemalan about his sexuality
combined with threatened sexual assault.2g7 A significant
number of victims of abuse (17.7%) were United States citizens,
which might concern even those with little sympathy for undocumented persons.298To make matters worse, according to the
report, the Border Patrol lacks the controls necessary to ensure
officer accountability for misconduct.299
Americas Watch also found human rights abuses to be
prevalent along the United States-Mexico border, including
shootings and other uses of lethal force.300Most shocking was
the finding of sexual abuse of undocumented women."' For
example, one nineteen-year-old reported that a Border Patrol
officer sexually molested her during a drug raid.302Evidence
of a callous attitude among Border Patrol officers toward persons attempting to unlawfully enter the country may tacitly
encourage such misconduct. Officers routinely refer to "illegal
aliens" as "tonks" because the nickname is similar to "the
" ~ de~~
sound of a flashlight hitting somebody's head: t ~ n k . By

295. AMERICANFRIENDSSERVICECOMMITTEE,
supra note 292, at 3.
296. Id. at 20 (presenting claim of Salvadoran woman that INS sought her to
sign papers, presumably for voluntary deportation: "I was very upset and crying.
They . . . told me to be
[He] said he would get me to sign at gunpoint . .
quiet, and used abusive language [such as] 'A tu pinche madre' [Your f . . .
mother']). This upset me even more, because I do not like anyone speaking ill of
my mother. I then signed, since he had threatened me to sign at gunpoint and I
was frightened.").
297. Id. at 21 (quoting Guatemalan man stating that INS officers remarked,
'You are queer, you like dick. Do you have AIDS?" and "go to the bathroom and
wash off real good with the other oficer so he can screw you?.
298. See id. at 4, 35.
299. See id. at 4 .
300. AMERICASWATCH,supra note 292, at 9-36 (documenting individual incidents).
301. See id. at 34-35.
302. See id. at 35; see also Lisa Baker, INS Guard Pleads Guilty to Molesting
Two Teen-Agers, BROWNSVILLE
HERALD,
Aug. 31, 1989, at 1, cited in Michael A.
Olivas, "Breaking the Law" on Principle: An Essay on Lawyers' Dilemmas, Unpopular Causes, and Legal Regimes, 52 U . FTw. L. REV. 815, 830 n.60 (1991) (reporting
that INS officer admitted to sexual molestation of juveniles in detention and that
INS was investigating prevalent use of drugs in detention facilities).
303. AMERICASWATCH,supra note 292, at 27 (quoting Earl Shorris, Raids,
Racism and the INS, NATION,May 8, 1989); see Rotella & M c D o ~ e l l Futile
,
Job,
supm note 292, at A1 (reporting that Border Patrol officers used terms "tanks" and
"wets" to refer to Mexican nationals seeking to cross border despite the fact that

..
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humanizing the undocumented in this manner, it assists officers in rationalizing the mistreatment of them.304
In the current political environment buttressed by the
Supreme Court's effective sanctioning of stringent enforcement
measures,305it may be unrealistic to expect the INS to restructure the current enforcement regime to curtail the potential for abuse. To the contrary, because of the Vocal Minority's
current enforcement fervor and its effectiveness in light of the
political dynamic, increased enforcement efforts have been
forthcoming. Although there are natural impulses to curtail
clear abuses of power resulting in negative publicity, less extreme, though still abusive, practices stemming from a zeal for
enforcement are unlikely to remedy themselves.
3. The story of Joseph Patrick Doherty
One extraordinary immigration case that inspired community, congressional, and press interest shows the inherent difficulties in ensuring the executive branch's political accountability to majoritarian desires on immigration matters. Joseph
Patrick Doherty, formerly a member of the Provisional Irish
Republican A m y , through a byzantine procedure was denied a
hearing on asylum and related claims based on his fear of political persecution if returned to the United Kingdom.306Among
the reasons that the Attorney General, who reviewed and reversed BIA decisions regarding Doherty on two separate occasions, offered for the denial was that Doherty was not entitled
to asylum because it would be contrary to United States foreign
Political pressure from Britain's Prime Minister,

such use violates internal policy, that former INS commissioner, who was Latino,
was nicknamed "Chief Tonk," and that a statue in front of Border Patrol station
depicted an agent with a net and a chicken, the chicken representing Border Patrol slang for Mexicans, "pollo").
304. In this way, use of the labels of "tonks" or "wetbacks" or "pollos" serves
the same abstraction function as referring to undocumented persons as "illegal
aliens." See supra text accompanying note 16.
305. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule based on unconstitutional arrest and seizure generally does not
apply to deportation hearings).
306. For a decidedly different, and in my view cynical and unsympathetic,
view of Doherty and his conduct from an English perspective, see MARTINDILLON,
JOEDOHERTY,THE IRA AND THE SPECIALRELATIONSHIP
KILLERIN CLOWNTOWN:
(1992).
307. See INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 723 (1992); see also Johnson, supra
note 160, at 472-79 (analyzing Doherty).
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Margaret Thatcher, to return Doherty to the United Kingdom
evidently caused the executive branch's insistence on returning
him without even hearing the merits of his asylum claim.308
Doherty, incarcerated throughout the lengthy proceedings:''
developed a significant following in the Irish
community3'' and attracted considerable political interest.
The Senate passed a resolution asking the Attorney General to
provide Doherty with a n asylum hearing? Refusing to relent, the Attorney General ordered Doherty's deportation. Forty-six members of Congress filed an amici curiae brief in the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit supporting Doherty's
petition for review of the deportation order.312 Doherty
prevailed313 and the INS petitioned for certiorari. One hundred thirty-two members of Congress filed a n amici brief in the
Supreme
The Court deferred to the Attorney
General's judgment315 and Doherty was deported to the United Kingdom.316
If political pressure was unsuccessful in the high-profile
asylum case of Joseph Patrick Doherty, it is difficult to imagine
how political action focused on a single case might improve the
executive branch's treatment of the masses of more mundane,
if not just as weighty, asylum cases. Despite the extraordinary
level of congressional interest in his case as well as the considerable amount of media attention,317 the Attorney General

308. See DILLON,supra note 306, a t xxiii-xxv.
309. See Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 205 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
3 10. See Cal McCrystal, Notebook: A Tug-of- War for America's Irish Soul, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 2, 1993, at 23 (reporting that Doherty had attained symbolic status
in Irish-American community and had been designated grand marshal of St.
Patrick's Day parades in cities throughout the United States).
311. S. Con. Res. 62, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S10,347 (1989)
(entitled "Relating to Political Asylum to Joseph Patrick Doherty").
312. Brief of Amici Curiae, Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d
1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (Nos. 88-4084, 89-4092). I was co-counsel on the brief.
313. See Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir.
1990), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992).
314. Brief for Amici Curiae Members of the United States Senate and Members of the United States House of Representatives in support of Respondent, INS
v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992) (No. 90-925). The members joining the brief
ranged in political views from Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) to Paul Simon @-Illinois). I
was co-counsel on the brief.
315. 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992).
316. See, e.g., James Barron, I.R.A. Fugitive Sent to Belfast from US. Jail,
N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 20, 1992, at Al.
317. See, e.g., Wade Lambert, The Drawn-Out Case of a n Irish Guerrilla
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staunchly refused to afford Doherty a hearing. Doherty inspired
the community but other agendas prevailed. Absent concerted
effort, noncitizens definitely face an uphill battle.
IV. TELLINGTHE UNTOLDSTORIES:CHANGING
THE IMAGESOF THE IMMIGRANT
As Part I11 demonstrated, the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches often are less than responsive to the needs of
the noncitizen community, even when those needs are consistent with majoritarian desires. In order to place the pressure
on the political branches necessary to change their ways,
noncitizens must improve their competitiveness in the political
marketplace. Insulated from society, the basic facts about the
lives of noncitizens often are not widely circulated in the popular milieu. Instead, the conventional wisdom propagated by a
few about "illegal aliens9'-that they take jobs, sap social services, victimize citizens, etc.-remains effectively unchallenged. It
is these images that inform and influence lawmakers and
policymakers and, for that matter, judges. Several alternatives
exist to offer a truer picture of the reality for noncitizens.

A. The Franchise
A popular misconception is that the Constitution bars
voting by noncitizens. That, however, is not the case.318 At
least white male noncitizens enjoyed suffrage in a number of
states until the early 1900s.~'~
Forceful arguments have been
made for the extension of the franchise to lawful permanent
resident^.^" Still, along with convicted
mi-

Reaches High Court, WALLST. J., Oct. 17, 1991, at Al.
318. See Neuman, supra note 41, a t 291-92 (observing that, although United
States Constitution is "oblique" on the question of "alien" suffrage (including Article
I's reference that members of House of Representatives shall be "chosen . . . by
the People of the several States," U.S. CONST.art. I, 2, cl. I), "it appears to be
settled doctrine that [under the Federal Constitution], alien suffrage is entirely
discretionary"); Raskin, supra note 41, a t 1417-41 (analyzing various constitutional
provisions and concluding that the Constitution permits, but does not compel, noncitizen suffrage); see also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1973) (recognizing "State's historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions" and stating that "citizenship is a permissible criterion
for limiting [voting] rights").
319. See Neuman, supra note 41, at 291-310; Raskin, supra note 41, a t 1397417; Rosberg, supra note 22, a t 1093-100.
320. See Neuman, supra note 41, a t 310-34 (arguing that allowing LPRs to
vote is a "permissible option"); Raskin, supra note 41, a t 1456 & n.339 (arguing
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nor^,^^ and others, lawful permanent residents as well as the
undocumented lack the right to vote in every state. This is true
even though lawful permanent residents owe obligations to the
community, including but not limited to paying taxes and military service.323Expansion of the franchise to noncitizens, or
even to some of them, would represent a movement toward
making suffrage more inclusive.324A number of countries, inapparently in favor of suffrage for LPRs and claiming that, even if they had the
right, the undocumented would be too fearful of deportation to register to vote);
Rosberg, supra note 22, at 1110-11 (contending that the Equal Protection Clause
mandates voting rights for LPRs); see also NATIONAL
BOARDOF THE CHANGING
RELATIONS
PROJECT, supra note 105, a t 7 (recommending that LPRs be permitted
to vote in local elections); Sanford Levinson, Suffrage and Community: Who Should
Vote?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 545, 555-57 (1989) (questioning citizenship requirement for
voting); cf. Ldpez, supra note 92, a t 696 ("It is not possible . . . to have persons
live, work, and participate in a community over many years without creating in
them a sense of entitlement to some benefits of community membership and a
moral obligation based on their reasonable expectations. No matter how strongly
our formal laws deny it, our conduct creates the obligation.") (footnotes omitted).
321. See Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality,
and "The Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989) (criticizing
disenfranchisement of convicted felons). One argument against extending the right
to vote to convicted felons is that, by violating the law, they violated the social
contract and therefore are not morally competent to vote. See id. a t 1304-09. The
same argument might be made with respect to undocumented immigrants. However, disenfranchisement by stigmatizing outsiders may most appropriately be viewed
as simply a device that artificially limits those who are defined a s part of the
community. See id. a t 1310-14.
322. See U.S. CONST.amend. XXVI (providing 18-year-olds with right to vote).
This limit on voting has been challenged because of the failure of the political
process to consider adequately the interests of children. See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson,
REV., Winter 1993,
An Immodest Proposal: Let's Give Children the Vote, BROOKINGS
a t 19; Vita Wallace, Give Children the Vote, NATION,Oct. 14, 1991, a t 439.
323. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U S . 68, 8 1 11.14 (1979) (Blackrnun, J., dissenting) ("[Rlesident aliens pay taxes, serve in the Armed Forces, and have made
significant contributions to our country i n private and public endeavors."); see also
Charles E. Roh, Jr. & Frank K. Upham, Comment, The Status of Aliens Under
United States Draft Laws, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501 (1972) (discussing application of
military draft to LPRs).
324. See generally JUDITH
N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP:THE QUEST FOR
INCLUSION
(1991) (documenting general trend toward expansion of benefits of citizenship). But cf. PETERH. SCHUCK& ROGERM. SMITH, CITIZENSHIPWITHOUT
CONSENT:ILLEGALALIENSIN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985) (arguing that, contrary
to current state of the law, "illegal aliens" born in United States should not automatically be afforded citizenship).
Expansion of the franchise also would be consonant with the call for a movement toward civic republicanism. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97
YALEL.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
M. BICKEL,THE MORALITY
OF CONSENT
L.J. 1539 (1988). See generally ALEXANDER
33-54 (1975) (criticizing distinction between citizens and noncitizens in the distribution of rights). Of course, because noncitizens even with the franchise still would
be outsiders with limited power, there is good reason for skepticism about the en-
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cluding Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands, to
some degree have granted noncitizens the right to vote in local
and regional election^.^*
There is one group of noncitizens, the undocumented, who
nobody apparently claims is deserving of voting rights. This
omission is a material one, if only because the undocumented
population in this country may well include millions of people.326The continued disenfranchisement of so large a group
of persons physically present in this nation for extended periods (and thus subject to its laws) should be significant to anyone with anything approaching a n idealistic conception of democracy.
Arguments for direct participation by noncitizens, including the undocumented, in the political process may be based on
a few foundational concepts. Many, perhaps most, undocumented persons are contributing members of the community. They
work, pay taxes, and participate i n the community in other
important ways.327 Undocumented or not, noncitizens undoubtedly comprise a part of society. Consequently, noncitizens
in theory should have some input into the operation of government, just as they influence the economy through their labors
and consumption.32g Empowerment of the faceless "illegal
alien" population might better ensure congressional and bureaucratic a c c o ~ n t a b i l i t y . ~ ~
That is not to suggest that the idea of enfranchisement of
the undocumented is not without significant theoretical as well
as practical problems. Many might scoff a t the idea. Allowing

tire civic republican vision in a heterogenous society fraught with deep power imbalances. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial
Politics, 97 YALEL.J. 1609 (1988).
325. See Raskin, supra note 41, at 1459.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40 (discussing estimates of undocumented population in United States).
327. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Consti9, 23 (1990) (making similar points with respect to
tution, 7 CONST.COMMENTARY
lawful permanent residents); see also Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship,
and the Search for National Identity, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1504 (1986) (discussing
relation between citizenship and community).
328. The important question perhaps is who among noncitizens might qualify
for input into the political process. For example, a residency requirement of some
length of time for all voters intuitively seems reasonable.
329. Others have made the argument to extend voting rights to LPRs. See
supra note 41 (citing authority). It is leR for someone in the future to articulate
fully the arguments for enfranchising the undocumented. The point made here is
that suffrage might improve bureaucratic accountability.
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the undocumented to vote is a radical thought penetrating the
core of this nation's self-definition-who is part of the community and who is not.330Mere mention of the franchise possibility would further irritate the restrictionist nerve. Moreover,
the perplexing duality of the undocumented-outsiders in this
country unlawfully and, a t the same time, present in sociSome might
ety-complicates the question ~onsiderably.~~'
argue that, because the undocumented are in this country "illegally" (and thus in violation of the social contract), they should
have few, if any, rights and certainly not one of the most cherished, the right to vote.ss2 To extend the franchise to those
who violate the immigration laws, so the argument goes, only
would encourage their violation. The borders will mean nothing
and a greater flood of "illegals" than already are coming will
flock here. Extension of the suffrage to "illegal aliens" would
further "devalue" the already dwindling worth of American
citizenship.333
Arguments of this sort might be attractive, and possibly
persuasive, politically. However, they ignore the fact that, absent an unforeseeable revolution in immigration enforcement or
in the world economy, undocumented persons, whether we like
it or not, will remain in this country and will continue to
come.3s4 In addition, some of the arguments made i n opposi330. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982) ("Self-government . . . begins by defining the scope of the community of the governed a i d thus
of the governors as well: Aliens are by definition those outside of this community.").
331. See generally Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual
Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
955 (explaining this duality).
332. See Alan C. Nelson, Undermining Democracy in Takoma Park, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8, 1991, at C8 (criticizing allowing undocumented residents to vote because, among other things, "it undermines the value of U.S. citizenship" and arguing that a five-year requirement for naturalization is not too much to ask).
333. See Foley v. Comelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978) (emphasizing that states
need not "obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship")(quoting Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1,
14 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)); Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal
Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR.L.J. 1, 9 (1989)
(arguing that development of constitutional and other law protecting "aliens" has
"devalued" citizenship); see also David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in
the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PIIT. L. REV. 165,
230-34 (1983) (arguing that, because the undocumented are in this country in violation of its laws, these "clandestine entrants" are entitled to minimal due process
protections).
MEXICAN
MIGRATION
TO THE UNITEDSTATES:
334. See WAYNEA. CORNELIUS,
THE LIMITSOF GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION
2-4 (Program in United States-Mexican
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tion to extension of the suffrage are difficult to measure. The
devaluation argument, for example, requires inquiry into
whether there is a general understanding of the "value" of
citizenship. (Noncitizens ironically may be the ones to place the
highest value on citizenship.) In a sense, expanding the right to
vote might &lute the individual's voting power to some degree.
That dilution, however, is difficult to measure. Citizens also
might gain from a more democratic government that allows
more rather than less p a r t i ~ i p a t i o n .It~ ~also
~ seems unlikely
that extension of the franchise might serve as a magnet to
people more worried about alleviating poverty, fleeing persecution, and the like, than the luxury of voting.
All this said, I have no illusions that noncitizens, or even
lawful permanent residents, will be afforded the right to vote in
the near future. True, a few localities have expanded the franchise to n o n c i t i z e n ~ A
.~~
~ political movement successful
mass
in gaining the right to vote for noncitizens, however, seems
little more than a pipedream, a t least for now.337 Moreover,

Studies Working Paper No. 5, 1981) (arguing that it is difficult for the United
States to limit illegal Mexican migration because of family and employer networks
developed between United States and Mexico dating back to the late 1800s).
335. See Bosniak, supra note 331, a t 1002-04 (suggesting that community's
unwillingness to extend membership to outsiders hinders United States participation in world economy); Raskin, supra note 41, at 1466-67 (suggesting that urban
unrest is less likely if noncitizens are allowed to participate in political process).
336. See Raskin, supra note 41, at 1460-67 (discussing cities, including New
York and Chicago, which allow noncitizen parents to vote in school district elections, and city council decision in Takoma Park, Maryland, to allow noncitizens to
vote in local elections).
A particularly compelling argument can be made for allowing LPRs to vote in
school board elections. To become a naturalized citizen, a LPR must understand,
read, and write "simple English" and understand the fundamentals of United
States history and government. See MA 9s 312(1), (2), 8 U.S.C. $9 1423(1), (2)
(1988 & Supp. 1992). Without access to the political process to ensure that the
educational system teaches these skills, some LPRs might never be able to become
naturalized citizens. This issue was squarely raised in Ojeda v. Brown, Sac. 7974
(Cal. 1973), reported in Cal. Official Reports No. 16 (Advance Sheets), a t 1, June
14, 1973 (on file with author) (denying petition for writ of mandate over the dissent of Chief Justice Wright and Justice Mosk). See also Padilla v. Allison, 113
Cal. Rptr. 582, 584 (1974) (holding that the 14th Amendment does not require
enfranchisement of LPRs). That case involved an equal protection challenge by
Spanish-speaking LPRs to the citizenship requirement for voting in school board
elections. John Oakley brought this case to my attention.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 82-129 (analyzing new nativism). Even
the recent "motor voter" legislation, which allows voter registration by persons
applying for drivers licenses, drew heated opposition on the ground that "illegal
aliens" who seek a drivers license as identification for employment purposes would
engage in massive fraudulent voter registration. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 9, 103d
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even if all noncitizens enjoyed the right to vote, in any election
they would still represent a distinct minority and, similar to
any minority, would find it difficult to vindicate their intere s t ~ The
. ~ hope
~ ~ that the franchise might lead to affirmative
change further assumes that economically marginalized undocumented persons enjoy the luxury of devoting the time and resources to participate in the democratic process.33g
One less extreme, and more practical, strategy would be a
drive to convince lawful permanent residents eligible for naturalization to become citizens and participate in the political
process.340Not only is this strategy a real possibility, it might
also be particularly effective for some groups, such as Mexicans, with a relatively large lawful permanent resident population in this country but who also have one of the lowest naturalization rates.341
Despite the many caveats, the vote might a t least make it
theoretically possible for noncitizens to achieve reform of the
immigration laws and ensure even-handed enforcement by the
immigration bureaucracy. A theoretical possibility presently
does not even exist. In the short term, however, it seems untenCong., 1st Sess. 36 (1993) (minority views) (arguing that act will result in fraud by
"illegal aliens"), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 138; see also 139 CONG.REC.
H2273 (daily ed. May 5, 1993) (statement of Rep. Livingston (R-La.) that without a
provision requiring documentation of citizenship the legislation should be an "autofraudo" bill and that "[ilt is an inducement to illegal aliens, to people that are
ineligible to vote to not only register but ultimately to cast their votes and to help
slant elections depending on who is pulling their strings"). The law ultimately
enacted repeatedly emphasized that its provisions only allowed registration by
citizens. See National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, $ 2(a)(l),
(b)(l), (b)(2), 107 Stat. 77 (1993).
338. See supra text accompanying notes 71-88; Guinier, supra note 71; see also
Lani Guinier, Second Proms and Second Primaries: The Limits of Majority Rule,
BOSTONREV., Sept./Oct. 1992, a t 32 ("[Wlith majority rule and a racially organized
majority, 'we don't count' is the 'way it works' for minorities. In a racially divided
society, majority rule is not a reliable instrument of democracy.").
339. See generally FRANCES
FOX PIVEN & RICHARDA. CLOWARD,
WTHYAMERICANS DON'TVOTE(1988) (analyzing reasons for low voter turnout for national elections).
340. See 1991 INS STATISTICS,supm note 40, a t 118 (noting 37.4% naturalization rate for lawful permanent residents admitted in 1977 through fiscal year
1990); see also Rodolfo 0.de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Save the Baby, Change the
Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub: Latino Electoral Participation After Seventeen Years
of Voting Rights Act Coverage, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1479, 1522 (1993) (advocating that
the federal government promote naturalization in order to increase Latino political
participation).
341. See 1991 INS STATISTICS,supra note 40, at 120 (showing that Mexican
naturalization rate for LPRs admitted in 1977 was 15.1% compared to overall average of over 37%).
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able, particularly in light of the rise of the new nativism, to
believe that the electorate will allow noncitizens to vote. Direct
political participation in the electoral process fortunately is
only one method of attempting to facilitate change.

B. Litigation
As the historic case of Brown u. Board of
amply demonstrates, litigation often is an integral component
i n any comprehensive strategy for social change. Litigation by
immigrant and refugee advocacy groups has successfully secured some protections and improvements for noncitizens. Litigation may fulfill other functions as well. For example, by
bringing to the forefront the stories of the immigrant community, litigation may serve as a useful publicity device.343
Though unsuccessful legally, the protracted litigation over
interdiction and repatriation helped bring the plight of the
Haitians to national attention? The same can be said about
litigation over the rights of Central Americans to apply for
asylum .345
Litigation, however, by definition has its limits.346 De-

342. 347 US. 483 (1954). See generally RICHARDKLUGER,SIMPLEJUSTICE:
THE
HISTORYOF BROWNV. BOARDOF EDUCATION
AND BLACK
AMERICA'SSTRUGGLE
FOR
EQUALITY
(1975).
343. See NANARON,LIBERTYAND JUSTICE
FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAWIN
THE 1980s AND BEYOND91-93 (1989); John Denvir, Towards a Political Theory of
Public Interest Litigation, 54 N.C. L. REV. 1133, 1137-38 (1976); Peter Gabel &
Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the
Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE369, 379-94 (1982-83).
344. See supra text accompanying notes 130-59.
345. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990)
(affirming far-reaching injunction limiting INS detention of asylum-seekers from
Central America).
346. See generally GERALDN. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOWHOPE: CAN COURTS
(1991). (questioning ability of courts and litigation to
BRINGABOUTSOCIALCHANGE?
facilitate social change); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW& SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974) (analyzing
how deck is stacked against reformers seeking change through litigation). In formulating a nonviolent strategy based on civil disobedience, Martin Luther King, Jr.
recognized that the law sometimes might be an impediment to change. See MARTIN
LUTHERKING,JR., L
~ FROM
R BIRMINGHAM
JAIL
(1963), reprinted in 26 U.C.
DAVISL. REV. 835 (1993) (observing that everything that Hitler did in Nazi Germany was 'legal"). For a fascinating analysis of the effectiveness of various strategies for social change in modem Japan ranging from "denunciation" of a discriminatory status quo to more traditional forms such as litigation, see FRANKK.
UPHAM,LAWAND SOCIAL CHANGEIN POSTWAR
JAPAN
(1987).
This discussion should not be read to suggest that immigration litigation, in
which I have been involved as an attorney before and after joining the academy,
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spite the aggressive and often successful litigation strategy of
various immigrant and refugee groups in the 1980s, the changes wrought generally were incremental and piecemeal in naMounting
litigation setbacks for the executive branch
t~re.~
~'
have not remedied the serious structural flaws in the immigration bureaucracy. The continued existence of such flaws consistently requires more costly litigation, which drains the limited
resources of immigrant and refugee groups. Thus, despite successful litigation and despite the intense criticism of the immigration system in recent years, major institutional reform has
not been forthcoming. Put simply, although litigation may have
assisted in some ways, the continued need for it-and the monitoring function that it serves-amply illustrates its shortcomings.
Reform litigation also is fraught with hazards in light of
Although there has
the current composition of the
has not proven worthwhile. Nor do I question the value of the work and commitment of the many attorneys who have devoted their working lives to protecting
immigrants and refugees. Successful litigation undoubtedly has made a difference
for innumerable noncitizens and clearly is one ingredient in any social movement.
The question addressed here is what mix of strategies best promotes substantial
reform of the immigration system.
347. See Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for
L. REV. 861, 872 (1990) ("Legal remedies that are designed
the Poor, 56 BROOKLYN
by lawyers to impose improved conditions upon the poor aren't likely t o do much
to challenge subordination in the long run. In many cases, lawyer-engineered remedies will not work as intended. Even in the rare cases when such remedies do
work according to plan, they still do not challenge the lived experience of subordination-the experience, that is, of other people controlling the terms of one's
life.").
348. See Eva M. Rodriguez, Federal Judicialy Will Soon Feel Clinton's Stamp,
LEGALTIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at 13 (observing that Presidents Reagan and Bush
appointed a majority of Supreme Court Justices and more than two-thirds of all
sitting federal judges, including a majority of all judges in each circuit court); see
also Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by Presioknt
Bush, 76 JUDICATURE
298 (1993) (empirical study of published opinions by judges
appointed by President Bush finding that in the aggregate they tended to decide
cases in relatively conservative fashion); Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on
the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74 JUDICATURE
294 (1991) (studying President Bush's appointments to the federal judiciary and finding similarities with
President Reagan's appointees). One prominent court of appeals judge went so far
as to say that "Presidents Reagan and Bush have ensured that the federal courts
will not be representative. Instead, they are a bastion of white America. They
stand as a symbol of white power." Stephen R. Reinhardt, Riots, Racism, and the
Courts, 23 GOLDENGATEU. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993).
Advocates for the subordinated obviously have recognized the inhospitality of
the current judiciary to their claims in formulating strategies. See White, supra
note 53, at 536-37 (noting difficulties facing poor people's advocates due to swing
to the right of federal government and courts and suggesting that impact litigation

1226 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNrVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993
been some success, there have been stunning litigation failures
as well, particularly in the Supreme C ~ u r t . " ~Some refugee
rights advocates, claiming that negotiations with the executive
branch might have produced more favorable results, secondguessed the decision to attempt to halt the Haitian repatriation
program through litigati~n.~"Whether or not that criticism
is justified, the evaluation of possible litigation must be viewed
in light of viable alternatives. During the 1980s, the Reagan
administration took some rigid stands on immigration matters,
which President Bush often continued.351 The Presidency has
changed hands, however, and negotiation may prove more
fruitful than it once
Deeper criticisms of litigation require consideration as
well. In other substantive areas, critics have argued that litigation has preserved, if not strengthened, the status
Care must be taken in formulating and pursuing litigation
strategies to avoid that pitfall. More fundamentally, litigation,
particularly impact litigation with its laudable reform goals,
may do little in the long run to empower the disempowered.354 Impact litigation in particular often treats class members as little more than passive observers, pawns of well-meaning attorneys pursuing social change.355The nominal role of

may not be "optimal response" to social problems).
349. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); Reno v.
Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
350. See Beck, supra note 134, at 59 (quoting Arthur Helton, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: "I think it's fair to say that the [Haitian] litigation has
contributed to revision of the executive order [which ultimately ended screening for
asylum applicants] . . . . I think it was unanticipated, but an unfortunate consequence . . . . It should remind us all of the inherent risks in the throw of the dice
that is an inevitable part of public interest litigation in the policy area."); see also
Gregg A. Beyer, Establishing the United States Asylum O#iier Corps: A First Report, 4 INT'L J. REFUGEEL. 455, 463 n.63 (1992) (suggesting that INS delay in
improving asylum adjudication system may have been caused by litigation challenging the system and fear of acknowledging weaknesses in current procedure).
351. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 130-59 (discussing Haitian interdiction program).
352. But see supra text accompanying notes 123, 141 (discussing Clinton
administration's proposed asylum "reforms" and rehsal to change President Bush's
Haitian repatriation policy).
353. See, e.g., Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.L.
REV. 1049 (1978); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicdization of the Wagner Act and
the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265
(1978).
354. See White, supra note 53, at 540-41.
~ R K EST AL., THE LAWYER,THE PUBLIC,AND PROFES355. See F. RAYMOND
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noncitizens in the legal system can be nothing other than
disempowering. That glimpse at law in action is unlikely t o
mobilize them to demand change when attorneys are unavailable to take charge. Empowerment is necessary to avoid future
litigation. Noncitizens have limited power in society and may
be left after litigation, even if successful in its aims, with the
firm impression that legal institutions-strange, alienating,
and foreign as they are-render them just as powerless.356
Lawyers therefore must address strategies besides litigation,
which may require them to re-evaluate their role as attorneys
promoting social change.

C. Strategies that Facilitate Storytelling
At least in the long run, political solutions to the plight of
noncitizens appear more likely to bear fruit than does litigat i ~ n . ~Indeed,
"
mobilization may be the only long-term solution t o the political powerlessness of the immigrant community
and allow noncitizens t o control their destiny. Concerted pressure, even during conservative presidencies, at times has convinced the INS to alleviate the harshness of its policies.358
Lobbying efforts might change the immigration laws and restrain the immigration bureaucracy. In light of the new nativism,ss9 however, it may be unrealistic t o hope to convince
Congress to affirmatively enact legislation significantly changSIONAL RESPONSIBIL~
230-31 (1972) (describing public interest client as "client for
the situation" in which client cedes decisionmaking authority to attorney because
public interest is paramount); White, supra note 53, at 545 ("[Iln practice, welfare
litigators often subordinate their clients' perceptions of need to the lawyers' own
agendas for reform. They rarely design litigation to respond to their clients' own
priorities and ideas. Rather, litigation is designed to effect broad reforms that will
benefit the whole class of welfare recipients.") (footnotes omitted); id. at 545 11.45
("Clients rarely deliberate with the lawyers, as equals, in formulating . . . goals,
and clients' personal feelings of injury are seldom the primary data that counsel
respond to.").
356. See Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in
the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1615 n.21 (1989) (observing that "the relatively disempowered feel profoundly ambivalent about law and
lawyers"); White, supra note 53, at 542 (contending that litigation is unlikely to
mobilize clients because "the majority of poor people perceive litigation as an alien
or even hostile cultural setting").
357. See generally GIRARDEAUA. SPANN,RACE AGAINSTTHE COURT(1993)
(arguing that subordinated minorities must seek greater influence in political community to foment change, rather than pursue litigation).
358. See supra text accompanying notes 272-75 (mentioning INS creation of
semi-autonomous asylum officers and its change in parole policy).
359. See supra text accompanying notes 82-129.
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ing the status quo (at least in a manner favorable to
noncitizens). Indeed, it may be overly optimistic to believe that
immigrant advocates will be able to stave off the growing spate
of anti-immigrant legi~lation.~"In any event, the reforms
that might be achieved through lobbying and negotiation obviously would be incremental and, in that way, face limitations
similar to those of litigation?
The political winds, however, may well change. At some
point, broad support might coalesce around meaningfid immigration reform that resolves the serious deep-seated problems
in the immigration bureaucracy. Numerous immigration enforcement and adjudication reforms have been advocated for
many years.362A key ingredient to fundamental change in my
view is a restructuring of the immigration bureaucracy. One
ambitious proposal, advocated by a former INS Commissioner,
calls for the removal of the INS from the Justice Department,
thereby affording the agency more political i n d e p e n d e n ~ e . ~ ~
Another former INS Commissioner suggested removal of the
Border Patrol from the INS so that the agency may devote its
attentions to its service obligation^.^" Either proposal might
free the INS from attempting the near impossible task of bal-

360. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11, 121-23 (discussing anti-immigrant legislation).
361. See supra text accompanying notes 346-47.
362. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency
Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWAL. REV. 1297 (1986);
Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN
DIEGOL. REV. 1 (1980); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31
UCLA L. REV. 1141 (1984); see also Johnson, supra note 160, at 443-54 (discussing
possible reforms to the structure of asylum adjudication).
363. See Gene McNary, Testimony Before the Congress of the United States
House of Representatives, Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agricultural
1993) (unpubSubcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations 7-8 (Mar:30,
lished manuscript on fde with the author) [hereinafter McNary Testimony] (stating
that Justice Department's enforcement nature was inconsistent with INS service
function and emphasizing lack of Attorney General's knowledge of immigration
law-"Most Attorneys General not only don't know anything about immigration,
they don't have the slightest interest."); see also H.R. REP NO. 216, supra note 262,
a t 27 (noting that former Commissioner McNary advocated that INS should report
directly to the President as a Cabinet level position or a n independent agency).
364. See Leone1 J. Castillo, Summary of Testimony to the Information, Justice,
Transportation, and Agricultural Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations 8-9 (Mar. 30, 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 216, supra note 262, at 23, 26 (mentioning that former Commissioner Castillo observed that the Border Patrol traditionally provided leadership to
INS, which gave the INS a non-service-oriented background and that, consequently,
the INS is "torn in several directions") (footnote omitted).
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ancing the agency's wildly divergent service and enforcement
To facilitate favorable change a t the proper time, efforts
might wisely be directed a t mobilizing the immigrant community in creative fashions to allow their voice to be heard. Such
efforts may be the only long-run alternative likely to facilitate
meaningful change in the immigration bureaucracy. To do so,
lawyers may need to reconceptualize their function as agents of
change. Imaginative approaches to the practice of law may
assist attorneys attempting to empower marginalized peop l e ~ . ~ ~ ~
Novel efforts a t community organization and mobilization
of noncitizens may educate the public about the true state of
affairs, which is a prerequisite to positive change.367The images we collectively share about immigrants affect how people
(including their attorney^):^ lawmakers, and policymakers
view immigrants and decide how they should be treated.369
365. See supra text accompanying notes 268-69.
366. See, e.g., GERALDP. L ~ P E ZREBELLIOUS
LAWYERING:
ONE CHICANO'SVI,
SION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE 11 (1992) (advocating active collaboration
between lawyer and minority client in "lawyering against subordination" as opposed
to the "regnant" idea of the lawyer for the subordinated); White, supra note 53, a t
546-63 (discussing use of "speak outs" among disability recipients to allow them to
describe their plight, and use of theater group of homeless, to assist in mobilizing
ES NUESTRA!
to bring change); see also Richard F. Klawiter, Comment, iLA RERRA
The Campesino Struggle in El Salvador and a Vision of Community-Based Lawyering, 42 STAN.L. REV. 1625, 1680-89 (1990) (arguing that community-based strategies rather than litigation should be utilized to attack deeper causes of subordination).
367. See Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness
Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1764 (1990) (arguing that we should listen "long
and hard to less privileged voices" to rectifjr "historical devoicing"); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Gendered Checks and Balances: Understanding the Legacy of White Patriarchy in an American Indian Cultural Context, 24 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1990)
("[The] common tendency 'to treat one's own perspective as true, rather than as
one of many possible points of view,' is particularly complicated by the continuing
and pervasive legacy of four centuries of white patriarchy in our society.") (footnote
omitted); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to
Minimum Entitlements, 44 MERCERL. REV. 525, 528-29 (1993) (noting that "[tlhe
poor are invisible to most Americans" and that war on poverty in 1960s followed
growing public awareness of poverty).
368. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning
Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) (arguing that poverty lawyers should listen to the stories of their clients).
369. See Delgado, supra note 14, a t 2413 (arguing that "[s]tories, parables,
chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying m i n d s e t t h e bundle
of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes place"); Gerald P. L6pez, Lay
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984) (analyzing how "stock stories" affect percep-
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One well-known immigration example of how stories affect
legislative judgments involves the INA's juhcial review provisions. In response to the much-discussed delay and manipulation of the deportation process by Carlos Marcello, a reputed
racketeer:?' Congress significantly narrowed the review provisions. The truth of the matter was that "[tlhe magnitude of
the delay in [Marcello's] case was hardly typical, and in any
event the bulk of that delay resulted from other countries'
refusals to receive him rather than from defects in the review
system.'"71 Unless appropriate measures are taken, stories of
a radical sheik, Chinese being smuggled by organized crime
into the country, and the like will animate legislative and regulatory change to the detriment of noncitizen~.~?~
These stories
may distort reality.373
Many citizens are unaware of how the ordinary noncitizen
lives in this country, many of whom are not nearly as lucky as
Victor and Lillian Cordero temporarily were. A great number of
undocumented persons, for example, live difficult lives on the
economic, as well as political, margins. But how many people
tion and interpretation of everyday world and analysis of problems as well as solutions); see also David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87
M I C H . L. REV. 2152, 2155-56 (1989) (claiming that law silences "the voices of racial
minorities, of women, of homosexuals, of the poor"); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to
the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323
(1987) (arguing that Critical Legal Studies movement should look to voices of subordinated peoples in developing theory); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of
Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White
Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219 (analyzing how myths about
Indians affected development of federal Indian law). This view is not limited to
those deeply critical of the status quo. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Rule lob-5
L. REV. S7, S8-11 (1993) (discussing psyas an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM
chological literature and analyzing how "stories about investing" affected development of securities law).
370. See H.R. REP. NO. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, 11 (1961); see also
ALEINIKOFF& MARTIN, supra note 15, a t 859-61 (discussing Marcello story's influence on congressional revision of judicial review provisions); supra text accompanying notes 254-56 (discussing congressional amendment of the INA's judicial review
provisions).
371. LEGOMSKY,
supra note 235, at 698.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11, 121-23.
373. See Sue Fishkoff, More Illegal Israelis in New York than Chinese, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 5, 1993 (reporting results of study by the State of New York
concluding that more undocumented Israelis lived in New York than undocumented
Chinese); Deborah Sontag, Study Sees Illegal Aliens in New Light, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 1993, at B1 (reporting that same study showed that the three largest
groups of undocumented persons in New York were from Ecuador, Italy, and Poland, contrary to popular perceptions that Chinese and Central Americans were the
most numerous).
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know of the everyday difficulties facing undocumented persons
like Maria Elena, a housekeeper living in San Francisco's Mission
What about the travails of undocumented
families-men, women, and children-who pick the crops that
feed the nation?375What about the lives of undocumented
workers who work behind the scenes in many of our favorite
restaurants376 or in urban sweatshops?377How about the
success stories of undocumented noncitizens, such as the high
school valedictorian who earned a scholarship to the University
of Chicago and turned himself in to the INS?378Why is it that
so much is said about "asylum abuse"37gwith so little mention made of the details of the political persecution feared by
asylum-seekers, such as the Haitians380 and others?381
374. See Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN.L.
REV. 1 (1989) (recounting story of Maria Elena); see also Kate Taylor, Bleak Life
for Illegals in Marin, S.F. CHRON.,Nov. 1, 1993, at A1 (describing difficult lives of
undocumented population in Marin County, California); Suzanne Espinosa, Hard
Times in Nation of Opportunity, S.F. CHRON.,June 22, 1993, a t A1 (describing
conditions of undocumented families living in garages and overcrowded apartments).
375. See generally CLETUSE. DANIEL,BITER HARVEST: A HISTORYOF CALIFORNIA FARMWORKERS,1870-1941 (1981) (analyzing the historical political
powerlessness of farmworkers in California); PHILIP L. MARTIN,HARVESTOF CONFU(1985) (study of migrant farm-workSION: MIGRANTWORKERS IN U.S. AGRICULTURE
ers in the United States). Most recently, increasing numbers of indigenous people
from southern Mexico, Mixtecs, have joined the farm labor force in California. See
generally CAROLZABIN ET AL., MIXTEC MIGRANTSIN CALIFORNIA
AGRICULTURE:
A
NEW CYCLEOF POVERTY(1993). Undocumented Mexican farm labor in California,
for example, includes a variety of different types of people, including those who
commute daily to the United States, single males who will work for almost any
rate so long as they are able to work many hours, families that migrate seasonalL. GONZALES,
JR., MEXICANAND MEXICANAMERICAN
ly, and others. See JUAN
FARMWORKERS:RIE CALIFORNIA
AGRICULTURAL
INDUSTRY
35-47 (1985).
376. See Pamela Burdman, Huge Boom in Human Smuggling-Inside Story of
Flight fiom China, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27, 1993, a t A1 (describing operations that
charge thousands of dollars to smuggle Chinese into United States and force them
to work long hours in restaurants and other jobs to repay debt); see also Vicki
Torres, 2 Men Tell of Torture a t Hands of Smugglers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, a t
B1 (reporting torture of Chinese immigrants held for ransom by smugglers).
377. See, e.g., Mark Thompson, Threadbare Justice, CAL. LAW., May 1990, a t
28 (discussing "lawless" exploitation of workers, many undocumented, in Los Angeles garment industry); see also JUDITH
BENTLEY,AMERICANIMMIGRATION
TODAY
154 (1981) (discussing Labor Department discovery of exploitation of undocumented
labor in garment, construction, hotel, and restaurants in large cities). See generally
SASHAG. LEWIS, SLAVETRADETODAY:AMERICAN
EXPLOITATION
OF ILLEGAL
ALIENS
(1979).
378. See Valedictorian Given Scholarship Admits Illegal Immigrant Status, CHI.
TRIB., July 4, 1993, at 4.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 121-29.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 130-59.
381. A compelling example is the story of one Cambodian refugee told in his
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Noncitizens, particularly the undocumented, in a sense are
"closeted" and, because "information about the[ir] lives . . . may
be unavailable . . . . [,I storytelling may be particularly useful
as a way of filling in informational gaps."382
The facts about the undocumented are shielded from public
view because of their political insularity as well as the relative
isolation i n which they live. They avoid visibility because discovery by the INS may result in deportation. A high premium
is placed on secrecy, privacy and maintaining a low profile.
Their world, unbeknownst to many, in numerous ways is very
different from that of the average citizen. Daily fear and uncertainty, combined with difficult working conditions, mark their
lives. Language barriers may contribute to the isolation. The
undocumented community fears-and legitimately so-retaliation in the form of deportation by authorities for any political
activity. That fear, which is not inconsequential, must be overcome if the popular images of the undocumented are to be
transformed.
Besides the hardships of difficult employment conditions
and the omnipresent threat of deportation, noncitizens often
are the most vulnerable to crime. At the same time, they fear
approaching the authorities for protection.383 Undocumented
own words:
When the Vietnamese came to Cambodia, I wound up running all the
tin-can factories. The Vietnamese said I did a good job, and they were
going to give me a big reward. They were going to send me to the Soviet
Union.
So I ran to Thailand. The communists catched me and put me in a
camp. In midnight, I say I go to the bathroom. I run away. They catched
me again. They line us up along the road and walk behind and chop,
chop, chop . . . chop our heads off. But they make u s dig our graves
first. Three, four, five miles, nothing but blood.
The soldiers hit me on the head with a machete. I fell. I pretend I
was dead. I hide in the reeds besides a boat in a canal. I put mud and
ash and urine on my wound. I cross through the jungle a t night into
Thailand. Church group bring me here. I haven't seen my family since
1979. But now I just heard they are alive. My mom and dad were killed
by the Khmer Rouge.
At night, when I dream, I worry and wake up. I wony about my
family and my country.
RICHARDS. STREET,ORGANIZINGFOR OUR L m S : NEW VOICESFROM RURAL COMMUNITIES 41 (1992).
382. Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 829 11.119 (linking concept of "closeting" to lesbians and gays) (citing Fajer, supra note 14, a t 512-22 and Eskridge,
Critique, supra note 228, a t 385-86).
383. See, e.g., H.R.REP. NO. 682(I), supra note 204, at 49, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5653 (explaining need for IRCA's amnesty program and stating that,
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women, for example, are reluctant to report rape, physical and
verbal abuse, and violation of the minimum wage laws.384
Noncitizens generally are subject to more dangerous working
conditions and the like.385While a few citizens highlight the
negatives about "illegal aliens," the noncitizen community remains silent in the ongoing public dialogue. The Vocal
Minority's stories of the undocumented are the most widely circulated. A fuller, truer picture of the undocumented reality
must be drawn.
By happenstance, I caught a glimpse a number of years
ago of the lives of a few undocumented Mexicans in the restaurant business. (The story may or may not be representative,
but I tend to think that it is.) In high school, I came to know
Jose Serrano, an undocumented Mexican, who supervised my
work in a restaurant in southern California. Serrano, who
supported a family in Mexico, lived with a number of other
men in a small apartment in a complex populated primarily by
the undocumented. Talking with them convinced me that these
men deeply feared "La Migra," which periodically raided and
emptied the apartment building. Deported to Mexico on several
occasions, Serrano returned. Despite the interruptions in his
employment, he was, in the eyes of the employer, the most
reliable and trusted employee.386 I learned much from
although many undocumented persons "have become a part of their communities"
and "have contributed to the United States in myriad ways," they "live in fear,
afraid to seek help when their rights are violated, when they are victimized by
criminals, employers or landlords or when they become ill"); Michelle J. Anderson,
Note, A License to Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants,
102 YALE L.J. 1401, 1401-02, 1420-22 (1993) (discussing spousal abuse of immigrant women and their fear of reporting it to authorities); McNary Testimony,
supra note 363, at 5 (stating that the "illegal alien" population "live[s] in constant
fear of being detected and deported. They work at the mercy of often un~crupulous
employers, they are deprived of the protection of our laws-afraid to report the
crimes that are routinely committed against them.").
384. See Martha F. Davis, Domestic Workers: Out of the Shadows, HUMAN
RTS., Spring 1993, at 14, 15, 28 (telling stories of undocumented women abused in
domestic employment).
385. See Peter T. Kilborn, For Hispanic Immigrants, a Higher Job-Injury Risk,
N.Y.TIMES,Feb. 18, 1992, at Al. There is a burgeoning literature in the area of
the disparate impact of pollution on minority communities generally. See, e.g., Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor and Poisoned: Minority Grassroots
Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y69
(1991); Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from the Field,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1991 (1992); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice? The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.787
(1993); Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 KAN. L. REV.271 (1992).
386. I recall that the employer trusted only Serrano with the secret recipe for
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Serrano. He earned my deepest respect for his devotion to job
and family. My experience with other undocumented Mexicans
in that and other jobs was little different.
I have suggested that revision of the images of the undocumented in particular and noncitizens generally is a precursor
to change. The reason for this is simple. As an intellectual
matter, it is far easier to blame the faceless "illegal alien," who
we do not know and rarely see, for society's woes and to label
"them" as criminals stealing American jobs.387 At its most
basic level, this is nothing other than a rationalization. "Illegal
aliens7'-largely non-white, often non-English speaking, and
apparently willing to do the work that many citizens will
not-in fact are different from the in-group. Despite the differences, it is more difficult to blame the nation's woes on persons
known to be hardworking and contributing members of society,
and who make the best of difficult lives. Put differently, if "we"
believe that "they" are "good" people, it is difficult to blame
"them" for all that is wrong. In contrast, if "we" believe that
"they" are "bad," it becomes easier to do
Ignorance of the basic facts makes it simple to believe that
crime is perpetrated by "criminal aliens" or that "illegal aliens"
are exhausting our social services dollars. Changing the images
of the immigrant in the minds of citizens and their elected
representatives would diminish the possibility that anti-immigrant hysteria would shape immigration laws and policies.
Perhaps more importantly, if the imagery were revised, the
powers that be might be more amenable to push for the muchneeded changes in the immigration bureaucracy.
This is not to suggest that the relevant information about
noncitizens currently is unavailable. Many works, literary as
well a s legal, tell the stories of noncitizens in detaL3" They

the restaurant's most popular dish.
387. This is suggested by psychology's cognitive dissonance theory, which is
based on the idea that individuals have a need for consistency in their thoughts
A THEORY
OF COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE
(1957); see
and beliefs. See LEON FESTINGER,
also Delgado, supra note 14, at 2413-14 ("Those in power sleep well at nightctheir
conduct does not seem to them like oppression."); Charles R. Lawrence 111, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.L.
REV.317, 328-44 (1987) (discussing psychological literature on racism).
388. See genemlly Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword:
Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10 (1987) (analyzing importance of perceived differences between groups in constitutional adjudication).
389. A sampling that illuminates the lives of undocumented Mexicans includes
BARRIO,THE PLUM PICKERS(1969) (novel chronicling lives of migrant
RAYMOND
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paint a picture very different from the one in the minds of
many. Perhaps what is missing is a triggering event that
brings the issue to the forefront in a sympathetic way. For
example, the nation's ignorance of the plight of farmworkers
was briefly interrupted by Edward R. Murrow's television special in the 19608, Harvest of Shame, which brought the issue to
Chance, it seems, plays a role in social
national attenti~n.~"
change.
There are some examples of organizations attempting t o
change the shared beliefs about their clientele. The United
Farmworkers Union (UFW) led by the late Cesar Chavez enjoyed some early success in bringing to light the lives of migrant farm worker^.^^' Early in the UFW's history, Chavez encapsulated his strategy as follows:
I have always believed that, in order for any movement to be
lasting, it must be built on the people. They must be the ones
involved in forming it, and they must be the ones that ultimately control it. I t is harder that way, but the benefits are
more meaningful and lasting when won in this fashion. I t is
necessary to build a power base. Money by itself does not get
the job done. This is why poverty programs have so much
difficulty. Although many nice things are said and many
wheels are spinning, very little real social change takes place.

Mexicans picking prunes under horrible conditions in California); TED CONOVER,
THROUGH
THE SECRETWORLDOF AMERICA'S
ILLEGAL
ALIENS
COYOTES:A JOURNEY
(1987) (account of Mexican undocumented workers in United States by author who
THE TARNISHED
DOOR:
lived in that community for over a year); JOHNCREWDSON,
(1983) (describing
THE NEW IMMIGRANTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA
travels in United States and interactions with immigrants); JOKN
DAVIDSON,
THE
LONGROADNORTH(1979) (same); EUGENENELSON,PABLOCRUZAND THE AMERICAN DREAM(1975) (same); R A M ~"TIANGuIs"
N
PI~REZ,
DIARYOF AN UNDOCUMENTED
supra note 60 (study of
IMMIGRANT
(1989) (Dick J. Reavis trans., 1991); SAMORA,
migrant Mexicans working in agriculture).
390. Harvest of Shame (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 30, 1960), cited in
Jeanne M . Glader, Note, A Harvest of Shame: The Imposition of Independent Contractor Status on Migmnt Farmworkers and Its Ramifications for Migrant Children,
42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1455, 1460-61 (1991) (noting how Murrow's "documentary on the
deplorable conditions of migrant labor in American agriculture[] drew national
attention to the plight of the migrant farmworker in the United States" and
"helped garner popular support for" legislative action). The plight of farmworkers
unfortunately has changed little in the intervening 30 years. After 30 Years,
America's Continuing Harvest of Shame: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on
Aging, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
391. See genemlly MARK DAY, FORTYACRES: CESARCHAVEZAND THE FARM
WORKERS
(1971) (describing and analyzing UFVCPs early history); JACQUES
E. LEVY,
CESARCHAVEZ:AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF LA CAUSA(1975) (oral history of creation of
U l V and Chavez's role in it).
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To try to change conditions without power is like trying to
move a car without gasoline. If the workers are going to do
anything, they need their own power. They need to involve
themselves in meaningful ways. Once they achieve a victory,
they can make use of their power to negotiate and change
things for the better.392

By cooperation with groups such as California Rural Legal
Assistance, which combines law reform litigation, community
organizing, and lobbying,393the UFW tried to "humanize" the
migrants in the fields for many citizens.394
392. Cesar Chavez, Introduction to FORTYACRES,supra note 391, at 9-10. In a
similar vein, Timothy Wexler observed with respect to the poor that:
Poverty will not be stopped by people who are not poor. If poverty is
stopped, it will be stopped by poor people. And poor people can stop poverty only if they work at it together. The lawyer who wants to serve poor
people must put his skills to the task of helping poor people organize
themselves. This is not the traditional use of a lawyer's skills; in many
ways it violates some of the basic tenets of the profession. Nevertheless, a
realistic analysis of the structure of poverty, and a fair assessment of the
legal need of the poor and the legal talent available to meet them, lead a
lawyer to this role.
Wexler, supra note 54, at 1053; see Anthony V. AKeri, The Antinomies of Poverty
Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U.REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
659 (1987-88) (arguing that poverty lawyers should focus on client empowerment
through development of class consciousness and political organization rather than
direct service and reform litigation).
Some claim that the UFW erroneously abandoned organizational activities,
which reduced its later effectiveness. See Beatriz J. Hernandez, Cesar's Ghost, CAL.
LAW.REV. 48 (1993) (discussing indigenous Mexican farmworkers' organizing efforts
and disenchantment with UFW); see also Refugio I. Rochin, Farmworkers: Strategies
for Empowerment, Paper presented at the National Council of La Raza 1993 Silver
Anniversary Conference in Detroit, Michigan (July 21, 1993) (on file with the author) (discussing current conditions in which farmworkers live and advocating strategies for group empowerment).
& LANCELIEBMAN,
THE SOCIALRESPONSIBILITIES
393. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN
O F LAWYERS
22-48 (1988) (case study of California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA)
describing its organization). CRLA has been involved in some novel organizing
activities of the rural poor, including many undocumented persons, attempting to
improve their lives. See STREET,supra note 381 (recounting organizing efforts in
rural communities). For an inside account of how CRLA successfully survived attacks by federal, state, and local governments, see Michael B e ~ e t t& Cruz
Reynoso, California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA): Survival of a Poverty Law
Practice, 1 CHICANOL. REV. 1 (1972).
394. Community-based strategies are not unheard of in the immigration realm.
Community organizations have, at times, worked successfully with the INS to implement certain programs. See Hing, supra note 238, at 444-59 (evaluating involvement of community organizations in implementing IRCA legalization program); see
also Marla Cone, Oppressed Take a Stand in Drywallem' Strike, LA. TIMES, Sept.
7, 1992, at A1 (describing strike by drywallers, many of whom were undocumented).
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This is not to suggest that the task will be easy; it most
definitely will not be. With respect t o noncitizens, it will be
them, but also to neutralize
necessary not only t o "h~rnanize'~
their demonization by the Vocal Minority. Mobilization will be
even more difficult when policies, such as the Haitian repatriation program or the expedited asylum procedures applied t o
Central Americans in the 1980s,3~~
are directed only toward
one segment of the noncitizen population. As with minority
groups of citizens:% noncitizens are not monolithic. Subgroups exist with different, sometimes conflicting, demands. As
with other marginalized groups, however, the common interests
of noncitizens frequently will outweigh their differences, particularly with respect to curbing INS abuses.
Filling the void through storytelling and image modification is simply the beginning. It is not simply the marginalization of noncitizens, particularly the undocumented, that
requires their stories to be told.397Nor should we fall into the
trap, as exemplified by President Reagan's colorful parables, of
manipulating questionable, if not downright fictitious, stories
to promote pre-selected policy preference^.^^' Instead, strategies for change must employ and circulate the stories of
noncitizens to assist in persuading policymakers, lawmakers,
and the electorate of the need for positive reforms.3ggThis is
only the first step. Innumerable reasonable changes to the
immigration law and bureaucracy have been advanced in recent years. More often than not, they have fallen on deaf ears.
The INS, though frequently attacked, continues business as
usual. So does the EOIR. The inherent logic of reform proposals
apparently has little impact. Resort to the stories of the people
affected may be the last hope of spurring political action.

395. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
OF AN AFFIRMATIVE
AC396. See generally STEPHENL. CARTER,REFLECTIONS
TION BABY (1991) (discussing division in African-American community on civil
rights issues); Randall L. K e ~ e d y Racial
,
Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 WV.
L. REV. 1745, 1778-87 (1989) (same).
397. See Anthony D. Taibi, Race Consciousness, Communitarianism, and Banking Regulation, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1106-07 n.13.
398. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 839 n.159.
399. See Eskridge, Critique, supra note 228, a t 385-86 (advocating narrative to
"redifjr stereotypical misconceptions . . and . . . educate society" and "creat[e]
conditions of empathy and emotional ~ 0 ~ e d i o n " ) .

.
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D. A Recapitulation
Suffrage would be a n invaluable (though highly improbable) tool to the noncitizen community, even if only on the state
or local level. As a n alternative, incremental steps must be
taken to improve the political power of immigrants. More importantly, innovative strategies for change must be pursued to
empower noncitizens and spur them to act politically.
Whatever the method, the untold stories of the noncitizen
community, as well as disclosure of its very existence in cities
across the nation, must be told. If not, the only stories that we
will hear are those of the Vocal Minority who claim that "illegal aliens" are taking "American" jobs, sapping the limited
financial resources of state and local governments, and preying
upon the citizenry. I t will be those images that fuel retrograde
changes i n immigration laws and policy.

Immigration may well become the civil rights issue of the
twenty-first century in the United state^.^" If that is so, one
might wonder where this Article leaves us with respect to the
political power of noncitizens and the opportunities for social
change. The potential for future action is shaped by several
forces.
New immigrants often are not popular among certain segments in the United States. This historically has been the case
for previous "new" immigrants. The lack of popularity is more
likely to remain with this group of new immigrants of today,
however, because many are people of color who are physically
unable to assimilate entirely into a white-dominated society.
The persistence of nativism, with its undisputed influence on
the political process, appears likely in the near future. This is
not to suggest that a majority of the electorate accepts restrictionist views. Rather, it may well be that a well-organized
minority that feels deeply about halting immigration has become increasingly involved in the political process and may
successfully play (hopefully only for a time) on the fears of a
nation frantically searching for answers.

400. See Stephen H . Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31

COLUM.J . TRANS. L. 319, 320 (1993) ("predict[ing] that, in the United States, immigration policy will become the civil rights issue of the 21st century").
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Whether or not sanctioned by the law, undocumented
noncitizens long have been part of the society. Lawful permanent residents are in this nation entirely consistent with its
laws. Both noncitizen groups contribute economically and otherwise to the well-being of the nation. The question is how they
will be treated under the immigration laws and by the agencies
enforcing those laws. Barred from the voting booth, noncitizens
cannot check the abuses of the immigration bureaucracy. This
helps explain the continued and consistent criticism of INS
policies and practices. Congress, without a strong noncitizen
constituency and pressured by a restrictionist lobby representing a minority of voters, frequently may have little incentive to
protect the noncitizen and may gain much politically by punishing them. For similar reasons, it lacks the motive to intervene
to override the anti-immigrant decisions of the Supreme Court,
even when inconsistent with the desires of the majority. Congress instead often has every reason to appease a restrictionist
minority by acting in a n anti-immigrant manner, knowing that
the Vocal Minority cares about the issue while aware that the
Silent Majority and noncitizens in all likelihood will remain
silent.
Even if immune from sympathy to human devastation, it
should be intellectually troubling that the checks-and-balances
system that the framers sought to create through the elaborate
Constitutional architecture401 fails to monitor the conduct of
the immigration bureaucracy and judicial interpretation of the
immigration laws. Continued INS abuses alone demonstrate
the weakness of the dynamic in the immigration realm. The
lack of overrides in important substantive immigration areas is
more of the same.
What will ensure serious consideration of the numerous
rational reform proposals that have fallen on deaf ears?*02
Extending the franchise to noncitizens, or a t least to lawful
permanent residents, might improve matters by creating the
theoretical possibility of political accountability. Such a farreaching proposal, however, for a variety of reasons is highly
unlikely in the short term. Litigation has offered some benefits
to some noncitizens on some issues. However, despite sustained

401. See Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Un&r Article 111, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990).
402. See supra text accompanying notes 362-65 (noting proposals for reform of
agency structure).
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successful litigation, unlawful conduct continues unabated.
That alone suggests the need for deeper reform.403
Noncitizens, as other disempowered groups are doing, must
articulate, envision, and adopt innovative strategies for social
change. Political mobilization and organization that empowers
noncitizens offers the only meaningful opportunity for change.
Ingenious strategies have been developed for other subordinated groups and must be experimented with by noncitizens. The
obstacles t o the development of such strategies is formidable.
Noncitizens, particularly the undocumented, deeply fear governmental authority and the power that it wields, especially
the power to deport them to their native country if their presence in this nation comes to light. They expose themselves t o
great risks if they become visible and try t o wrestle control of
their lives from the powers that be. But more of the same-e.g.,
fear, abuse, helplessness, exploitation-will continue if strategic changes are not forthcoming.
The facts, the stories, and the truth about noncitizens will
hopefully come to light. Then, the electorate will know how
noncitizens live and will learn how the economy depends on
their continued exploitation. They will learn of the lives of the
exploited and the difficulty and sadness of their daily toils.
These are the stories that must gain common currency to wake
up a sleeping public that finds the subject of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Border Patrol, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review to be at most of vague interest. Until that is
changed, noncitizens, a significant part of the national community, will continue to be Los Oluidados, The Forgotten. Although this strategy for change may fail:*
and may be
403. This is not to suggest that attempts at incremental change should be
abandoned. At least with respect to asylum decisionmaking by the INS,such reASYLUM STUDY PROJECT,
form has wrought some improvement. See, e.g., NATIONAL
AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT
OF THE &XLUM PROCESS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
2 (1992) (concluding that there had been an overall improvement in INS asylum decisions as a result of initial implementation of Asylum
Officer program in July 1990, although noting some lingering problems). Some
changes might be simple in nature, such as institutionalizing avenues for input of
the groups most significantly affected by INS and EOIR decisions. See Schuck &
Wang, supra note 44, a t 178 (The patterns of impact litigation against the INS
also suggest a need for the agency to solicit outside advice from advocacy groups
before developing and implementing new programs."). Others are more fundamental. See Johnson, supra note 16 (suggesting that courts engage in "hard look" review of agency asylum decisions).
404. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in Ameri-
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doomed from the outset by its underlying optimism, if not naivete, we will never know unless we try.405

International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local
37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954)
INA 4 2 12(d)(7)
Provision :
Winner:
Government
Union and Noncitizen Members
Losers :
Overridden:
No
This case is included in Table 1 (supra page
Note:
1200).
2.

United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955)
INA 8 405(a)
Noncitizen
Government
Yes. Pub. L. No. 87-301, 3 17, 75 Stat. 649, 656
(1961). Reason Offered for Override: To "overcome interpretations placed on" § 405 by
Menasche and two lower court decisions
reaching similar conclusions (In re Naturalization of Wolff, 270 F.2d 422 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 928 (1960), and Medalion v. United
States, 279 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1960)) because
"such interpretations are contrary to the intent
of Congress clearly indicated in the" INA. H.R.
REP. NO. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2981-82.

Provision :
Winner:
Loser:
Overridden:

Ultimate
Winner:

Government

can Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.1258 (1992) (arguing that simply circulating stories of outgroups may
not affect consciousness of in-group or change the dominant social structure that
ensures hegemonic status quo).
405. See Anthony E. Cook, Bqond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive
Theology of Dr. Martin Luther Ring, Jr., 103 HAW. L. REV. 985, 993 (1990) ("Although theoretical deconstruction is important, the ultimate goal of critical theory
should be the reconstruction of community from the debris of theoretical
deconstruction . . . .").
406. The methodology used in compiling this Appendix is described supra note
242.
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3.

Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540 (1955)
Provision:
INA $3 318, 405(a), 405(b)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No

4.

Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955)
Provision:
INA $ 242(b)
Noncitizen
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Yes. Pub. L. No. 87-301, $ 5, 75 Stat. 649, 651Overridden :
53 (1961). Reason Ofered for Override: To halt
delays in deportation and exclusion by "judicial
actions being instituted by undesirable aliens
whose cases have no legal basis or merit, but
which are brought solely for the purpose" of
delay, particularly by "subversives, gangsters,
immoral [sic], or narcotics peddlers." H.R. REP.
No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2967. The override was
supported by the administration. See id. a t
2968-70.
Ultimate
Government
Winner:
In
Brownell v. Rubinstein, 346 US. 929 (1954)
Note:
(per curiam), a lower court conclusion to the
same effect as Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro was
by an equally divided Court.

5.

Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955)
Provision:
INA $3 241(a)(ll), 241(d), 242(b)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No

6.

United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956)
Provision:
INA $9 235(a), 340(a)
Winner:
Citizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No

7.

United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91 (1956)
Provision :
INA $ 340(a)
Winner:
Citizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
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Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956)
Provision:
INA $5 244(a)(5), 244(c)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
r

9.

Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956)
Provision :
INA 5 236(c)
Winner:
Noncitizen
Loser:
Government
Yes. Pub. L. No. 87-301, 8 5, 75 Stat. 649, 651Overridden:
53 (1961). Reason Offered for Override: To halt
delays in deportation and exclusion by "judicial
actions being instituted by undesirable aliens
whose cases have no legal basis or merit, but
which are brought solely for the purpose" of
delay, particularly by "subversives, gangsters,
immoral [sic], or narcotics peddlers." H.R. REP.
No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2967. The override was
supported by the administration. See id. a t
2968-70.
Ultimate
Government
Winner:

lo.

United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957)
Provision:
INA 5 242(d)
Winner:
Noncitizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden :
No

11. Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957)
INA $5 405(a), 241(a)(l), 241(a)(4), 241(d)
Provision :
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No

12. Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692 (1957)
INA $5 241(a)(ll), 241(d), 405(a)
Provision:
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
13. Dessalernos v. Savoretti, 356 U.S. 269 (1958) (per curiam)
Provision :
INA 3 244(a)
Winner:
Noncitizen
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Loser:
Overridden:

Government
No

14. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405 (1958)
Provision:
INA 5 252(c)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
15. Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670 (1958)
Provision:
INA § 340(a)
Winner:
Citizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
16. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958)
Provision:
INA 8 243(h)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
Note:
Provision amended. Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96212, 9 202(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107, extended section
243(h) to noncitizens in exclusion proceedings.
Other aspects of the Court's decision remain intact. Reason Offeredfor Amendment: To conform
domestic law with obligations under international law. See H. CONF. REP. NO. 781, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.AN. 160,
161. The report explaining the amendment does
not mention Leng May Ma.
17. Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193 (1958)
Provision :
INA $5 243(h), 237(a)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
Note:
Provision amended. Section 243(h) was amended
as described in the entry for Leng May Ma (No.
16, supra). The conference report explaining the
amendment does not mention Rogers.
18. Abel v. United
Provision:
Winner:
Loser:
Overridden:

States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960)
INA 5 242(a)
Government
Noncitizen
No
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19. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960)
Provision :
INA 5 340(a)
Winner:
Citizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
20. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961)
Provision :
INA 5 340(a)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Citizen
Overridden:
No
21. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962)
INA $5 360(b), 360(c)
Provision :
Winner:
Citizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
22. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)
Provision:
INA 3 349(a)(10)
Winner:
Citizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
Note:
Provision repealed, Pub. L. No. 94-412,
501(a)(2), 90 Stat. 1255, 1258 (1976). Reason
for Repeal: The Court found that the provision
was unconstitutional.
23. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963)
Provision :
INA 5 101(a)(13)
Winner:
Noncitizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
Congress overrode the lower court decision in
Note:
this case dealing with the exclusion of a gay
man, an issue that was not addressed by the
Supreme Court. See supra note 204.
24. Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469 (1963)
Provision:
INA 3 241(a)(6)(C)
Winner:
Noncitizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
25. Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963)
Provision:
INA 3 106(a)
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Winner:
Loser:
Overridden:
Note:

Noncitizen
Government
No
In a somewhat similar case, the Court in a oneparagraph per curiam opinion relied on the fact
that the United States and the noncitizen both
requested reversal and reversed the court of
appeals' conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to
review denial of a motion to reopen deportation
proceedings. See Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S.
18 (1964) (per curiam), rev& 308 F.2d 347 (9th
Cir. 1962) (per curiam). Because of the extraordinary circumstances, Giova was not included as
a separate entry.

Costello v. INS,376 U.S. 120 (1964)
Provision :
INA $§ 241(a)(4), 340(a)
Winner:
Noncitizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
Mrvica v. Esperdy, 376 U.S. 560 (1964)
Provision:
INA 9 249
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964)
Provision :
INA $ 352(a)(1)
Winner:
Citizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
Provision repealed, Pub. L. No. 95-432, 9 2, 92
Note:
Stat. 1046 (1978). Reason for Repeal: The Court
found that the provision was unconstitutional.
See H.R. REP. NO. 1493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1978).
INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966)
Provision :
INA fj 241(f)
Winner:
Noncitizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
Yes. Pub. L. No. 97-116, fj 8, 95 Stat. 1611, 1616
(1981)-. Reason Offered for Override: To clarify
inconsistent interpretations of 9 241(f); the acting INS Commissioner and the Department of
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Justice supported the override. See H.R. REP.
No. 264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2577,2594.

Ultimate
Winner:
Note:

Government
Section 241(f) eventually was repealed and recodified as amended. See Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, $ 602, 104 Stat. 4778,
5079 (1990) (codified a t 8 U.S.C. $ 1251(a)(l)(H)
(Supp. 1992)).

30. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966)
INA $9 106(a)(4),242(b)(4)
Provision :
Winner:
Noncitizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
31. United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967)
Provision:
INA 5 2 15(b)
Winner:
Citizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
The Court, in a companion case, Travis v. UnitNote;
ed States, 385 U.S. 491 (1967), issued a decision
reversing a lower court decision based on its reasoning in Laub.
32. Berenyi v. District Director, 385 U.S. 630 (1967)
INA $5 101(f), 316(a)
Provision :
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
33. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967)
INA $ 2 12(a)(4)
Provision :
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
Yes. Pub. L. 101-649, $ 601, 104 Stat. 4978,
5067 (1990). Reason m e r e d for Override: The
exclusion ground was "out of step with current
notions of privacy and personal dignity" and "inconsistent with contemporary psychiatric theories." See H.R. REP. NO. 72, lOlst Cong., 2d
Sess. 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6710, 6736.
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Ultimate
Winner:

Noncitizens

34. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968)
Provision :
INA 9 106(a)

Winner:
Loser:
Overridden:
Note:

Government
Noncitizen
No
In the Supreme Court, the INS sided with the
noncitizen on the jurisdiction question. See 392
U.S. a t 210. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
held that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction
to hear the noncitizen's petition for review and
flirrned dismissal of the petition for review. The
noncitizen thus did not prevail.

35. INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62 (1969)
Provision :
INA 99 252(b), 242(b)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
36. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971)
Provision :
INA 6 301(b)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Citizen
Overridden:
No
Note:
Provision amended. Although the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the provision, Congress
amended the statute. See Pub. L. No. 92-584, 86
Stat. 1289 (1972). Reason Offered for Amendment: The provision placed hardships on citizens
living abroad. See H.R. REP. NO. 1386, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4826, 4827. The report acknowledged that Congress had upheld the constitutionality of the provision. Congress repealed
9 301(b) in 1978. See Pub. L. No. 95-432, 9 1,92
Stat. 1046 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 1493, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978) (noting inequity of
6 301(b)).
37. Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971)
Provision:
INA 5 203(a)(7)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
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Overridden:
Note:

No
.Provision repealed. Ideological considerations for
refugee status were removed by the Refugee Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, Ij 203(c)(3),94 Stat. 102, 107
(1980). Reason Offered for Repeal: To bring United States into compliance with international
law. See S. REP. NO. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144.

38. Astrup v. INS, 402 U.S. 509 (1971)
Provision :
INA $ 315
Winner:
Noncitizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
39. United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971)
Provision:
INA Ij§ 402(a), 101(a)(13)
Winner:
Noncitizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
Without mention of the decision in the legislaNote:
tive history (including committee hearings), the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
amended the statutory provision a t issue in
Campos-Serrano to offer greater specificity about
the type of fraudulent documents that may serve
as the basis of criminal penalties. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-603, 103, 100 Stat. 3359, 3380 (1986). Because Congress does not appear to have consciously responded to the Supreme Court's decision, i t is not classified as an override. See supra
note 243 (defining override).
40. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)
Provision:
INA Ij$ 212(a)(28), 212(d)
Winners:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
Provision amended. Although the Court upheld
Note:
the constitutionality of the provision, Congress
amended the statute. See Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. 101-649 601, 602, 104 Stat.
4978, 5076 (1990). Reason Offered for Amendment: To bar exclusion based merely on the
speech or beliefs of noncitizens. See H. CONF.
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REP. NO. 955, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 128-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 6793-96.
41. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
Provision:
INA § 287(a)(3)
Winners:
Government and Noncitizens
Losers :
Labor Union
Overridden:
No
42. Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974)
Provision:
INA § 101(a)(27)(B)
Winner:
Noncitizen and Government
Loser:
Noncitizen and Government
Overridden:
No
The judgment below was affirmed in part, reNote:
versed in part.
43. Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975)
Provision :
INA 85 241(f), 241(a)(2)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Yes. Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 8, 95 Stat. 1611, 1616
Overridden:
(1981). Reason Offered for Override: To clarify
inconsistent interpretations of 241(f); the acting INS Commissioner and the Department of
Justice supported the override. See H.R. REP.
NO. 264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2577,2594.
Ultimate
Government
Winner:
Note:
Section 241(f) eventually was repealed and recodified a s amended. See Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,g 602, 104 Stat. 4778,
5079 (1990) (codified a t 8 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(l)(H)
(Supp. 1992)).
*

44. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)
Provision :
INA $9 287(a)(l), 287(a)(3)
Winner:
Citizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
Note:
Although the decision is opaque on this point, an
apparent citizen unlawfully attempted to bring
noncitizens into the country.
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45. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)
No specific provision. Court addressed the scope
Provision :
of INA for purposes of federal preemption
Winners:
Migrant Farmworkers, State Government
Losers:
Farm Labor Contractors, Noncitizens
Overridden:
No
Migrant farmworkers based a claim on a state
Note:
law barring employment of undocumented labor.
The Court found that the Immigration and Nationality Act did not preempt the state law.
State government was the indirect beneficiary
(because the decision offered greater power to
legislate in the immigration realm) and
noncitizens were indirect losers (because the
Court unheld a state law barring their employment). The precise holding of the decisions is no
longer good law because IRCA, which makes it
unlawful to employ undocumented persons,
expressly preempts state laws on the subject.
See INA 8 274A(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. 5 1324a(h)(2)
(1988). IRCA's legislative history apparently
does not mention De Canas.
46. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976) (per curiam)
Provision :
INA 8 245
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
47. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)
Provision:
INA $8 101(b)(l), 101(b)(2)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
Provision amended. Although the Court upheld
Note:
the constitutionality of the provision, Congress
amended the statute. See IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99603, 5 315(a), 100 Stat. 3359, 3439 (1986). Reason Offered for Amendment: To afford equal
status to natural fathers as well as mothers of
illegitimate children in obtaining immigration
benefits. See H.R. REP. NO. 682(1), 99th Cong.,
2d Sess., 124, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5728 (statement of administration's position).
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48. Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748 (1978)
Provision :
INA 5 106(a)(5)(B)
Person Claiming to Be Citizen
Winner:
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
The INS claimed that Agosto was a noncitizen.
Note:
For purposes of Table 2, supra page 1202, this
case was classified as one between a citizen and
the government.
49. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980)
Provision :
INA $8 349(a)(2), 349(c)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Citizen
Overridden:
No
The government obtained reversal on the issue
Note:
of the proper burden of proof in establishing loss
of citizenship but the Court held for the citizen
on an element necessary to lose citizenship. By
successfully obtaining reversal and remand of an
adverse court of appeals decision, the government was the primary beneficiary.
50. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981)
Provision :
INA 5 340(a)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Citizen
Overridden:
No

51. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S.139 (1981) (per curiam)
Provision :
INA 5 244(a)(l)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
Note:
The decision in part focused on the discretion of
Attorney General under the regulation pertaining to a motion to reopen deportation proceedings so that the noncitizen could apply for relief
under INA.

52. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1(1982)
Provision :
INA 9 lOl(a)(15)(g)(iv),Scope of INA for Purposes of Federal Preemption
Winner:
Noncitizens
Loser:
State University
Overridden:
No
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The Court earlier decided related issues in
Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978). To avoid
overcounting, Elkins is not included as a separate decision interpreting or applying the INA.

53. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)
Provision :
INA $5 235(a), 235(b)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
Note:
This decision posed a difficult classification
problem because the Court held that a lawful
permanent resident in exclusion proceedings
was entitled to due process, an important gain
for certain noncitizens as a group. However, the
Court reversed the court of appeals holding in
favor of the noncitizen that the INS lacked the
authority to proceed in exclusion, rather than
deportation, proceedings. Consequently, although the individual noncitizen party to the
case lost, noncitizens as a group to some extent
gained.
54. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
Provision:
INA $ 244(c)(2)
Winners:
Noncitizen and executive branch
Loser:
Congress
Overridden:
No
Note:
Provision repealed. See Pub. L. No. 100-525,
§ 2(q)(l), 102 Stat. 2609, 2613 (1988). Reason for
Repeal: The Court found that the provision was
unconstitutional.
55. INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984)
Provision:
INA $244(a)(l)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Yes. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub.
Overridden:
L. No. 99-603, $ 315(b), 100 Stat. 3359, 3439
(1986). Reason Offered for Override: To "relax"
interpretation of Phinpathya. See H.R. REP. NO.
682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 110, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5714.
Ultimate
Winner:
Noncitizen
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INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984)
Provision :
INA 9 243b)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985)
Provision :
INA $ 244(a)(l)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
The decision in part focused on the discretion of
Note:
the Attorney General under the regulation pertaining to a motion to reopen deportation proceedings so that the noncitizen could apply for
relief under INA.
Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)
Provision:
INA $ 212(d)(5)(A)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizens
Overridden:
No
INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85 (1986) (per curiam)
Provision:
INA $ 244(a)(l)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)
INA $§ 243(h), 208(a), 101(a)(42)(A)
Provision :
Winner:
Noncitizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
Senator Kennedy, a few days after the Supreme
Note:
Court decided the case, praised the decision on
the floor of the Senate as consistent with the
"intent of Congress" in enacting the Refugee Act
of 1980. See 133 CONG. REC. S3038 (daily ed.
Mar. 11, 1987).
INS v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987)
Provision:
INA § 276
Winner:
Noncitizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
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62. INS v. Abudu,
Provision :
Winner:
Loser:
Overridden:
Note:

485 U.S. 94 (1988)
INA $5 243(h), 1101(a)(42),208
Government
Noncitizen
No
The decision in part focused on the discretion of
the Attorney General under the regulation pertaining to a motion to reopen deportation proceedings so that the noncitizen could apply for
relief under INA.

63. Kungys v. INS, 485 U.S. 759 (1988)
Provision :
INA $9 340(a), 316(a), 101(f)(6)
Winner:
Citizen
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
64. INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988)
Provision:
INA 5 310
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen s
Overridden:
No
The case focused primarily on noncitizen entitleNote:
ment to relief under the Nationality Act of 1940.
In authorizing federal courts to order the Attorney General to accept new amnesty applications
under the Immigration Reform and Control Act,
Congress recognized that the lower courts had
spilt on whether the reasoning of Pangilinan,
which involved different statutory provisions,
barred the federal courts from doing so. See H.R.
REP. NO. 723(I) (1990), lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 50,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6730.
Without apparent mention of Pangilinan,
Congress amended the INA to allow Philippine
veterans who performed honorably in World War
I1 to become naturalized citizens, which the
Court's interpretation of prior law had denied
them. See Immigration Act of 1990, $ 407(b)(5)
(amending 8 U.S.C. $ 329).
65. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991)
Provision:
INA 9 210(e)
Winner:
Noncitizens
Loser:
Government
Overridden:
No
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66. INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 551
(1991)
Provision :
INA 8 242(a)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizens
Overridden:
No
The case in part focused on the validity of a
Note:
regulation promulgated under INA 8 242(a).
67. INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992)
Provision :
INA §§ 208(a), 243
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden:
No
The case in part focused on the discretion of the
Note:
Attorney General under the regulation pertaining to a motion to reopen deportation proceedings so that the noncitizen could apply for relief
under INA.
68. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992)
Provision:
INA 8 101(a)(42)
Winner:
Government
Loser:
Noncitizen
Overridden :
No
69. Reno v. Flores,
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